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This dissertation consists of three empirical studies using Dutch individual-level data that 
are related, in different ways, to the possible consequences of (labor)market imperfections. 
In addition to this substantive connection, the chapters also have in common that they 
relate to topics that received much public attention in the last decade. The first two studies 
deal with individual wage inequality and how this connects to the divergence of wages 
and performance amongst firms. The third study focuses on a subject that, if possible, 
may have received even more attention in the last decade: the bonuses of bankers and the 
introduction of a bonus cap. 
1.1 Income Inequality
Economic inequality was a relatively unpopular research subject between the 1950s and 
1980s, studying inequality levels is famously described as “watching the grass grow” 
(Aaron, 1978). This lack of attention had several related causes. In his pioneering work, 
Kuznets (1955) proposed an inverted U-shaped relation between economic growth and 
income inequality. According to this reasoning, income inequality increases in the early 
stages of economic development due to the emergence of new industries with high 
productivity levels and corresponding high wages, but as an increasing proportion of the 
population finds its way into these industries, inequality would eventually decline. Even 
if the level of income inequality is considered to be problematic, economic development 
would, therefore, automatically lead to a decline in inequality. 
Empirical observations confirmed this notion at the time. Although global income inequality 
was on the rise, this was mostly a between-country phenomenon. During this period, 
within-country income inequality levels in the United States and Europe were stable or 
even declining. In retrospect, it is claimed that the relative stability of income inequality was 
caused by the sharp decline in top income shares due to the Great Depression, World War 
II and increased government intervention, as opposed to the shift in sectoral composition 
predicted by Kuznets (e.g., Katz & Autor, 1999; Card & DiNardo, 2002; Piketty & Saez, 2014; 
Atkinson, 2016; Goda & Garcia, 2017).
It all started to change in the mid-1970s and especially the 1980s. While after the fall of 
communism and the subsequent increase in globalization the gap between the average 
income of countries started to shrink, within-country inequality was on the rise. Whether 
this has led to increased or decreased global income inequality remains unclear since 
the pattern follows a so called “elephant curve”1, and depends to a large extent on the 
1 The “elephant curve” refers to the shape of the curve when plotting the development of income 
11
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measures and data used (Alvaredo et al., 2018; UNDP, 2019). What is clear, however, is that 
almost all advanced, but also emerging, economies have witnessed an increase in income 
inequality in recent decades (e.g., Sala-i-Martin, 2006; Milanovic, 2012; Piketty & Saez, 
2014; Dabla-Norris et al., 2015; Goda & Garcia, 2017). 
These developments were accompanied by a rediscovery of inequality as a research area. 
The increase in global attention reached its peak for the general public by the publication of 
Piketty’s ‘Capital in the Twenty-First Century’ in 2014. However, this work focuses primarily 
on inequality as a consequence of wealth inequality, which results from the difference in 
the return to capital compared to the return to labor, and not on wage inequality. Although 
wealth inequality undeniably influences and is influenced by income inequality, the focus 
of this thesis is on labor market outcomes and, therefore, on wage inequality. 
There is no broad consensus about the overall impact of income inequality on economic 
growth. On the one hand, the conventional textbook approach would argue that 
differences in rewards provide the incentives for everyone in society to work hard, to be 
efficient, to save and invest, and to be innovative. Or to put it in other words: these are the 
incentives that reward ‘good’ productive behavior and punish ‘bad’ unproductive behavior. 
These incentives are generally regarded as one of the main sources of average income, 
but they can come at the cost of inequality since they generate differences in economic 
outcomes between the more- and less successful people in the economy. This famous 
trade-off between efficiency and equality, introduced by Okun in 1975, is also suggested 
to work the other way around. Any policy that seeks to reduce inequality can reduce 
the above-mentioned incentives for productive behavior and, therefore, decrease total 
production. However, this textbook argument is being challenged by an increasing number 
of economists, shifting the consensus towards a possible negative effect of inequality on 
economic growth (e.g., Persson & Tabellini, 1991; Furman & Stiglitz, 1998; Aghion et al., 
1999; Herzer & Vollmer, 2011; Halter et al., 2014; Ostry et al., 2014). 
Next to the still open debate about the relationship between inequality and economic 
growth, inequality is associated with a wide range of possible economic and non-economic 
(negative) outcomes. For example, income inequality seems to negatively affect health 
outcomes and mortality (e.g., Kaplan et al., 1996; Singh & Siahpush, 2006; Picket & 
Wilkinson, 2015), lower savings and investment (Alesina & Perotti, 1993), create more 
unequal education outcomes (Mayer, 2001; Blanden & Machin, 2004; Kearney & Levine, 
growth for each percentile of the global income distribution. High growth between percentile 20-60 
because of fast growing wages in emerging economies, low growth between percentile 70-90 due to slow 
growing lower- and middle-class wages in developed countries and extremely high growth for the global 
top earners (Milanovic, 2012; Alvaredo et al., 2018).
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2014), increase the amount of violent crimes (Kelly, 2000; Fajnzylber et al., 2002), lower 
overall happiness (Oishi et al., 2011), increase socio-economic segregation (Reardon & 
Bischoff, 2011), and income inequality is even suggested to be one of the causes of the 
recent financial crisis (e.g., Rajan, 2010; van Treeck, 2014). However, most results in this 
field are not entirely undisputed, mainly because of the possible endogenous nature of the 
relationship between inequality and the mentioned outcomes. Differences in educational 
attainment, for example, cannot only be explained by inequality but can also cause income 
inequality (Lemieux, 2006; Rodríguez-Pose & Tselios, 2009)
It is almost impossible to study inequality and, in particular, to make any statements about 
the desirability of certain levels of inequality, without being influenced by normative 
issues. Due to, among other things, the often-alleged existence of a trade-off between 
efficiency and equity, fairness considerations, and the wide range of possible (negative) 
effects of inequality, it is not possible to make any statements about the existence of an 
objectively ‘optimal’ level of inequality. However, there seems to be a trend that high 
levels of inequality are not only seen as a moral problem but also as possibly harming the 
economy.
Nevertheless, the desired level of inequality is still a moral, social, and political choice. 
This is also reflected by the institutional differences between countries concerning the 
redistributive policies that lower market income inequality and differences in institutions 
that govern the labor market (Joumard et al., 2012; Berg, 2015; Causa & Hermansen, 
2018).2 Differences in preferences for redistribution, in turn, are found to be influenced 
by differences in for example culture and political systems (e.g., Luttmer & Singhal, 2011; 
Alesina, 2001). 
When it comes to inequality in opportunities, as opposed to inequality in outcomes, there 
is more consensus. People tend to see inequality as fair when it reflects differences in 
individual effort and achievement, but not when it is caused by luck or when it reflects 
differences in opportunities (Almas et al., 2010). The most straightforward way to assess 
the relationship between income inequality and the equality of opportunities is by looking 
at intergenerational mobility. Overall, countries with higher levels of income inequality 
have lower rates of social mobility, which means there is a higher correlation between 
the income of parents and their children (Corak, 2006; Andrews & Leigh, 2009). This way, 
income inequality becomes persistent over generations, where high-income families are 
2 In the Netherlands inequality after taxes and transfers is significantly lower than in the United States 
(Gini of 0.285 versus 0.39), while the level of market income inequality is relatively close to that of the 
United States (Gini of 0.445 versus 0.506). Data from OECD Income Distribution Database (IDD) for 2016.
1
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better able to offer their children opportunities to succeed in life compared to lower-
income families, resulting in higher future incomes for their children (Neckerman & Torche, 
2007). When people regard upward social mobility as a fair possibility, low levels of income 
inequality may incentivize people to strive for success. When people feel that, no matter 
their effort, upward social mobility is not a fair game, the opposite might happen (World 
Economic Forum, 2012).
1.2 Wage inequality and its causes
Wages are the primary source of income for most households and individuals in developed 
economies, representing about 70-80 percent of total income for households with at least 
one member of working-age. The dependence on wages as the primary source of income 
is even higher for the middle class in these countries, whose presence and size are often 
regarded as one of the most important growth factors in modern economies (ILO, 2016). 
In addition to the importance of wages for total incomes, wages offer the advantage that 
administrative data are increasingly available and relatively easy to use for comparative 
reasons compared to self-employed and capital income. Not surprisingly, most studies 
about income inequality focus on wage inequality. 
When wage inequality, after a remarkably long period of relative stability, started to increase 
in the 1980s, labor economists began to wonder why this was happening. In a competitive 
labor market, where the “law of one price” applies, wage differences between employees 
must be based on objectively observable differences between these employees, such as the 
level of education, experience, and the nature of the tasks performed. This idea gave rise 
to the “human capital revolution,” which relates wage differentials to differences in on-the-
job training and education investment (Becker, 1962; Mincer, 1972). While offering a sound 
explanation for time-invariant variation in wages over different skill groups of workers, the 
observation that the differences in wages between these groups were growing proved 
to be problematic. Tinbergen (1975) proposed a so-called “race between technological 
development and access to education.” Technological change increases the demand and 
relative wages for high-skilled workers, while the access to education increases the supply 
of high-skilled workers and therefore has a downward pressure on the relative wages of 
high-skilled workers.   
In the two decades that followed, technological change became the main focus of wage 
inequality research. Using models of relative supply and demand of skills, a series of papers 
laid the foundation for the “skill-biased technological change” (SBTC) hypothesis (e.g., 
Bound & Johnson, 1989; Katz & Murphy, 1992; Krueger, 1993; Berman et al., 1994; Autor 
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et al., 1998; Caselli, 1999). Technological development has the potential to increase labor 
productivity, and therefore the value of labor, but not all workers possess the necessary 
skills to transform technology into actual productivity. The resulting increase in the 
relative demand for high-skilled workers, who are better able to handle new technologies, 
subsequently increases their relative wages and thereby wage inequality. The observed 
rapid increase of the college wage premium in the 1980s seems, at first sight, to confirm 
the validity of the SBTC hypothesis (Grogger & Eide, 1995; Acemoglu, 2002). 
However, the “skill-biased technological change” hypothesis has some limitations as well. 
The timing of the increase in inequality does not seem to be fully consistent with the SBTC 
hypothesis. Wage inequality started to increase in the mid-1970s, while the widespread 
introduction of computers only began in the 1980s. The increase in wage inequality started 
to stabilize in the 1990s, which coincided with the slowdown in rising returns to education, 
although computer technology spread faster and more widely (Card & DiNardo, 2002; 
Beaudry & Green, 2005; Lemieux, 2006). The scope of the increase in wage inequality 
also raises some questions. Although the diffusion of technology was comparable among 
advanced economies, wage inequality grew faster in some countries (i.e., the United States 
and the United Kingdom) than in others (mostly continental European countries). 
Also, skill-biased technological change may explain the relative increase in wages for high-
skilled workers but it is insufficiently able to explain, on its own, the absolute stagnation 
in wage growth for workers at the bottom of the wage distribution (Acemoglu, 2002). 
Relatedly, while the SBTC hypothesis was successful in explaining inequality trends of the 
1980s, with increased wages for the high-skilled workers, and a relative decrease in the 
wages for low-skilled workers, wage trends in the 1990s were different. Several studies 
observed a ‘polarization’ of the labor market during this period: increased demand for 
the highest- and lowest-paying jobs in combination with decreased demand for jobs in 
the middle of the income distribution (Autor & Dorn, 2008; Goos & Manning, 2007). This 
observation was the starting point of an alternative but related explanation. The routine-
biased technological change hypothesis argues that technology can replace routine-tasks, 
which are usually performed by workers with medium level wages, but not high-skilled or 
low-skilled non-routine or manual tasks (Autor et al., 2003; Acemoglu & Autor, 2014; Goos 
et al., 2014). 
There are two main (non-technological) alternative explanations for the rising wage 
inequality. The first is globalization, especially the increased trade between high-wage and 
low-wage economies. This argument follows a similar relative supply and demand kind of 
reasoning as the SBTC hypothesis. Assuming global trade patterns follow simple comparative 
advantage logic, standard Heckscher-Ohlin models predict an increased demand for high-
1
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skilled labor in high-skilled labor abundant economies (e.g., Wood, 1995; Burtless, 1995). A 
potential drawback of this explanation is the fact that the demand for high-skilled workers 
also increased in low-skilled labor abundant countries (Berman & Machin, 2000). More 
recently, attention shifted towards the effects of offshoring (e.g., Blinder, 2007) and import 
competition from especially, China (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2014; Autor et al., 2014). 
The second is institutions. Labor market institutions have undergone significant changes 
in some countries since the 1980s. The importance of labor market institutions for labor 
market outcomes cannot be underestimated, for example, more than half of the changes 
in unemployment patterns in OECD countries can be accounted for by changes in labor 
market institutions (Nickel et al., 2003). Changes in these institutions, such as a lower real 
value of minimum wages (Lee, 1999; Card & DiNardo, 2002), the demise of labor union 
power (DiNardo & Lee, 2004; Card et al., 2004), and the decline of collective bargaining 
(Antonczyk et al., 2010) are potential explanations for the decline in wages at the bottom 
of the wage distribution. Differences in (the development of) these institutions can be 
used to explain how the relative supply and demand effects of technological change and 
globalization on wages differ between countries (Machin, 2008). 
1.3 The role of firms
All studies discussed in the previous section explain the increase in wage inequality as a result 
of changes in relative supply and demand, or a changed bargaining position, of different 
types of workers. Although wage differences between groups of workers with varying levels 
of education, occupations, and experience increased substantially, a relatively large fraction 
of the increase in wage inequality occurred within these groups or remained unexplained, 
that is, it was captured by the ‘residual’ (Juhn et al., 1993; Katz & Author, 1999; Lemieux, 
2006). The relative importance of within-group or residual inequality could simply reflect 
unobservable differences in skills. However, some studies observed that wages of seemingly 
equally skilled employees differ substantially between industries (Krueger and Summers, 
1998) or even firms (Van Reenen, 1996). This observation is difficult to reconcile with the 
ideas of competitive market theories, where workers receive their efficiency wages, and 
firms are not willing or able to pay salaries that deviate from the standard competitive level 
(Manning, 2011). A problem with these earlier studies, however, is that they are not able 
to observe if firms differ in wages paid to workers of similar quality, or if wage differences 
between firms are a consequence of differences in the quality of the workforce.
In their seminal methodological paper, Abowd, Kramarz, & Margolis (1999) are the first to 
use two-way fixed effects regressions to separately identify the (unobservable) individual 
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and firm components of wages. Using French matched employer-employee data, they find 
large individual effects, smaller yet substantial firm effects and surprisingly low correlations 
between the two. So, although firm wage premiums matter for wage determination, 
individual skill heterogeneity matters more and workers with different skills appear to 
be almost randomly distributed over firms with different wage premiums. According to 
the authors, the results of their “AKM” methodology have raised more new questions 
than they solved, especially because of the unexpectedly low correlation between the 
individual- and firm-fixed effects (Abowd et al., 1999). Although the methodology is not 
uncontested, a new strand of literature was born.3 The analysis now common in this 
literature allows decomposing wages into its between-firm and within-firm components 
while taking the heterogeneity of worker quality into account. By applying (versions of) the 
AKM methodology to employer-employee matched databases from different countries, 
several studies have investigated the role of firms in wage inequality (e.g., Card et al., 
2013; Barth et al., 2016; Song et al., 2019; Alvarez et al., 2018; Card et al., 2018). Most 
studies on the subject differ in certain important methodological aspects, but the wage 
variance decomposition studies have in common that they all find an important role for 
firms in the level of wage inequality. More interestingly, the few studies that apply the 
AKM methodology to successive periods find a dominant role for firms in explaining the 
development of wage inequality over time. 
To what extent can these findings of the importance of firms for wages be reconciled 
with the explanations mentioned above for the increase in wage inequality from prior 
literature? It is quite likely that these seemingly clashing findings are more complementary 
than they may seem at first sight. The previous theories describe the aggregate forces that 
explain overall trends in wage inequality at the macro-level. But apparently, the firm is an 
important, and until recently relatively neglected, micro-level channel through which these 
aggregate forces operate.
1.4 Differences between firms
If firms pay different wages to their employees, and if this wage heterogeneity between 
firms increases over time, what is the reason for this? There are two possible explanations: 
(i) firms increasingly differ in their firm wage premium, i.e., they pay different wages to 
similar employees, or (ii) firms increasingly differ in the average quality of their employees. 
If the first explanation holds, firms themselves are a source of wage inequality because of 
3 See, for example, Andrews et al., 2008; Andrews et al., 2012; and Eeckhout & Kirchner, 2011, for an 
overview of the main criticism concerning the AKM methodology. 
1
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differences in rents or rent-sharing. If the second explanation holds, firms are the platform 
that makes wage inequality possible, rather than an actual source of it. A nuance must be 
provided to this last statement if the two explanations are related. This would mean that 
high-wage workers not only increasingly work together in the same firms, which we refer 
to as increased segregation (worker-worker sorting), but also for firms with higher wage 
premiums, which we refer to as increased sorting (or matching). 
Theoretical explanations for the causes and effects of worker segregation and sorting are 
all based on the existence of certain labor market imperfections such as search frictions, 
assortative matching, or monopsony power. These labor market imperfections can lead to 
differences in rents captured by heterogeneous workers employed by heterogeneous firms 
(e.g., Shimer & Smith, 2000; Postel-Viney & Robin, 2002; Cahuc, 2006; Manning, 2011; 
Bagger & Lentz, 2018; Lopes de Melo, 2018; Azar et al., 2020). Earlier empirical studies on 
this topic revealed a relatively large role for between-firm differences in wage premiums. 
More recent studies find a more important role for the segregation of low- and high-wage 
employees between different firms and the sorting of low- and high-wage employees into 
low- and high-wage firms (e.g., Card et al., 2013; Song et al., 2019). 
Heterogeneity between firms is not limited to wages alone. The most comprehensive 
way in which firms differ from each other, and where other forms of firm heterogeneity 
come together, is in productivity levels. Differences in productivity levels between firms 
are large, persistent, and widespread (Syverson, 2011). In general terms, productivity can 
be described as the efficiency with which a firm converts inputs into outputs. Multiple 
possible causes are suggested to explain differences in productivity levels between firms. 
Some of the factors considered important include between-firm differences in the use of 
technology and IT, capital intensity, the size of firms, international exposure, management 
and ownership, product innovation, learning-by-doing, outsourcing behavior, firm 
structures, the quality of the workforce, quality of other inputs, market concentration, and 
the environment in which firms are operating (e.g., Bartelsman & Doms, 2000; Syverson, 
2011). These between-firm productivity differences appear to be increasing, across nations, 
and especially between (global) frontier firms and the rest (Andrews et al., 2016; Berlingieri 
et al., 2017). 
One of the many not fully answered questions is whether and how the increasing between-
firm divergence of wages and productivity are intertwined. The answer to this question 
is probably closely related to the aforementioned possible explanations for differences 
in wages between firms. It could be that differences in firm-level productivity lead to 
differences in the rents these firms can generate, and that part of these rents spill over 
into higher wages for all workers of these firms. However, it could also be that some firms 
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can attract better-skilled workers, who they have to pay higher wages, because of which 
these firms become more productive. In other words: do workers receive higher wages 
because their employers are more productive, or are firms more productive because they 
have more productive, and therefore higher-wage employees? 
Multiple studies find a strong and significant relationship between firm-level productivity 
and wages (e.g., Van Reenen, 1996; Faggio et al., 2010; Barth et al., 2016; Berlingieri et al., 
2017). However, most of these studies insufficiently account for differences in workforce 
quality in their analyses. Not accounting for worker quality heterogeneity leads to an 
overestimation of the rent-sharing coefficient and subsequent underestimation of the 
importance of worker sorting for the link between productivity and wages (Card et al., 
2018). 
Although economic literature presents both possible explanations for the growing apart 
together of firm-level productivity and wages as substitutes, it is not too hard to argue 
that both may be complementary or even reinforce each other. Any initial differences 
in workforce composition, in combination with complementarities between the skills of 
workers and firms, may lead to differences in firm-level productivity and rents. If part of 
these extra rents is shared with the workers, a widening of the firm wage premium will 
occur. Differences in the firm wage premium, in turn, would make the economic incentives 
for worker sorting stronger and may, therefore, lead to larger differences in workforce 
composition.    
But there is more going on than just the divergence of firm-level productivity levels together 
with firm-level wages. At the aggregate level, there seems to be a divergence between 
productivity and wages. In many OECD countries, real wage growth has structurally fallen 
below real labor productivity growth (Pessoa & Van Reenen, 2013; Schwellnus et al., 
2017). Relatedly, several studies have shown a decline in the labor share, i.e., the share 
of GDP paid out as compensation for labor (e.g., Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2013; Elsby et 
al., 2013). This decline of the labor share is surprising given the conventional economic 
wisdom that the stability of the labor share is one of the stylized facts of economic growth 
(Kaldor, 1961). Various possible explanations for the recent disconnection of productivity 
and wages exist such as the increased importance of self-employment (Elsby et al., 2013), 
the evolution of profit shares (Barkai, 2019), lower capital costs (Karabarbounis & Neiman, 
2013), a global productivity slowdown (Grossman et al., 2017), and automation (Acemoglu 
& Restrepo, 2020; Salomons, 2018). 
A striking feature of the macro-level decline of the labor share in for example the United 
States, however, is the fact that it does not apply at the micro-level. On the contrary, most 
1
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employees now work for a firm with a higher labor share than a few decades ago. These 
seemingly contradictory findings may be reconciled by the observation that there has been 
a significant reallocation of economic activity towards low-labor-share high-productivity 
firms. This development may be a symptom of markets being increasingly characterized 
by “winner takes most” kind of competition, which results in the so-called rise of the 
“superstar firm” (Kehrig & Vincent, 2017; Autor et al., 2020). The superstar firm is a 
recently introduced term to describe high-productivity firms that disproportionally benefit 
from globalization and/or technological change, perhaps made possible in part by changing 
institutions or market characteristics, which enables them to capture an increasing market 
share. The reallocation of economic activity to these dominant firms increases market 
concentration and lowers the labor share, despite the fact that these high-productivity 
firms pay higher wages than the average firm. Developments such as increased market 
consolidation (Blonigen & Pierce, 2017) and increased labor market concentration (Azar et 
al., 2020) might be able to explain this phenomenon. 
The most interesting explanation, however, involves the combination of rising fixed costs, 
the growing importance of platforms and network effects, and, subsequently, decreasing 
marginal costs of production. This pushes sales to the most productive firms in each 
industry, the “superstar firm” (Berry et al., 2019; Autor et al., 2020; Bessen et al., 2020). 
Theoretically, this could open the door to the emergence of natural monopolies in industries 
that were previously not affected by this possibility. However, these network or platform 
monopolies may differ from traditional monopolies in that they increase their rents by 
using their power over suppliers instead of by increasing consumer prices. It can even be 
that these companies do not use their market power to increase their prices, but that these 
companies enjoy such a large market share exactly because of their relatively low prices. 
This would mean that whenever regulators attempt to measure the market power of firms, 
they would increasingly have to focus on vertical instead of horizontal market power (e.g., 
Bessen, 2018; Syverson, 2019).
1.5 The financial sector
If there is one sector in the economy that has experienced rapid growth in size and wages 
in recent decades, it is the financial sector (Philippon & Reshef, 2013). Wage growth in the 
financial sector, especially for the top earners, has been responsible for a considerable 
part of the increase in wage inequality in the United Kingdom and France (Bell & Van 
Reenen, 2014; Godeschot, 2012). This observation itself does not have to be a problem, 
from an efficiency perspective, if the wages of financial sector employees are determined 
in a competitive (labor) market and simply reflect their talents and marginal productivity 
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(Gabaix & Landier, 2008). However, the financial sector is not an ordinary sector. There 
is ample evidence that certain market imperfections, such as the explicit and implicit 
guarantees by taxpayers that financial firms enjoy, allow financial sector firms and workers 
to extract rents from the market (e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Philippon & Resheff, 2013). 
This possibility is consistent with empirical studies that show the existence of a large and 
growing finance wage premium, which cannot be accounted for by differences in workforce 
composition (Célérier and Vallée, 2015; Böhm et al., 2018).
But is not the level of remuneration in the financial sector that is causing most debate, 
primarily the structure of the compensation packages is under scrutiny. Compared to other 
industries, remuneration packages in the financial sector consist for a relatively large part 
of bonuses, again mainly for top earners (Bell & Van Reenen, 2014). On the one hand, these 
performance-related bonuses help to minimize the agency problem between shareholders 
and employees by incentivizing financial sector workers to choose sufficient levels of effort 
and risk-taking (e.g., Murphy, 2013; Lefebvre & Vieider, 2014). Besides encouraging workers 
to take sufficient levels of risk, bonuses also have the potential to limit risk-taking behavior 
because of their risk-sharing characteristics (Efing et al., 2018). 
On the other hand, the bargaining power of financial sector workers, perverse incentives, 
and the existence of negative externalities of risk-taking could lead to excessive risk-taking 
from the perspective of shareholders or society (e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, 2009; Thanassoulis, 
2012; Hakanes & Schnabel, 2014). This last argument has received increasing attention 
from both academics and policymakers because of the alleged role of bonuses in causing 
the global financial crisis through excessive risk-taking (e.g., Diamond & Rajan, 2009; 
Rzepczynski, 2013; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011; Dewitripont & Freixas, 2012).
The recognition that certain market imperfections affecting the financial sector may 
cause excessive risk-taking resulted in several new regulations that should address this 
problem. The United States has implemented the Dodd-Frank act, which consists of several 
provisions in this field, such as the disclosure of any incentive-based compensation and the 
prohibition of incentive plans that, according to regulators, encourage excessive risk-taking 
(Murphy, 2013). The United Kingdom introduced a so-called ‘clawback rule’, which requires 
that at least 40% of the variable remuneration of bankers is deferred for at least three 
years (Harris et al.,.2018). The European Union introduced a bonus cap for bankers. This 
EU bonus cap limits the variable remuneration of the ‘material risk takers’ of all European 
banks to 100% of the fixed remuneration. However, legislation in the Netherlands went 
even further. In February 2015 the Netherlands introduced a bonus cap of 20% of the 
annual fixed compensation for all employees of all financial companies to which the law 
applies.
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Bonus caps are a new and radical type of regulation. Given that financial companies 
compete on a global level, the introduction of the Dutch bonus cap received the necessary 
reservations, primarily concerning its effectiveness and the possible negative unintended 
consequences concerning the competitiveness of Dutch financial companies. An 
evaluation of the effects of a bonus cap ultimately comes down to assessing whether the 
implementation of a bonus cap reduces (excessive) risk-taking and if it negatively affects the 
competitiveness of financial companies in the (international) labor market. The existence 
of a bonus cap can, for example, make it harder for Dutch financial companies to attract 
and retain talented employees. However, it is not easy to empirically identify the causal link 
between incentive contracts, limiting the possibilities to use them, and risk-taking behavior. 
Nonetheless, some experimental studies have shown that limiting the maximum allowable 
bonus reduces risk-taking by decision-makers (e.g., Kleinlercher et al., 2014; Hartmann & 
Slapnicar, 2015; Weitzel et al., 2018), but may also lower the chosen effort level (e.g., Harris 
et al., 2018). The second question is whether financial sector employees mind the cap and 
act on this by letting it affect their labor market choices. After all, financial sector employees 
are relatively mobile between industries and countries, and high wages in the financial 
sector are considered necessary to attract and retain the most skilled and talented workers 
(Philippon & Reshef, 2012; Murphy, 2013). The scarcely available empirical studies on the 
subject find evidence of increased executive turnover due to the EU bonus cap (Kleymenova 
& Tuna, 2018), or no effect on labor market mobility but higher fixed remunerations to offset 
the effect of the bonus cap on total compensation (Colonnello et al., 2018).
1.6 Studies in this thesis
This thesis contains three empirical studies. Although there is no clear central overarching 
theme, all three studies relate in different ways to the consequences of (labor) market 
imperfections. The three chapters examine different open questions regarding the topics 
discussed in this introduction. In each study, we make use of a combination of individual- 
and firm-level datasets of the Dutch manufacturing and service industries provided by 
Statistics Netherlands. 
The first study investigates the role of firms and workers in the evolution of wage inequality. 
The study shows that, although the Netherlands is characterized by relatively low levels 
of disposable income inequality, gross wage inequality is increasing. The majority of 
this increase in wage inequality takes place between firms, which is surprising given the 
relatively high coverage of sector-wide collective labor agreements. The divergence of 
between-firm wages is mainly due to increased differences in worker quality between 
firms. This shows that the labor market is not only becoming more segregated between 
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workers with different skill levels, but also more segregated because workers with different 
skill levels are increasingly employed by different firms. 
These findings serve as the basis for the second study. The second study investigates to 
what extent, and in what way, the observed between-firm wage differences are related to 
between-firm performance differences. We observe a dispersion of productivity between 
the most-productive firms and the rest, which is accompanied by an ongoing reallocation 
of economic activity towards these most productive, and low-labor share, companies. 
Furthermore, the relationship between firm wages and performance is strengthening 
over time, mainly due to increased workforce quality heterogeneity. This shows that not 
only the labor market is becoming more segregated, but also the performance of firms is 
diverging and there appears to be a clear relationship between these two developments.
In the third study, we analyze the effects of the implementation of the Dutch bonus cap in 
the financial sector on the labor mobility of financial sector employees. Financial companies 
compete on a global level and financial sector employees are relatively mobile between 
industries and countries. Consequentially, a bonus cap that only affects the Dutch financial 
companies could harm these companies in their ability to attract and retain talented 
employees. We find evidence of an increase in the probability that financial sector workers 
leave their employer and industry for another industry in the Netherlands. However, we 
find no evidence of an effect of the bonus cap on international migration of employees in 
the financial sector.
1.6.1 Chapter 2: A firm variance decomposition
Chapter 2 studies the contribution of firms and worker flows in the development 
of individual gross wage variance in the Netherlands. To achieve this, we created a 
longitudinal employer-employee matched database, containing all workers and firms in 
the manufacturing and service industries in the Netherlands between 1999 and 2015. A 
growing body of empirical studies finds an important role for firms in the observed increase 
in wage inequality in recent decades (e.g., Card et al., 2013; Barth et al., 2016; Song et 
al., 2019). We apply a wide range of descriptive analyses and regression-based variance 
decompositions to investigate if this phenomenon also holds for the evolution of wage 
inequality in the Netherlands. 
The first important finding is that it does. Between-firm wage differences account for 
approximately 35% of overall wage inequality at the beginning of our sample period. This 
increases to about 45% at the end of this period. More striking, growing wage differences 
between firms explain approximately two-thirds of the total increase in wage inequality 
during this period.
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The second research objective is to identify which factors can explain the growing 
differences in average wages paid by firms. Three factors possibly can: (i) firms increasingly 
pay different wages to similar employees, (ii) similar workers are increasingly likely to work 
for the same firms, which leads to between-firm divergence in average worker quality 
(segregation), and (iii) high-wage workers are increasingly likely to work for high-wage 
firms, while low-wage workers are increasingly likely to work for low-wage firms (sorting). 
We apply a two-way fixed-effect methodology, as introduced by Abowd et al., (1999), to 
distinguish the relative importance of these three explanations. 
The second important finding is that all three matter, but that increased worker heterogeneity 
between firms explains the vast majority of the rise in between-firm wage inequality. The 
dispersion of firm wage premiums, the first explanation, explains only 10% of the increase 
in wage variance. Worker segregation between different firms, the second explanation, and 
the sorting of workers into low- and high-wage firms, the third explanation, can account for 
respectively 32% and 20% of the overall increase in wage inequality.  
1.6.2 Chapter 3: Growing apart together
Chapter 3 studies to what extent, and in what way, the development of between-firm wage 
and performance differences are interrelated. Two observations give rise to the notion that 
these two developments could be intertwined. Most of the increase in wage inequality can 
be attributed to the increase in wage differences between firms (e.g., Card et al., 2013) 
and differences between the productivity levels of firms are large, persistent, ubiquitous 
and increasing (e.g., Syverson, 2011; Andrews et al., 2015). To account for the likely role 
of (observed and unobserved) heterogeneity in worker quality for the relation between 
performance and pay, we split the data management process into two consecutive phases. 
In the first phase, we utilize our employer-employee matched database, consisting of the 
entire population of firms and workers in the Netherlands between 2001 and 2016 that 
fulfill our selection criteria, to estimate the worker- and firm-specific wage components 
for each worker and firm in our sample. In the second phase, we merge the firm-level 
aggregate outcomes of these worker-level wage estimations with firm-level production 
statistics. This process results in an unbalanced panel of 132.111 firm-period observations. 
Divided over four periods of four years each, the sample reflects information about the 
employers of 6.9 to 7.4 million worker observations, consisting of 2.1 to 2.3 million unique 
workers employed by 29 to 36 thousand unique firms for each period.  
To gain some insight into the level and evolution of the heterogeneity of firm-level 
performance, we start with a descriptive overview of certain interesting developments 
in this area. Firm-level productivity is diverging, especially between the most productive 
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firms and the rest. At the aggregate level, real wage growth has lagged behind real labor 
productivity growth. However, for most workers, real wages and labor productivity have 
grown at approximately the same rate. Only for employees of the least- and most-productive 
firms, real wages have grown slower than labor productivity. The labor share is declining, 
albeit minimal, on the aggregate level. However, once weighted for worker observations, it 
is increasing. This means that in 2016 the average employee works for a firm with a higher 
labor share than in 2001, but that the economy has undergone a major reallocation of 
economic activity towards less labor-intensive firms. To illustrate this, the proportion of 
total value-added generated by 20% of the workforce employed by firms with the lowest 
labor shares increased from 29% to 40% between 2001 and 2016. The proportion of total 
profits these workers generate increased from 51% to a stunning 67% during this period. 
Returning to the main research questions, we find that better-performing firms, on average, pay 
higher wages. Furthermore, the divergence of wages between firms with different performance 
levels, as well as the strength of the link between performance and wages, is increasing. In line 
with the findings of chapter 2, this is mostly due to growing heterogeneity in workforce quality 
and only for a small part because of divergence in rent sharing between firms. The results show 
that while 30-40% of the correlation between firm performance and firm-level wages is due to 
differences in rent-sharing, changing differences in rent-sharing between firms with different 
performance levels can only account for 2.5-3.5% of the total increase in between-firm wage 
variance over time. In contrast, about 55-65% of the correlation between firm performance 
and wages can be attributed to workforce quality heterogeneity, while changing differences 
in workforce composition between these firms can account for 8-15% of the total increase in 
between-firm wage variance. These results reveal that worker sorting and segregation are the 
main channels through which firm-level performance relates to wage heterogeneity.
Finally, we find evidence of a relationship between the average quality of the workforce and 
firm-level choices concerning the use of alternative work arrangements, external workers, 
flexible workers, and whether they use outsourcing. Given the growing importance of these 
alternative work arrangements (e.g., Katz & Krueger, 2019), this could mean that some 
firms are increasingly able to select the workforce they deem optimal and could serve as a 
potential explanation for the increased importance of sorting for overall wage inequality.
1.6.3 Chapter 4: Mind the cap
Chapter 4 studies the effect of the introduction of the Dutch financial sector bonus cap 
in 2015 on the labor mobility of financial sector employees. A bonus cap that lowers the 
overall level of remuneration in the financial sector could have adverse effects on the 
attractiveness for, especially, the most skilled employees with sufficient outside options 
in other industries or countries (Murphy, 2013). To be able to research this, we created an 
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employer-employee matched database for the years 2010-2016 that allows us to follow 
the inter-industry transitions of employees over time. 
This study exploits the introduction of the bonus cap as a natural experiment to test if this 
affected the probability of financial sector employees to change the sector, or country, in 
which they are employed. We employ a Difference-in-Difference approach that uses financial 
sector employees to which the bonus cap does not apply as a control group. The Difference-
in-Difference approach compares the observed labor market movements of the treatment 
group (workers affected by the bonus cap) with the predicted labor market movements 
of this group. The predicted movements are based on the observed movements by the 
control group, the differences between both groups before the introduction of the bonus 
cap, and all included covariates. This way, any deviation in the observed and predicted 
probability of making a certain labor market movement is attributed to the bonus cap. 
The main finding is an increased probability, in 2016, of 0.65 percentage points that 
a financial sector employee leaves a bonus cap industry for any other industry in the 
Netherlands. This increased probability of leaving the financial sector cannot be attributed 
to a specific target industry. However, we do observe an increased probability of outflow to 
one of the “related industries.” These are four industries that we have identified because 
of their relatively close connection to the financial sector based on labor mobility in 
previous years, which means that they may serve as a realistic alternative for financial 
sector employees. The results do not reveal any evidence of a decrease in the probability 
that a bonus cap employee recently entered the industry, which means we cannot make 
any statements about an effect on the capabilities of financial firms to attract employees.
It can be expected that a possible effect of the bonus cap will be different for employees 
with different characteristics; certain groups of employees are more mobile than other 
groups of employees. We find that the effect of the bonus cap on the probability of leaving 
a bonus cap industry is larger for higher-income groups, younger employees and employees 
with at least a bachelor diploma or equivalent. From a policy perspective, however, the 
biggest worries will probably not be about domestic labor mobility, but about a possible 
deterioration of the competitive position of Dutch financial companies in the international 
labor market. This would be reflected by an increased outflow or decreased inflow of 
financial sector employees to and from other countries. However, we find no evidence of a 
change in the probability that a bonus cap employee migrates to or from the Netherlands.
Originally, we also wanted to study the effect of the bonus cap on wage levels. However, 
due to the lack of information about the amount of variable and fixed pay and, more 
importantly, a violation of the ‘parallel trend assumption’, we are not able to make any 
statements about this.
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Utz Weitzel, A firm wage variance. Current status: in preparation for 
submission. Jan Verhoeckx is the lead author and has been the main 
contributor in all stages of this study, including idea generation, data 
management, data analysis, results interpretation and writing the 
chapter. This chapter is based on CBS microdata, funded by Radboud 
University.
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2.1 Introduction
Income inequality in Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom has increased rapidly since the 1970s. This has spurred a rich body of theoretical 
and empirical studies to understand the driving forces behind this trend. Prior literature 
mostly focused on the macroeconomic drivers of this phenomenon. Technological change, 
globalization and changes in the institutional framework are suggested to affect the 
relative demand and supply of skilled versus unskilled workers, which in turn affects the 
income distribution (see among others Katz & Autor, 1999; Acemoglu, 2002 and Machin, 
2008). Less is known about the micro level channels through which these aggregate forces 
operate.
Recent works by Card et al., (2013), Song et al., (2019) and Barth et al., (2016) suggest that 
the firm is an important and (until recently) largely neglected source of the increase in 
income inequality. These studies show that much of the increase in wage variance can be 
accounted for by examining between-firm rather than within-firm earnings dispersion. This 
means that it is not only your individual skills that determine your salary, as predicted by 
standard competitive labor market models, but also the firm that employs you. Potential 
explanations for the role of firms in earnings dispersion are increased productivity dispersion 
between firms or increased sorting between employees and firms (Card et al., 2013). 
Between-firm wage differences may in part be driven by macroeconomic developments 
which show themselves at the firm-level rather than at the individual- or aggregate-level. 
In that case the firm is not the source of increasing wage inequality but rather the level at 
which it manifests itself. 
In this chapter we apply a wide range of descriptive analyses and variance decompositions 
to study the components and development of wage inequality in the Netherlands, which 
is characterized by more collectivistic labor market institutions than the Anglo-Saxon 
countries. We find that the “between-firm effect” is the most important factor in explaining 
the rising wage variance in the Netherlands as well. Roughly two third of the increase in 
wage variance in our sample is driven by wage increased differences between firms. This 
result is robust for different samples of workers, firms and industries. These between-
firm wage differences appear to arise mainly from the increased segregation of workers 
between different firms and the increased sorting of workers into firms with different 
wage premiums. Increased heterogeneity in firm wage premiums turns out to be of less 
importance.
The classical explanations for the increase in earnings inequality resolve around changes 
in the relative demand and supply of (high) skilled labor. Demand for high-skilled workers 
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increased more than the supply of high-skilled workers, which led to different rewards 
based on skills, education, and experience (Bound & Johnson, 1989; Katz & Murphy, 1992; 
Machin, 2008). Technological change and globalization are generally regarded as the main 
drivers of this phenomenon. In early literature, the “skill-biased technological change” 
(SBTC) hypothesis was seen as the most valid explanation. More skilled workers are better 
equipped to operate and adapt to new productive technologies, which leads to more 
demand and higher wages for these workers. Workers who do not possess the skills to 
productively use new technologies will be faced by lower wages or loss of jobs (Machin, 
2008; Lemieux, 2006). Despite the success of the many empirical studies on the subject in 
explaining differences in returns to skills, the classical SBTC hypothesis turned out to be less 
well suitable to explain more recent inequality related developments in the labor markets 
(Card & DiNardo, 2002; Acemoglu, 2002; Machin, 2008; Acemoglu & Autor, 2011). 
In spite of the popularity of the SBTC hypothesis, some related macro-level explanations 
have received considerable attention as well. Using a Heckscher-Ohlin type of reasoning, 
increased trade between developed skilled-abundant countries and developing skill-
scarce countries could yield similar results. This may have created an upward pressure 
on wages of workers in more skilled labor-intensive industries and a downward pressure 
on wages in more unskilled labor-intensive industries (Leamer, 1996). Changing labor 
market institutions, such as the demise of labor union power, the increased prevalence of 
alternative work arrangements or changes in minimum wages, could explain the weakened 
bargaining position of low-skilled labor. This could help explain some of the observed trends 
which are not sufficiently covered by the SBTC or globalization hypotheses (DiNardo & Lee, 
2004; Katz & Krueger, 2019; Lee, 1999). While this literature predicts and tests for greater 
dispersion between skill groups, the more recent empirical literature shows that a large 
part of the increases in income inequality is within groups with similar skills, education, and 
experience. Theoretically, this could be because of some unobserved measure of skills (Juhn 
et al., 1993; Lemieux, 2006; Autor et al., 2008), but recent attention has shifted towards 
the firm as a potentially important driver or channel of increases in wage inequality. 
Using different variance decomposition techniques, Barth et al., (2016) and Song et al., 
(2019) both find that roughly two-thirds of the increase in individual earnings dispersion 
in the United States can be accounted for by the average wages paid by the firm that hires 
them. Their findings are robust for different time periods, size classes of firms, industries, 
geographical locations, age groups, job tenure groups, and gender. Most studies on the 
“between-firm” effect make use of a form of the “AKM model” introduced by the seminal 
work of Abowd et al., (1999). This model decomposes individual earnings into worker-
specific components and firm-specific components to analyze the role of individual 
heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity and the correlation between the two. The size of the 
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“between-firm” component differs per study, but all show an important role for the firm in 
explaining the development of individual earnings variance (Abowd et al., 1999; Card et al., 
2013; Barth et al., 2016; Song et al., 2019). 
The next question is why wage differences between firms in many countries have increased 
in the last decades? It can be that firm wage premiums have become more heterogeneous 
over time or that worker quality heterogeneity between firms has increased. In other 
words, do certain firms pay higher wages to the same employees than other firms do, 
or do employees increasingly sort themselves into low- and high-paying firms or in firms 
with similarly paid co-workers? Using the AKM approach to decompose the between-firm 
variance into these three potential explanations, a “pure” firm-fixed effect reflects the 
first explanation, the co-variance between worker and firm effects reflects sorting and the 
average worker effect per firm reflects the segregation of employees between firms. 
In a perfectly competitive labor market, without frictions, workers’ wages reflect their 
marginal productivity. This means that wage differences between firms can only result 
from worker-worker sorting (segregation). Although employed by different firms, the 
wages workers receive are solely based on their productivity and therefore their individual 
skills. An increase in worker segregation itself does not affect overall wage inequality, as it 
only reflects a reallocation of within-firm to between-firm wage differences. An increase 
in this type of worker segregation can result from a reduction in market frictions, such as 
search frictions, or lower (transaction) costs related to spreading different tasks involving 
different skills across different firms. However, if wage heterogeneity between firms goes 
beyond the mere asymmetric distribution of workers, with different skills, across different 
firms, it likely reflects a deviation from equilibrium wages and therefore causes or at least 
enables wage inequality. This means that firms are able and willing to pay higher (wage-
markup pricing) or lower wages (wage-markdown pricing) than equilibrium wages because 
of, for example, differences in rents captured by firms, complementarities, or worker-firm 
complementarities, resulting in differences in firm wage premiums and the sorting of 
workers, with heterogeneous skills, into firms with heterogeneous wage premiums.
Why would certain firms pay higher wages to the same workers than other firms do? 
This can only occur when firms would differ in their rent-sharing, for example because 
of differences in monopsony power, or differ in the rents they generate. A potential 
explanation for between-firm differences in rent-generation is that the SBTC hypothesis, 
popular in earlier literature, manifests itself at the industry- or even firm-level rather 
than at the individual level. Firms differ in their adoption of new productive technologies, 
automation, and ICT investment, partly based on the initial distribution of skilled workers, 
leading to more variance in “returns to skills,” “returns to capital,” and complementarities 
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at the firm-level (Caselli, 1999; Acemoglu, 2002). This would result in increased productivity 
heterogeneity between industries and between firms within industries, as observed 
in the works of Syverson (2011), Andrews et al., (2015) and Berlingieri et al., (2017), or 
even increased market concentration (e.g., Autor et al., 2020). Any spillovers of these 
productivity differences to wages would lead to a dispersion of firm wage premiums. 
While Dunne et al., (2004) and Faggio et al., (2010) find an important role for productivity 
dispersion, Barth et al., (2016) can only explain a small part of the firm wage premium by 
firm-level productivity. Card et al., (2018) report that most studies find wage-productivity 
elasticities within a range of 0.05-0.15, emphasizing the relatively lower findings in studies 
controlling for worker quality heterogeneity, implying an important role for worker sorting 
in between-firm wage variance.
Why would worker skill heterogeneity between firms increase? Workers do not randomly 
distribute themselves over firms. If workers’ skills are complementary, workers with 
certain skills can better use these skills in combination with other workers with similar 
skills. Furthermore, if workers’ skills and firm skills are also complementary, better workers 
will cluster together in better firms and increase the productivity of firms. Both types of 
complementarities would affect firm-level “returns to skills” and create larger between-
firm wage differences than can be explained by differences in worker skills only. In the 
presence of certain costs associated with making the optimal match between workers, 
co-workers and firms, it is acceptable for firms to allow for a certain level of mismatch. 
However, when the potential benefits of the right match increase, or the costs of this 
match decrease, firms may be more inclined to optimize the match. Therefore, the overall 
effect of matching workers with other workers and firms is ultimately a trade-off between 
the productivity benefits stemming from complementarities and the existence of certain 
search and matching costs in the labor market. This suggests that an increase in sorting 
could come from increased complementarities and/or reduced labor market frictions or the 
costs of relocating certain activities to external firms or workers. Skill-biased technological 
change as well as globalization are suggested to positively affect workers’ and firm skills 
complementarities, giving rise to worker sorting and corresponding productivity and 
wage dispersion between firms (Kremer & Maskin, 1996; Acemoglu, 1999; Caselli, 1999; 
Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; Håkanson et al., 2020; Bombardini et al., 2019; Winkler, 
2020). 
Worker segregation also appears to be related to firm choices or labor marker costs 
concerning the composition of its workforce. Internal rent-sharing because of collective 
bargaining agreements (Card et al., 2004), internal equity concerns (Weil, 2014) or fair 
“wage-effort” considerations (Akerlof & Yellen, 1990) could result in high-productivity 
firms paying wages above efficiency wages, also to their lower-skilled workers. In order to 
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overcome sharing the firm wage premium with its lower-skilled workers, high rent firms 
may be encouraged to make more use of international offshoring (Goos et al., 2014) and 
domestic outsourcing (Goldschmidt & Schmieder, 2017; Handwerker & Spletzer, 2015), 
decreasing the range of tasks performed within the firm and lowering the share of workers 
with a relatively low value-added in production. This, in turn, would be strengthened by 
any institutional or technological developments that decrease market transaction costs 
and therefore the costs of outsourcing (Bernhardt et al., 2015; Song et al., 2019). 
The segregation and sorting of workers explains about one-third of the increased wage 
variance in Germany (Card et al., 2013), while it is found to explain almost half of the 
increase in between-firm wage variance in Sweden (Håkanson et al., 2020) and appears 
to be the main driver of increased wage variance in the United States (Song et al., 2019). 
Contrary to this, increased segregation of workers is found to have a relatively small role in 
the work of for example Barth et al., (2016) concerning the increased wage variance in the 
United States. However, this seems to be caused by their adjustment of the AKM model. 
Their study is based on yearly estimations and therefore excludes worker fixed effects. 
Because of this, they do not control for unobserved worker heterogeneity which is the 
main factor of worker sorting in most studies using the AKM model. 
It can be argued that the apparent theoretical and empirical dichotomy between the 
“firm productivity” and “worker segregation” hypotheses is driven by the same underlying 
mechanisms and that the two explanations reinforce each other. Any initial deviation from 
the equal distribution of skilled workers across firms leads to between-firm differences 
in technology investment, complementarities, productivity, and wages. If the firm wage 
premium is widening, especially in combination with the existence of complementarities, 
the economic incentives for worker sorting and the outsourcing of tasks with relatively 
low value-added become stronger, which in turn would affect technology investment and 
increasing productivity differences between firms. This, in combination with globalization, 
technological developments, changing institutions, changing market characteristics and 
stronger network effects, could lead to “winners take most” type of competition at the 
national or even international level and give rise to the so-called “superstar firm” (Autor et 
al., 2020).
Most studies dealing with the role of the firm in earnings inequality are based on matched 
employee-employer databases in the United States, Germany, Sweden or the United 
Kingdom. At first glance, continental European countries like the Netherlands seem to 
have more equally distributed incomes as compared to the more Anglo-Saxon countries. 
However, this is mostly due to the re-distributive effects of social security systems and 
taxes, while the inequality of primary incomes is almost similar (Caminada et al., 2012 and 
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Joumard et al., 2012). This chapter examines yearly real gross full-time earnings dispersion 
within and between firms in the manufacturing and service industries in the Netherlands 
for the period 1999 to 2015. 
The Netherlands is interesting for multiple reasons. First of all, the labor market in the 
Netherlands is highly institutionalized and characterized by a relatively high level of sector-
wide collective labor agreement coverage. Collective bargaining is based on sector-level 
consensual decision-making between the government, unions and industry-associations. 
About three quarters of all employees are covered by collective labor agreements, and 
the agreements are often declared legally binding by the government, even for firms and 
employees not directly involved in the agreement (Hartog & Salverda, 2018). Although 
firms can be granted an exemption from sector-wide agreements, the role of individual 
firms in wage-setting is relatively constrained, especially compared to countries with 
less centralized wage coordination. Furthermore, although employment protection for 
permanent contracts is among the strictest in the world, employment protection for 
temporary contracts is relatively weak (CPB, 2011; OECD, 2014). The incidence of workers 
that enjoy weaker protection on the labor market, such as flexible, temporary and self-
employed workers, has grown rapidly in recent decades (Hartog & Salverda, 2018). Finally, 
for practical reasons, linked data on all employees and firms is available, earnings are 
not top-coded and the role of firms in income inequality in the Netherlands is not yet 
investigated. 
Different sources of micro-data collected by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) are used to 
create an employer-employee matched database, containing information about personal 
characteristics like age, gender, job tenure, education and information about the firm 
where the workers are employed. All employees (>0.25 FTE) and firms (>5 FTE) with wages 
above the minimum wage in the manufacturing and service industries for the period 1999-
2015 are included, which gives us a database of over 3.7 million worker and over 69.000 
firm observations per year. 
The decomposition of earnings variance is based on a combination of empirical methods 
applied by among others Card et al., (2013), Barth et al., (2016) and Song et al., (2019). The 
results show that, depending on the empirical method and data sample used, between 
59-82% of the increase in earnings inequality can be explained by increased between-firm 
earnings dispersion. Results coming from analyses applied to the main sample all show that 
the between-firm effect accounts for around 70% of the total increase in wage variance, 
where the lower and higher shares mainly come from different sample selections. This 
is largely in line with related recent empirical findings on the subject in other countries. 
However, our results concerning the importance of worker segregation and sorting between 
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firms show values somewhat in between the values found by Song et al., (2019) and most 
other studies on the subject. The findings suggest that increasing average worker fixed 
effects differences, which reflect increased segregation of workers between firms, account 
for almost half of the increased between firm variance. The other half of the increased 
between firm variance is mostly explained by the different sorting components and to a 
smaller extent by increased firm fixed effects variance. Overall, roughly 60% of the increase 
in individual wage variance can be linked to increased worker heterogeneity between firms 
and 10% by increased firm wage premium heterogeneity.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data, the sample selection, 
shows some descriptives and presents an overview of earnings dispersion in the database. 
Section 2.3 decomposes the level and increase in earnings dispersion into its between-
firm and within-firm component. Section 2.4 decomposes overall earnings dispersion into 
its worker-specific components, firm-specific components and co-variance between them. 
Section 2.5 discusses and concludes.
2.2 Data selection and descriptives
2.2.1 Data selection
This chapter makes use of several different longitudinal micro-data sets collected by 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS) covering the period 1999-2015. The datasets contain data at 
the firm- and at the individual level. On the individual level, personal characteristics from 
the municipalities database (GBA) are merged with education data, income tax data and are 
matched with the firm where they are employed. On the firm-level, production statistics 
and firm characteristics from the General Firm Register (ABR) are merged. Because of data 
availability concerning firm-level production statistics, only the workers and firms in the 
manufacturing and service industries are used in our sample. This means we exclude the 
public, education and healthcare sectors. Besides data availability, the concept of a firm in 
public and semi-public sectors like government, education, and healthcare is more unclear 
and earnings are more steered by central government wage-setting policy. We further limit 
our attention in the baseline sample to employees which have worked at least 0.25 FTE on 
a yearly basis, have earnings above the minimum wage and we limit the sample to firms 
that employ at least the equivalent of 5 fulltime workers in a specific year. This creates a 
matched employee-employer database containing detailed personal data, covering at least 
69.000 firm and 3.7 million worker observations per year. 
Employees are identified by their personal identification code, while jobs are identified by 
specific job identification codes. For earnings, we use the constant full-time yearly gross 
2
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wages for a specific individual in a year. Information about wages comes from the earnings 
database, which registers the wages over which income taxes have to be paid per job. 
Wages are converted to constant 2006 euros using the Consumer Price Index. The total 
earnings in a year are calculated and weighted for the number of social insurance days per 
job and/or person in order to determine the full-time equivalent.5 Employees can have 
multiple jobs in a specific year, because of holding multiple jobs simultaneously or because 
of switching jobs in a certain year. Following among others Card et al., (2013) and Song et 
al., (2019), individuals who hold multiple jobs are assigned to the employer where they had 
the highest earnings in that year. Dummies are created for individuals who leave their job or 
start a new job in a certain year. Individuals are merged, using their personal identification 
number, with the municipalities database containing information about gender, date of 
birth and place of birth. The same identification number is used to match individuals to 
the education database, containing information about the highest obtained diploma. This 
database is based on a yearly survey, resulting in a growing number of employees for which 
education data is available over the years. In 1999, education data for 20.4% of the total 
sample is available, growing to 57.6% in 2015. The education variables used are based on 
the Dutch standard classification of education (SOI), which distinguishes 7 main levels of 
obtained diplomas. Furthermore, a “skilled” dummy is created if a person has obtained 
a bachelor degree or higher. Imputation is used when possible to create “new” skilled 
dummies for missing (in between) years. Furthermore, re-coding was needed to be able 
to match the education data from before 2006 with the data since 2006, because Statistics 
Netherlands changed some of their measurements in that period. 
Firms are defined as “business units” and identified by their unique identification code 
(BE_ID) using the General Firm Register (ABR). Statistics Netherlands distinguishes 
between firm groups (OND), business units (BE) and local business units (LBE). One firm 
group can consist of multiple business units, which in turn can consist of multiple local 
business units. We use the business unit as the main method to identify the firm where 
the person is employed. First of all, CBS defines the business unit as autonomous in its 
decision-making, suggesting possibilities for independent wage policies at the business 
unit level. Furthermore, production statistics are collected at the business unit level and 
based on surveys, which makes aggregating to the firm group level not possible. Lastly, 
employees and their jobs are matched to the firm at the business unit level and the main 
industry in which a firm is active is also defined at the business unit level. In our first basic 
estimation, we check for different results using the firm group (OND) or business unit (BE) 
as the definition of a “firm”, resulting in similar outcomes. 
5  This could lead to potential biases in results if the number of hours per workday developed 
(asymmetrically) over time. 
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The General Firm Register consists of information about the industry in which the main 
activity of the firm takes place, the municipality in which the firm is located, the year the 
firm is founded and the number of employees working at the firm. The unique business 
unit identification code is used to match this database with the production statistics 
databases. The Production Statistics databases include information about among others 
wages, turnover, profit, value-added, depreciation and the number of employees on the 
business unit level. The production statistics database is based on yearly surveys conducted 
among roughly 80.000 firms per year, of which around 25.000-30.000 are in services and 
manufacturing.
Because we take only workers into consideration that worked at least 0.25 FTE and have 
earnings of at least the minimum wage in a specific year and attribute them to their “main” 
job only, the reported firm-level data about the number of employees and wages paid does 
not correctly match the aggregated employee level data anymore. To increase the validity 
of the data concerning the number of workers and wages paid by a firm, we conduct a 
bottom-up approach instead of using firm-level data. The sum of the full-time equivalent 
of individual jobs per year firm is calculated in order to determine the number of full-time 
jobs per firm. We used the same bottom-up approach to calculate the total and mean 
wages paid by firms; the sum of individual wages of employees matched to a firm instead 
of the information collected by the Production Statistics surveys.
2.2.2 Descriptives
In the period 1999-2015, the average real gross full-time wage has increased by 13.9% 
(0.086 log points) which is slightly higher than the increase in unweighted average wages 
paid by firms in our main sample. Table 2.1 shows the gross full-time earnings of individuals 
and firms and some standard inequality measures. In the period 1999-2015, the variance 
of log gross full-time earnings has increased by 0.067 log points (34.7%). Wage earnings 
dispersion is more present in the upper half of the earnings distribution, with an increase 
of p90-p50 of 0.205 log points, as compared to the lower half of the income distribution, 
with an increase of p50-p10 of 0.066 log points. In the same period, we observe an increase 
in the variance of log mean firm wages of 0.036 log points (56.3%).
2
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Table 2.1 Earnings dispersion of worker and firm wages
To get a quick first look into the development of the wage distribution, Figure 2.1 shows the 
juxtaposed development of different percentiles of individual and firm mean wages over 
time. The development of the income distribution of individuals and firms show strikingly 
similar patterns. The income of the top-earning individuals, as well as the mean wages paid 
by top-paying firms (both 90th percentile), have increased by respectively 22.2% and 19.6% 
in real terms. In contrast, the real income of the lower earning individuals and real wages 
paid by lower paying firms (both 10th percentile) has decreased by respectively 0.4% and 
1.21%. The two graphs do reveal some differences between individual’ and firm wage 
development as well; the increased dispersion at the individual level is more apparent 
at the upper half of the wage distribution, with median individual wages increasing only 
6.3%, while the dispersion is more equally distributed at the firm-level. Intuitively, the close 
resemblance of individual and firm mean wage dispersion seems to suggest an increasing 
importance of between-firm wage dispersion in individual income inequality. However, 
since these are aggregate statistics, where employees are not matched to their employers, 
within-firm inequality can theoretically still be the main driver of income dispersion.
 Employees Firms
 Year Obs  LN  Gini Variance perc perc perc Obs LN  Var 
   wages wages wages 90/10 90/50 50/10  wages wages 
 1999 3,806,081 10.330 0.254 0.193 1.036 0.536 0.501 78,486 10.260 0.064
 2000 3,925,236 10.348 0.256 0.193 1.035 0.534 0.501 81,152 10.278 0.064
 2001 3,965,229 10.361 0.259 0.196 1.047 0.548 0.499 82,783 10.286 0.068
 2002 3,973,353 10.367 0.259 0.198 1.052 0.554 0.498 82,955 10.287 0.068
 2003 3,894,809 10.378 0.258 0.196 1.049 0.553 0.496 81,959 10.297 0.069
 2004 3,815,376 10.402 0.263 0.203 1.070 0.566 0.504 80,143 10.317 0.072
 2005 3,803,178 10.383 0.269 0.212 1.092 0.583 0.509 80,100 10.300 0.076
 2006 3,839,854 10.403 0.280 0.227 1.140 0.608 0.532 79,407 10.332 0.088
 2007 4,049,116 10.422 0.286 0.233 1.157 0.616 0.541 84,130 10.357 0.089
 2008 4,067,568 10.440 0.284 0.234 1.168 0.619 0.550 85,062 10.372 0.090
 2009 3,999,649 10.468 0.282 0.236 1.186 0.621 0.564 83,219 10.394 0.092
 2010 3,930,551 10.475 0.284 0.239 1.195 0.628 0.568 75,945 10.402 0.090
 2011 3,970,990 10.468 0.289 0.245 1.206 0.635 0.571 76,335 10.396 0.093
 2012 3,923,002 10.464 0.292 0.252 1.232 0.649 0.583 74,883 10.389 0.097
 2013 3,818,223 10.408 0.299 0.254 1.228 0.672 0.556 70,610 10.329 0.095
 2014 3,741,767 10.409 0.299 0.255 1.235 0.670 0.565 69,327 10.328 0.097
 2015 3,794,315 10.416 0.305 0.260 1.241 0.675 0.567 70,089 10.331 0.100
 Change   0.086 0.051 0.067 0.205 0.139 0.066   0.071 0.036
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Figure 2.1 Changes in percenti les of annual individual and fi rm mean wages
2.3 Earnings dispersion between and within fi rms
2.3.1 Wage variance decompositi on
To explore the determinants of earnings dispersion in some more detail, the second step is 
to decompose individual earnings dispersion into its within- and between-fi rm component 
and calculate changes in these components over ti me. The same methodology is used as 
in Akerman et al., (2013), Song et al., (2019) and Barth et al., (2016). Let wijt be log real 
gross yearly earnings of worker i employed by fi rm j in year t, wt the average log wage 
of all workers in the sample in year t and wjt the average log wage of fi rm j in year t. The 
decompositi on of individual log yearly earnings is then as follows:
Since we are interested in the dispersion of wages, we take the variance of both sides, 
which gives:
The overall earnings dispersion in the sample, on the left -hand side, is calculated as the 
variance of log real individual full-ti me earnings. The fi rst term on the right-hand side 
calculates the variance of between-fi rm log average wages. This is a functi on of fi rm mean 
wages versus average wages for the whole sample. The second term on the right-hand side 
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terms. In contrast, the real income of the lower earning individuals and real wages paid by lower 
paying firms (both 10th percentile) has decreased by respectively 0.4% and 1.21%. The two 
graphs do reveal some differences between individual’ and firm wage development as well; the 
increased dispersion at the individual level is more apparent at the upper half of the wage 
distribution, with median individual wages increasing only 6.3%, while the dispersion is more 
equally distributed at the firm-level. Intuitively, the close resemblance of individual and firm 
mean wage dispersion seems to suggest an increasing importance of between-firm wage 
dispersion in individual income inequality. However, since these are aggregate statistics, where 
employees are not matched to their employers, within-firm inequality can theoretically still be 
the main driver of income dispersion. 
Figure 2.1: Changes in percentiles of annual individual and firm mean wages 
 
2.3 Earnings dispersion between and within firms 
2.3.1 Wage variance decomposition 
To explore the determinants of earnings dispersion in some more detail, the second step is to 
decompose individual earnings dispersion into its within- and between-firm component and 
calculate changes in these components over time. The same methodology is used as in Akerman 
et al., (2013), Song et al., (2019) and Barth et al., (2016). Let 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 be log real gross yearly 
earnings of worker i employed by firm j in year t, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 the average log wage of all workers in the 
sample in year t and 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   the average log wage of firm j in year t. The decomposition of 
individual log yearly earnings is then as follows: 
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The overall earnings di persion in the sample, on the left- and side, is calculated as the variance 
of log real individual full-time earnings. The first term on the right-hand side calculates the 
variance of between-firm log average wages. This is a function of firm mean wages versus 
average wages for the whole sample. The second term on the right-hand side calculates the 
variance of within-firm log earnings, this is a function of individual worker's wages versus firm 
mean wages. 
Table 2.2: Variance decomposition full-time wages: All employees (>0.25 FTE) and firms (>5 
FTE) in service and manufacturing 





1999 0.193 0.069 0.124 
2000 0.193 0.069 0.125 
2001 0.196 0.070 0.126 
2002 0.198 0.073 0.125 
2003 0.196 0.074 0.123 
2004 0.203 0.080 0.124 
2005 0.212 0.086 0.125 
2006 0.228 0.096 0.132 
2007 0.234 0.097 0.136 
2008 0.234 0.098 0.136 
2009 0.236 0.101 0.135 
2010 0.239 0.101 0.138 
2011 0.245 0.105 0.140 
2012 0.252 0.112 0.141 
2013 0.255 0.111 0.144 
2014 0.255 0.114 0.141 
2015 0.260 0.117 0.143 





Table 2.2 shows the decomposition of individual earnings variance into its within- and between-
firm components for the period 1999-2015. The results show that log earnings variance has 
increased by 0.067 log points in this period. In 2015 as well as in 1999, individual wages varied 
more within firms than between firms. However, the increase in log worker earnings variance 
is largely accounted for by the increase in between-firm wage variance: 71.6%, to be exact. 
These findings are strikingly similar to the findings of Barth et al., (2016) and Song et al., 
2
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calculates the variance of within-firm log earnings, this is a function of individual worker’s 
wages versus firm mean wages.
Table 2.2 Variance decomposition full-time wages: All employees (>0.25 FTE) and firms (>5 FTE) in 
service and manufacturing
Table 2.2 shows the decomposition of individual earnings variance into its within- and 
between-firm components for the period 1999-2015. The results show that log earnings 
variance has increased by 0.067 log points in this period. In 2015 as well as in 1999, 
individual wages varied more within firms than between firms. However, the increase in 
log worker earnings variance is largely accounted for by the increase in between-firm wage 
variance: 71.6%, to be exact. These findings are strikingly similar to the findings of Barth et 
al., (2016) and Song et al., (2019) for the United States. The same variance decomposition 
is applied to sub-samples with less restrictive worker and firm conditions, only full-time 
workers, only small or large firms and for different industries. The results can be found in 
Tables 2.A.1 – 2.A.3 in the appendix, and show that between-firm variance still accounts for 
the majority of the increase in earnings dispersion in all sub-samples. 
 Year Variance full-time wages Variance between firm Variance within firm
 1999 0.193 0.069 0.124
 2000 0.193 0.069 0.125
 2001 0.196 0.070 0.126
 2002 0.198 0.073 0.125
 2003 0.196 0.074 0.123
 2004 0.203 0.080 0.124
 2005 0.212 0.086 0.125
 2006 0.228 0.096 0.132
 2007 0.234 0.097 0.136
 2008 0.234 0.098 0.136
 2009 0.236 0.101 0.135
 2010 0.239 0.101 0.138
 2011 0.245 0.105 0.140
 2012 0.252 0.112 0.141
 2013 0.255 0.111 0.144
 2014 0.255 0.114 0.141
 2015 0.260 0.117 0.143
 Change 0.067 (35%) 0.048 (70%) 0.019 (15%)
 Share  71.64% 28.36%
PS_JVerhoeckx_def.indd   40 03-05-21   10:12
41
A F I R M VA R I A N C E D E C O M P O S I T I O N
Next, we apply the same methodology in order to test to what extent the between-firm 
component is driven by inter-industry or inter-region wage variability. The weighted 
between-firm wage variance component is decomposed into its between- and within-
industry and region shares. In Table 2.3 we present the results of the between-group 
components of between-worker and between-firm wage variance. The findings show that 
a considerable part of the increase in between-worker and between-firm wage variance is 
driven by increasing between-industry wage variance. For example, rising wage variance 
across 3-digit industries accounts for 48.3% of the increase in between-worker earnings 
dispersion and 67.4% of the increase in between-firm wage variance. Logically, this share 
declines with higher levels of industry aggregation. These results are in line with previous 
studies on inter-industry wage variance by for example Krueger and Summers (1988) and 
Gibbons & Katz (1992).
These results imply that the rising inequality between workers is not only driven 
by increased heterogeneity between firms within industries, but also by increased 
heterogeneity between firms between industries. This could indicate that firms in different 
industries vary more in for example their adoption of new technologies, their outsourcing 
behavior or the extent to which they are globally active, leading to increased industry-level 
productivity and wage-premium dispersion over time. Another explanation could be that 
any increased sorting of workers not only occurs at the firm-level, but high-wage workers 
are also increasingly concentrated in high-wage industries and low-wage workers in low-
wage industries.
Regional wage differentials appear to have only minor effects on between-firm wage 
variance, but the effect is somewhat increasing. Variation in firm mean wages located 
in different municipalities explains only 8.1% of worker log earnings variance in 2015, 
but 15.8% of the increase in individual earnings inequality and 22.0% of the increase in 
inter-firm wage variance between 1999 and 2015. Results for local labor markets (Corop 
regions), as defined by Statistics Netherlands, appear to have almost negligible effects on 
earnings variance. These results seem to suggest that the “urban wage premium” in the 
Netherlands is relatively small as compared to other countries (see for example Dauth et 
al., (2016) for an analysis on German regions), which could be due to the relatively close 
proximity of urban regions in the Netherlands.
2
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Table 2.3 Decomposition of between-worker and between-firm wage variance: All employees (>0.25 
FTE) and firms (>5 FTE) in service and manufacturing
Because of the longitudinal nature of the database, we are able to observe which workers 
stay at the same employer from one year to the other, and which workers change employer 
in a given year. Theoretically, entry and exit of firms, labor mobility and sorting of employees 
between firms could explain increased wage differences between firms. By applying the 
same analysis to a sub-sample with only workers who stayed at the same employer in two 
consecutive years and to a sub-sample with only workers that stayed at the same employer 
during the whole 1999-2015 period, we control for these possibilities. This way, changes 
in earnings variance are more likely to come from changes in mean firm wage variance or 
within-firm wage variance, rather than firm entry and/or exit.
Table 2.4 shows the results of our variance decomposition on a sub-sample of workers who 
stayed at the same firm from one year to the next. Increasing between-firm variance accounts 
for 77.9 percent of the increase in overall variance, which is higher than the estimated 
between-firm effect of the whole sample. More interestingly, increases in between-firm 
 Year Workers Firms 3-digit 2-digit 1-digit Municipa- Local labor  
    industries industries industries lities markets
 1999 0.193 0.069 0.040 0.029 0.010 0.010 0.005
 2000 0.193 0.069 0.039 0.028 0.010 0.010 0.006
 2001 0.196 0.070 0.039 0.029 0.010 0.010 0.007
 2002 0.198 0.073 0.041 0.031 0.012 0.011 0.007
 2003 0.196 0.074 0.043 0.032 0.012 0.011 0.007
 2004 0.203 0.080 0.047 0.035 0.013 0.012 0.007
 2005 0.212 0.086 0.050 0.037 0.014 0.014 0.007
 2006 0.228 0.096 0.056 0.039 0.014 0.015 0.008
 2007 0.234 0.097 0.057 0.041 0.015 0.017 0.008
 2008 0.234 0.098 0.057 0.041 0.015 0.017 0.009
 2009 0.236 0.101 0.059 0.043 0.016 0.017 0.010
 2010 0.239 0.101 0.062 0.045 0.017 0.017 0.010
 2011 0.245 0.105 0.065 0.047 0.018 0.018 0.010
 2012 0.252 0.112 0.071 0.052 0.019 0.019 0.009
 2013 0.255 0.111 0.069 0.050 0.019 0.020 0.010
 2014 0.255 0.114 0.071 0.052 0.019 0.020 0.010
 2015 0.260 0.117 0.072 0.053 0.019 0.021 0.010
 Change 0.067 0.048 0.032 0.024 0.009 0.011 0.005
 % worker var   71.64% 47.76% 35.82% 13.43% 16.42% 7.46%
 % firm var    66.67% 50.00% 18.75% 22.92% 10.42%
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wage differences account for 59% of the increase in total wage variance for workers who 
stayed at the same employer between 1999 and 2015. These results hint at a contribution 
of firm- and worker mobility to income inequality, but thus far wage differences between 
firms remain the dominant factor in explaining the increase in earnings dispersion. 
Table 2.4 Variance decomposition full-time wages job stayers: All employees (>0.25 FTE) in service and 
manufacturing who stayed at the same job in two consecutive years and during the whole period
2.3.2 Inequality across the earnings distribution
The variance decomposition in section 2.3.1 shows that the majority of the increase in 
overall log earnings variance is a driven by rising wage differentials across firms. However, 
since these are summary statistics based on all income groups, this does not illustrate to 
what extent this phenomenon is the same for all segments of the income distribution. 
We follow Song et al., (2019) by using a graphical analysis which shows the evolution of 
within- and between-group income over the earnings distribution in our sample. Three 
key variables are of interest: Individual worker’s log earnings wijt of worker i, employed by 
    Workers who stay at the same firm:  Workers who stay at the same firm:
   In consecutive years   During the whole period
 Year Observations Variance Variance  Observations Variance Variance
   wages between firms  wages between firms
 1999 2,504,160 0.166 0.050 291,719 0.120 0.046
 2000 2,208,193 0.152 0.050 291,719 0.115 0.047
 2001 2,279,763 0.158 0.054 291,719 0.116 0.048
 2002 2,308,979 0.157 0.054 291,719 0.116 0.047
 2003 2,395,103 0.156 0.055 291,719 0.116 0.048
 2004 2,529,277 0.166 0.061 291,719 0.123 0.053
 2005 2,043,984 0.171 0.071 291,719 0.131 0.059
 2006 1,951,941 0.190 0.079 291,719 0.146 0.067
 2007 2,187,159 0.193 0.078 291,719 0.154 0.070
 2008 2,332,966 0.193 0.078 291,719 0.156 0.070
 2009 2,339,585 0.193 0.077 291,719 0.157 0.070
 2010 2,352,742 0.195 0.078 291,719 0.160 0.072
 2011 2,497,243 0.200 0.080 291,719 0.166 0.075
 2012 2,539,686 0.202 0.083 291,719 0.171 0.079
 2013 2,506,488 0.220 0.090 291,719 0.186 0.085
 2014 2,461,210 0.216 0.091 291,719 0.184 0.085
 2015 2,707,555 0.229 0.099 291,719 0.198 0.092
 Change   0.063 (38%) 0.049 (98%)   0.078 (65%) 0.046 (100%)
 Share   77.78%    58.97%
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firm j in year t, log mean wages paid by firms wjt  and the difference between these two 
(wijt – wjt). For all variables we use log real full-time wages.
To construct wijt, we first sort all individuals into their respective percentiles according 
to their income in 1999 and 2015. For each percentile we calculate the average earnings 
for both periods. The line “individual” in Figure 2.2 shows the differences of the average 
earnings per percentile between the two years. For example, workers in the 50th percentile 
in 2015 earned on average 6.1 log point (6.3%) higher wages than workers in the 50th 
percentile earned in 1999.
For the next variable (wjt), we use the mean wages of the firms where the individual workers 
are employed. It should be noted however that the workers in specific earnings percentiles 
and their employers are not likely to be the same individuals and firms in 1999 as in 2015. 
For both periods, we again use the same ranking of individual earnings percentiles to 
calculate the average of the mean wages of their employers. The line “firm” in Figure 2.2 
shows the differences between 1999 and 2015 of the mean wages of firms that employ 
workers which are present in the specific earnings percentiles. For example, workers in the 
50th percentile in 2015 were employed by firms that paid on average 9.8 log point (10.3%) 
higher wages than firms who employed workers from the 50th percentile in 1999. 
The last variable (wijt – wjt) is based on the differences between individual earnings and 
mean firm wages. Per percentile of individual earnings, we calculate for both periods the 
average difference between individual earnings and the mean wages of their employers. 
The line “Individual/Firm” in Figure 2.2 shows the change of this variable between 1999 
and 2015. Technically, the “Individual/Firm” line shows the difference between the two 
other lines. For example, workers in the 50th percentile in 1999 had on average 3.5 log 
points (3.6%) lower earnings than the mean wage at their firms. In 2015, workers in the 
50th percentile earned on average wages that were 7.3 log points (7.6%) lower than their 
employer’s mean wages. For the 50th percentile this means that the increase of individual 
earnings was on average 3.8 log points (3.9%) lower than the increase in mean wages of 
the firms that hired workers from the 50th percentile.
In Figure 2.2 we present for all three variables the differences between the two specific 
periods. This way we can illustrate the importance of the between-firm component in the 
evolution of wage dispersion and how this relates to the wage distribution. For all three lines 
the interpretation is similar. An upward-sloping line means an increase in inequality, while 
a downward-sloping line means a decrease in inequality. If changes in between-firm wage 
differences are important for the increase in individual income inequality, the “individual” 
and “firm” lines should closely mirror each other. The “Individual/Firm” line represents any 
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changes in within-firm inequality over the period for specific income groups, with a positive 
slope reflecting an increase in within-firm inequality and a negative slope a decrease in 
within-firm inequality for the specific income groups. 
Figure 2.2 Wage differences by individual percentiles 1999-2015: All employees (FTE>0.25) in service 
and manufacturing working for plants with FTE>5
The results show some interesting and surprising findings. The increase in real wage earnings 
has been larger for workers in higher income percentiles, as shown by the upward sloping 
line. This illustrates that especially workers in the upper half of the income distribution 
have experienced an increase in their real income, and overall earnings inequality has 
increased. Furthermore, most of the increase in individual real wages was accompanied by 
similar or even larger increases in the mean wages paid by their employers. This means that 
individuals at the top of the income distribution now work for firms paying relatively higher 
wages than before, compared to individuals at the bottom of the distribution, implying an 
increasingly important role for firms in the rise of income inequality. 
The line “Individual/Firm” shows that individual workers, throughout most of the income 
distribution, receive roughly similar wages relative to their firm’s mean wages in 2015 as 
in 1999. However, there are some small but still interesting findings to observe. For the 
lower income groups, it can be seen that their earnings have increased relatively to the 
average wages paid by their firms and that the Individual/Plant line has a negative slope. 
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groups and/or that these workers are more often employed by lower paying firms. Workers 
between the 15th and 70th income percentile have seen their wages decrease slightly 
compared to their co-worker wages. Moreover, the “Individual/Firm” line is almost flat 
between the 20th and 65th percentile and mostly upward-sloping from the 65th percentile. 
This suggests that within-firm inequality has decreased for lower-wage workers, remained 
constant for middle-wage workers, while increased for higher-wage workers. Although 
these findings based on aggregate data raise some interesting questions, it seems too 
early to hypothesize about potential explanations. Overall, the findings are in line with the 
between-firm hypothesis, but there seems to be some heterogeneity in this effect for the 
different income groups.
We performed the same analysis for a different definition of “firm”, for the region and 
industry instead of the firm, for a larger sample with less strict worker and firm conditions, 
for only full-time employees, only workers who stayed at the same firm, only small or 
large firms, for different industries and for only the top 10% earners. The results of these 
analyses can be found in Figures 2.A.1 – 2.A.3 in the appendix. The main result holds; the 
increase in wage inequality seems to be mostly a between-firm phenomenon. However, 
when taking only full-time employees into account (Figure 2.A.2.B), we observe smaller 
within-firm inequality changes. Furthermore, the analysis of workers who stayed at the 
same firm during the entire sample period (Figure 2.A.2.C) hints at a more important role 
for within-firm wage variance. This could suggest that worker mobility, worker segregation 
and increased concentration of part-time workers is one of the explaining factors of the 
increase in wage variance.
2.4 Worker characteristics, firm effects and sorting of employees 
between firms
2.4.1 Worker characteristics and firm effects
The results in section 2.3 show that increasing differences between mean wages paid 
by firms are a potential explanation for increases in wage inequality in the Netherlands. 
The between-firm effect could be because of increasing differences of captured rents by 
companies, of which a part is shared with their employees. Another potential explanation 
could be sorting of employees between firms. More productive workers gravitate toward 
more productive firms, while less productive workers leave those firms and concentrate at 
lesser productive firms. We first employ the same methodology as Barth et al., (2016) to 
examine the returns to observable individual characteristics and disentangle the between-
firm effect into a firm fixed effect and sorting of workers between firms. This model, in 
turn, is based on the “AKM” model employed by among others Abowd et al., (1999) and 
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Card et al., (2013). The “AKM” model makes use of worker as well as firm fixed effects to 
capture the time-invariant heterogeneity among workers and firms. Because we first make 
use of yearly observations instead of longer time periods, adding worker fixed effects is not 
possible in this estimation.6 This leads to the following equation:
In this equation wijt  is the real gross full-time wage of employee i, hired by firm j in year t. 
To examine and control for the returns to individual observable characteristics, the widely 
applied Mincer equation (Mincer, 1974) is used as the first term of the right-hand side. 
xijt is a vector of individual worker characteristics, including age and its square, experience, 
gender, education, and a dummy for foreign-born workers. Accordingly, ß are year specific 
returns to individual characteristics. Furthermore, λijt is the vector of dummy variables for 
firm j which employs worker i in year t. This dummy is firm specific, which indicates we 
impose equal firm effects on all workers of a firm in a certain year. Individual heterogeneity 
in the firm fixed effect is placed in the error term and reflects the match between the 
individual and the firm. Equation 2.3 is estimated separately for all years in the data-set. 
Using this equation allows us to decompose the observed variance of log wages into a 
part which can be explained by the variance of the time-varying worker characteristics, 
the variance of firm-level average time-varying worker characteristics, the variance of the 
firm fixed effect, the co-variance between them and the variance of the error term. In 
our decomposition we use the same method as Barth et al., (2016) with one adaption. 
Following Song et al., (2019) we split the time-varying worker component into its firm-
level average and the difference between the individual worker component and the firm-
level average. When workers with similar observable “skills” gravitate to the same firms, 
this would now be captured by the firm-level average component. This gives the following 
decomposition:
 
Because the number of individual observations for which education data is available in 
our database increases over the years, which makes it likely to be biased, we first estimate 
equation 2.4 without education data in the Mincer equation. The results are depicted in 
Table 2.5. 
6  It is only possible to estimate worker- as well as firm-fixed effects in a dataset with sufficient mobility 
of workers between firms.
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of worker as well as firm fixed effects to capture the time-invariant heterogeneity among 
workers and firms. Because we first make use of yearly observations instead of longer time 
periods, adding worker fixed effects is not possible in this estimation.6 This leads to the 
following equation: 
(2.3)  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) = 0  
In this equation 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the real gross full-time wage of employee i, hired by firm j in year t. To 
examine and control for the returns to individual observable characteristics, the widely applied
Mincer equation (Mincer, 1974) is used as the first term of the right-hand side. 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector 
of individual worker characteristics, including age and its square, experience, gender, 
education, and a dummy for foreign-born workers. Accordingly, 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 are year specific returns to 
individual characteristics. Furthermore, 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the vector of dummy variables for firm j which 
employs worker i in year t. This dummy is firm specific, which indicates we impose equ l firm 
effects on all workers of a firm in a certain year. Individual heterogeneity in the firm fixed effect 
is placed in the error term and reflects the match between the individual and the firm. Equation 
2.3 is estimated separately for all years in the data-set.  
Using this equation allows us to d pose the observed variance of log wa es into a part
which can be explained by the variance of the time-varying worker characteristics, the variance 
of firm-level average time-varying worker characteristics, the variance of the firm fixed effect, 
the co-variance between them and the variance of the error term. In our decomposition we use 
the same method as Barth et al., (2016) with one adaption. Following Song et al., (2019) we 
split the time-varying worker component into its firm-level average and the difference between 
the individual worker component and the firm-level average. When workers with similar 
observable "skills" gravitate to the sa e firms, this would now be captured by the firm-level 
average component. This gives the following decomposition: 
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6 It is only possible to estimate worker- as well as firm-fixed effects in a dataset with sufficient mobility of workers 
between firms. 
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Table 2.5 Decomposition of wage variance after Mincer regressions (without education data). Data: All 
employees (FTE>0.25) in service and manufacturing working for plants with FTE>5
The findings show that changing earnings variance due to individual characteristics explains 
-4.3 percent of the increase in overall variance, while the changing variance of the residual 
accounts for 32.6 percent of the increase. This means that the increased within-firm wage 
variance explains 28.3 percent of the overall increase in wage variance. The between-firm 
component accounts for 71.7 percent of the increase in earnings dispersion, and is mostly 
determined by the firm-fixed effect (55.2% of total variance increase) with a relatively low 
share of 16.5 percent (0.7% + 15.8%) of the wage variance increase which can be associated 
with the segregation of workers and sorting and matching between workers and firms. 
As a first extension, we add education class (SOI) based skilled dummies to the individual 
characteristics in the Mincer equation. The results are depicted in Table 2.A.4 in the appendix. 
In this estimation we use our own created “skilled” variable based on imputation of available 
 Year Obs Variance Variance Variance Covariance Between- Variance Variance Within-
   wages mean firm  mean firm covariates residual firm
    covariates effect covariates variance (D) (E) variance
    (A) (B) & firm (A+B+C)   (D+E)
      effect
      (C)
 1999 3,806,081 0.193 0.015 0.044 0.010 0.069 0.039 0.085 0.124
 2000 3,925,236 0.193 0.015 0.046 0.008 0.069 0.037 0.087 0.125
 2001 3,965,229 0.196 0.014 0.048 0.007 0.070 0.037 0.089 0.126
 2002 3,973,353 0.198 0.014 0.050 0.010 0.073 0.036 0.089 0.125
 2003 3,894,809 0.196 0.013 0.050 0.011 0.074 0.034 0.089 0.123
 2004 3,815,376 0.203 0.013 0.054 0.012 0.080 0.034 0.090 0.124
 2005 3,803,178 0.212 0.014 0.059 0.013 0.086 0.034 0.092 0.125
 2006 3,792,897 0.228 0.016 0.065 0.015 0.096 0.036 0.096 0.132
 2007 4,001,458 0.234 0.016 0.067 0.015 0.097 0.037 0.099 0.136
 2008 4,067,568 0.234 0.016 0.067 0.015 0.098 0.037 0.099 0.136
 2009 3,999,649 0.236 0.015 0.069 0.017 0.101 0.036 0.099 0.135
 2010 3,930,551 0.239 0.015 0.069 0.017 0.101 0.037 0.102 0.138
 2011 3,970,990 0.245 0.016 0.071 0.019 0.105 0.037 0.103 0.140
 2012 3,923,002 0.252 0.017 0.074 0.021 0.112 0.038 0.103 0.141
 2013 3,765,865 0.255 0.016 0.077 0.018 0.111 0.037 0.108 0.144
 2014 3,741,767 0.255 0.016 0.078 0.020 0.114 0.036 0.105 0.141
 2015 3,794,315 0.260 0.016 0.081 0.021 0.117 0.036 0.107 0.143
 Change  0.067 0.0004 0.037 0.011 0.048 -0.003 0.022 0.019
 Share   0.7% 55.2% 15.8% 71.7% -4.3% 32.6% 28.3%
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education data. In 1999, education data is available for 44.8% of all individual observations 
in our database, this increases to 60.5% in 2015. Because of this, the sample size for which 
we estimate equation 2.4 increases over the years. The increase in overall variance among 
individuals for which education data is available is larger compared to the results without 
education data. The results show that increasing between-firm wage differences now explain 
65.8% of the increased income inequality, and the decomposition results of the between-
firm effects hint at a different source for this. After adding “skilled” dummies, it seems that 
segregation of workers and sorting between workers and firms is a more important driver 
of the between-firm effect, explaining 42.3% of the increase of total wage variance in our 
sample, while the firm fixed effect decreases in importance. However, the results show 
for both samples relatively high values of the residual variance. This is likely to come from 
unobserved worker heterogeneity which could partly be captured by including person-fixed 
effects. The same analysis is applied to multiple different samples. The results can be found in 
Tables 2.A.4 – 2.A.8 in the appendix and show that the between-firm effect is slightly smaller 
for full-time workers and smaller firms (<1000 FTE). This is in line with our earlier finding that 
the sorting of part-time workers might explain a part of the increased wage variance and 
suggests that worker heterogeneity between small and large firms has increased.
2.4.2 Worker- and firm-specific components
The results thus far show that increased between-firm wage variance explains a large share 
of the overall increase of individual worker earnings variance. As mentioned before, this 
can come from two distinct sources. It can be that firms have become more heterogeneous 
in their wages or that the workforce composition of firms has become more heterogeneous 
over time. In other words, do firms pay increasingly different wages to the same workers or 
do firms increasingly consist of different workers? In order to decompose earnings variance 
into its worker-specific and firm-specific component we make use of an “AKM” model as 
introduced by Abowd et al., (1999) and further developed by Card et al., (2013) and Song 
et al., (2019). This model will be estimated separately for four different time periods of four 
years each. The model we estimate for each of these periods is as follows:
In this equation wijt  is the log real gross full-time wage of employee i, hired by firm j in year t. 
γip is a time-invariant worker-specific effect for worker i in period p. Just as in equation 2.3, 
ßxijt  captures the time-variant worker observables and λijp the time-invariant firm-specific 
effect. Both the worker and firm specific effect are estimated for every whole period of 
four years. As for equation 2.3, any worker-firm specific match component is captured by 
the error term. 
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estimate equation 2.4 increases over the years. The increase in overall variance among 
individuals for which education data is available is larger compared to the results without 
education data. The results show that increasing between-firm wage differences now explain 
65.8% f the increased income inequality, nd the decomposition results of the etween-firm 
effects hint at a different source for this. After adding "skilled" dummies, it seems that 
segregation of workers and sorting between workers and firms is a more important driver of the 
between-firm effect, explaining 42.3% of the increase of total wage variance in our sample, 
while the firm fixed effect decreases in importance. However, the results show for both samples 
relatively high values of the residual variance. This is likely to come from unobserved worker 
heterogeneity which could partly be captured by including person-fixed effects. The same 
analysis is applied to ultiple different samples. The results can be found in Table 2.A.4 – 
2.A.8 in the appendix and show that the between-firm effect is slightly smaller for full-time 
workers and smaller firms (<1000 FTE). This is in line with our earlier finding that the sorting 
of part-time workers might explain a part of the increased wage variance and suggests that 
worker het rogen ity between small and large firms as increased. 
2.4.2 Worker- and firm-specific compone ts 
The results thus far show that increased between-firm wage variance explains a large share of 
the overall increase of individual worker earnings variance. As mentioned before, this can come 
from two distinct sources. It can be that firms have become more heterogeneous in their wages 
or that the workforce composition of firms has become more heter geneous over time. In other 
words, do firms pay increasingly different wages to the same workers or do firms increasingly 
consist of different workers? In order to decompose earnings variance into its worker-specific 
and firm-specific component we make use f an "AKM" model as introduced by Abowd et al., 
(1999) and further developed by Card et al., (2013) and Song et al., (2019). This model will be 
estimated separately for four different time periods of four years each. The model we estimate 
for each of these periods is as follows: 
(2.5)    ln𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 0 
In this equation 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the log real gross full-time wage of employee i, hired by firm j in year 
t. 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a time-invariant worker-specific effect for worker i in period p. Just as in equation 2.3, 
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 captures the time-variant worker observables and 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  the time-invariant firm-specific 
effect. Both the worker and firm specific effect are estimated for every whole period of four 
2
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The estimation of the time-invariant worker- and firm-specific components is based 
on worker mobility between sampled firms in the specific periods. Because of this, 
observations for workers employed by firms (and/or observations of firms) which had no 
workers moving between two firms in a sample period have to be dropped, leaving us with 
a slightly smaller and different sample as compared to earlier estimations. However, this 
could still leave us with firm fixed effects that are estimated using a relatively small number 
of workers moving between firms, which could lead to a downward bias in the correlation 
between the worker- and firm-fixed effects, suggesting low or even negative assortative 
matching7. This problem, called the “limited mobility bias”, could lead to considerable 
biases especially in finite samples with relative few movers between firms (Andrews et al., 
2008 and Andrews et al., 2012). Despite the fact that we cannot rule out the possibility that 
this problem affects our results, we do not think this is too problematic given our sample, 
results and research goal. The sample consists of all workers and all firms, the results show 
positive correlations between worker- and firm-fixed effects and we are interested in the 
development over time, which is less likely to be affected by the “limited mobility bias”, and 
not so much in the absolute levels of worker sorting. 
A second problem that could arise using two-way fixed effects models is related to the 
possible existence of systematic match effects between workers and firms (Eeckhout & 
Kirchner, 2011; Card et al., 2018). The AKM model assumes similar firm wage effects for 
all workers of the same firm. If certain worker types systematically receive different firm 
wage premiums from the same firm types as compared to other worker types, this would 
lead to a misspecification of the worker- as well as firm-fixed effects.8 As mentioned 
earlier, any worker-firm match effect will be captured by the residual. By calculating the 
mean residual for all combinations of workers and firm types it is possible to evaluate 
whether such a bias exists. In an ideal case, with no evidence of systematic worker-firm 
match effects, the average residual per worker and firm effects combination should be 
(close to) zero. If firm effects vary systematically with worker skills, the mean residuals 
should depart from zero and differ between different firm- and worker types. Figure 2.A.4 
in the appendix shows the mean residuals for all 100 possible combinations of deciles of 
the estimated worker effects and deciles of the estimated firm effects for the first and 
fourth period. The results in this figure show that the mean residuals are all remarkably 
close to 0 with almost negligible differences between the different groups. For example, 
the mean residual for workers in the 10th decile (highest worker fixed effects) employed 
by firms in the 10th decile (highest firm fixed effects) in the first period is 0.0026. This 
7  Some early studies using two-way fixed effects models in combination with employer-employee 
linked datasets found negative correlations between worker- and firm- fixed effects (for example Abowd 
et al., 1999)
8  Worker- and firm-types are here defined as deciles of worker- and firm fixed effect coefficients.
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means that these workers receive on average a wage that is only 0.26% higher than 
estimated by the AKM model.
Figure 2.3 Average wage changes of workers moving between firm fixed effect quartiles
The third potential problem we would like to address is about the direction and exogeneity 
of worker mobility between firms. The AKM model estimates the firm fixed effects as a 
wage premium received by all employees of that firm. This means that all workers who 
move between two firms with different wage premiums should be faced by the same 
increase or decrease in their wages. If the AKM model is specified correctly, this wage 
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followed Card et al., (2016 & 2018) and Song et al., (2019) in performing an event-study 
analyses on the wage change of movers between different firms. The results are depicted in 
Figure 2.3. All firms are divided into quartiles according to their firm fixed effects. We then 
measure the average wages, two years before as well as two years after moving, of workers 
that moved between two firms that are allocated to different firm fixed effects quartiles. 
The results show that, on average, wage changes of workers moving between firms with 
different wage premiums are rather symmetric and do not seem to be influenced by the 
direction of mobility. Furthermore, the results in Figure 2.3 show that the average wages of 
workers in the years before and after the move are rather stable. Workers who are about 
to receive a wage gain by moving to a firm with a higher wage premium do not seem to 
receive significant wage gains in the two years before this move. 
Overall, we conclude that our version of the AKM model is suitable to study the evolution 
of the different wage variance components in the sample. The estimated parameters for 
the different periods, and their change over time, are used to further decompose the 
between- and within-firm variance. The decomposition method applied is similar to the 
method of Song et al., (2019), which includes splitting the worker components into its firm-
level average and the difference between the worker and firm-level component. This leads 
to the following decomposition:
Using this method yields some advantages. First of all, firm-level average worker effects 
measure segregation of workers between firms, which makes us better able to study the 
effects of worker segregation and sorting between firms. Furthermore, this decomposition 
method leads to between- and within-firm shares which are exactly equal to the “raw” 
decomposition shares using equation 2.2, suggesting this method is better able in identifying 
the different components of worker variance as compared to previous decomposition 
methods applied to the “AKM” estimation. For clarification, Table 2.A.9 in the appendix 
shows the meaning of the different components of the variance decompositions. Table 2.6 
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Using this method yields some advantages. First of all, firm-level average worker effects 
measure segregation of workers between firms, which makes us better able to study the effects 
of worker segregation and s rting between firms. Furthermore, this dec mposition method 
leads to between- and withi -firm shares which are exactly equal to the "raw" decomposition 
shares using equation 2.2, suggesting this method is better able in identifying the different 
components of worker variance as compared to previous decomposition methods applied to the 
"AKM" estimation. For clarification, Table 2.A.9 in the appendix shows the meaning of the 
different components of the variance decompositions. Table 2.6 presents the results of the 
decomposition of workers earnings for our main sample based on equation 2.6. 
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The results show some interesting findings. In all periods, the variance of time-invariant 
worker-specific effects explains around 65% of the level of individual log gross yearly 
earnings. This consists of a within-firm component (γip – γjp), which explains 45-50%, and 
a between-firm component (γjp), which explains 15-20% of the level of individual earnings 
variance. Time-varying worker observables explain in total 9-12% of the level of worker-
level wage variance, this consists of a within-firm component (ßxijt – ßxjp), which accounts 
for 7.5-10% and a between-firm component (ßxjp), that only contributes around 1.5% 
to the level of overall earnings variance. Time-invariant firm-specific effects account for 
7-9%, the different co-variance measures explain about 10-15% and the residual explains 
around 3.5-6%. To summarize, within-firm wage variance is still the most important factor 
in explaining the level of wage variance, although its share has decreased from 65% in the 
first period to 57% in the last period. 
When looking at the changes over time, we observe different explanatory factors. The 
increase in log earnings variance is for 69.8% a between-firm phenomenon. The results 
indicate that worker segregation is the main factor driving this. Increasing differences in 
firm-level average worker-fixed effects explain 31.9% of the increase in earnings variance. 
Workers with certain unobserved skills are increasingly clustering in the same firms, this 
leads to growing differences in workforce composition between firms. Furthermore, the 
co-variance between worker- and firm components together explain another 27.5% of the 
increase in earnings variance. This means that the different measures of worker sorting 
and segregation between firms together explain 59.4% of the increased income inequality. 
Besides that, increased heterogeneity between pure firm-effects accounts for 10.1% of the 
increase in worker earnings variance. Another measure of segregation is included, based on 
Song et al., (2019), which shows the relation between average worker fixed effects per firm 
and individual worker fixed effects. The higher this index, the more important clustering 
of similar workers in specific firms is in accounting for overall wage variance. This index 
has increased from 0.230 to 0.292, showing the increased importance of the clustering of 
workers with similar skills in the same firms. Overall, we find worker segregation and sorting 
to be more important in explaining the evolution of income variance in the Netherlands 
compared to most other studies on the subject for different countries.9
To test if these findings are influenced by our sample selection, we have performed the 
same analyses on different samples. The results of these are presented in Tables 2.A.9 - 
2.A.12 in the appendix. As with all previous analyses, the main results hold; the increase in 
individual wage variance has been mostly a between-firm phenomenon, and this is mainly 
9  With the exception of Song et al., (2019) who contribute all growing between-firm wage variance to 
the segregation and sorting of workers between firms.
PS_JVerhoeckx_def.indd   54 03-05-21   10:12
55
A F I R M VA R I A N C E D E C O M P O S I T I O N
driven by worker segregation and sorting of workers between firms. The results of the 
estimation of equation 2.6 (Table 2.A.9) on a larger sample, where lower paid workers and 
smaller firms are also included, show an even larger role for firms in the increased wage 
variance. These lower paid workers earn wages below the official minimum wage, and 
appear to be even more segregated and sorted into low- and high-paying firms. 
When the same analysis is limited to only full-time workers (Table 2.A.10), we observe 
a somewhat smaller between-firm effect. Furthermore, the components that drive the 
between-firm wage differences are different as compared to the main sample. Segregation 
of workers, as measured by the average person-fixed effect per firm, now dominates the 
increased wage variance, explaining in itself already 46.4% of the change in wage variance. 
The other components have all decreased in importance. This could mean that full-time 
workers have segregated more into different firms based on their skills and the skills of 
their co-workers, which in itself creates between-firm wage differences, but that this 
segregation is to a smaller extent based on the wage premium of the firm and the match 
with the firm. 
As a last step, the sample is split between larger firms that employ more than 1000 FTE 
per year, and smaller firms that employ less than 1000 FTE per year. The results, in Table 
2.A.11 & 2.A.12 in the appendix, show that between-firm differences are more important 
in explaining wage variance for workers who are employed by large firms than for workers 
who are employed by smaller firms. This difference is mainly determined by the co-variance 
between average worker fixed effects and firm fixed effects, suggesting that sorting of 
workers into firms with compatible skills is more apparent for larger firms.
2.4.3 Visualization of worker sorting
The segregation and sorting of workers between firms, leading to increased unobserved 
worker skills heterogeneity, is proven to be the dominant factor explaining the increase in 
wage variance. In Figure 2.4 we show the development of sorting of high- and low wage 
workers into high- and low wage firms in a more intuitive and graphical way. Using the 
same main sample as used to construct Table 2.6, all individual workers are assigned to 
5 groups of 20 percentiles each, based on their individual worker fixed effects. Firms are 
assigned to 10 decile groups based on their firm fixed effects. For each combination of 
worker- and firm-fixed effect groups, the share of workers in these groups are calculated. 
The vertical axis in Figure 2.4 shows the firm fixed effects deciles, the horizontal axis the 
share of workers employed by these firms. If workers are randomly distributed over firms, 
we would expect all shares to be equal. If workers are completely sorted, the workers with 
high person fixed effects would all work for firms with high firm fixed effects, and workers 
with low worker fixed effects would work for firms with low firm fixed effects. 
2
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The visualization in Figure 2.4 shows that in period 1 (2000-2003), workers were already 
sorted between firms based on their individual skills and the firm wage premiums. Firms 
in the lower two deciles clearly employ a larger share of workers which are in the lower 
person fixed effects groups, and firms in the higher deciles employ more workers from the 
higher person fixed effects groups. This worker sorting has increased over time, shown by 
the more segregated distribution in period 4 (2012-2015) and by the change between the 
two periods. Compared to period 1, firms in the lower four groups of firm-fixed effects 
employ more workers from the lower person fixed effects groups and less workers from 
the higher person fixed effects groups. The firms in the upper 6 groups of firm-level fixed 
effects show the opposite. These firms hire less workers from the lower person fixed effects 
groups and more workers from the higher fixed effects groups. 
2.5 Conclusion and discussion
Individual wage inequality of gross earnings in the Netherlands has increased by more 
than one third between 1999 and 2015. A combination of empirical methods and 
graphical constructs are used to decompose workers earnings variance into its within- and 
between-firm components. The main finding is that the increase in log real fulltime wage 
variance of workers in the manufacturing and service industries is mostly a between-firm 
phenomenon. Workers with comparable observable and unobservable skills earn different 
wages in different firms, and this difference is increasing over time. Although these results 
are in line with some recent related studies on this subject, it seems surprising that these 
developments also hold for a country like the Netherlands, which has more collectivistic 
labor market institutions, sectoral-level collective bargaining and a relatively low level of 
income inequality. 
In absolute terms, individual wages vary more within firms than between firms, this holds 
in 1999 as well as in 2015. However, the increase in between-firm wage heterogeneity 
accounts for 69.8% of the total increase in wage variance in our main sample and sample 
period. Although the results differ slightly between different samples of workers and firms, 
the results are highly robust for different industries, different samples of worker selection 
and different samples of firm selection. Moreover, the graphical constructs show that 
this relation between individual and firm wage development applies to the entire income 
distribution and is not determined by certain income groups. 
The decomposition of the between-firm wage variance shows that this development is 
mainly driven by increased worker heterogeneity between firms, implying that workers 
are more segregated and sorted between firms. This occurs in two main ways. Workers 
2
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with comparable skills, and therefore comparable wages, increasingly cluster together 
in the same firms (segregation). Second, high-skilled and therefore high-wage workers 
increasingly work for high-wage firms, and vice versa (sorting). This segregation and sorting 
of workers between firms explains roughly half of the total increase in wage variance in our 
main sample. Here, segregation is measured by the average person fixed effect per firm, 
which accounts for 32% of the increase in wage variance and the co-variance between 
the average person-fixed effects and the firm fixed effects, which accounts for 20% of the 
increase in wage variance.
These results are quite robust for different sample selections as well. Although the 
importance of certain components differs when relaxing the selection criteria, only taking 
full-time workers into account or making a distinction between firms based on their size, 
the segregation and sorting of employees is always the most important factor in explaining 
the increased wage variance. Wage differences between firms based on “pure” firm 
wage premiums are less important, but can still account for 10% of the increased wage 
variance. This means that firms, independent from the composition of their work-forces, 
are increasingly willing and able to pay different wages than other firms do. 
The main findings indicate that worker-worker and worker-firm sorting has changed 
substantially over the last decades. This raises the question what factors drive this 
divergence in the workforce composition of firms. There is surprisingly little known about 
the exact causes of increased sorting in labor markets. Any plausible explanation has to 
explain why firms are either increasingly different in their incentives or in their ability to 
attract or retain certain workers. Ultimately, this comes down to a trade-off between the 
benefits of attracting and paying for employees with specific skills, in the context of the 
skills of their co-workers and the firm itself, relative to the costs of searching and matching 
the right workers or relocating certain activities to external workers or companies. 
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10  This chapter is based on a joint paper with Anna Salomons and 
Utz Weitzel, Growing apart together. Current status: in preparation 
for submission. Jan Verhoeckx is the lead author and has been the 
main contributor in all stages of this study, including idea generation, 
data management, data analysis, results interpretation and writing 
the chapter. This chapter is based on CBS microdata, funded by 
Radboud University.
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3.1 Introduction
There is a substantial and growing body of empirical studies which find that the majority of 
the rising variance in gross wages paid to individual workers can be attributed to increasing 
differences in mean wages paid by firms, even within narrowly defined industries and 
regions (Card et al., 2013, Barth et al., 2016, Song et al., 2019). These findings suggest that 
between-firm wage dispersion has been growing faster than within-firm wage dispersion. 
In the previous chapter, it is established that around 65-70% of the increase in total wage 
inequality in the Netherlands occurs at the between-firm level, which is remarkably similar 
to results of related studies for different countries.11 The growing between-firm wage 
variance in the Netherlands can primarily be attributed to the segregation and sorting of 
workers between different firms. 
The fact that average firm wages are growing apart does not seem to be an isolated 
development. For example, differences in firm productivity levels, again within narrowly 
defined industries, appear to be significant, persistent and ubiquitous (Syverson, 2011). 
Between-firm productivity divergence is a cross-country phenomenon, and most evident 
in the gap between (global) frontier firms and the rest (Andrews et al., 2016; Berlingieri et 
al., 2017). These productivity differences, in turn, can be linked to firm-level heterogeneity 
in various domains like exporting behavior (e.g., Bernard et al., 1995; Bernard et al., 2003; 
Helpman et al., 2004), IT capital intensity and R&D expenditures (e.g., Faggio et al., 2010; 
Doraszelski & Jaumandreu 2013), management practices (e.g., Bloom & Van Reenen 2007) 
and outsourcing behavior or the use of external or temporary workers (e.g., Weil 2014; 
Katz & Krueger 2019). 
Simultaneously, many countries and industries have experienced a decline in the labor 
share of GDP in recent decades and, related to that, witnessed a decoupling of average 
wage growth and average labor productivity growth. However, while in for example the 
United States the share of GDP going to labor has declined on the aggregate level, the 
unweighted mean labor shares within firms has not fallen. This phenomenon appears to 
be determined by firm-level productivity differences as well, where the most productive 
firms within industries (which are often firms with relatively low labor shares) generate 
an increasing share of total value-added in their industries (Autor et al., 2017; Kehrig & 
Vincent, 2017; Salomons, 2018). 
An important question that remains insufficiently answered is to what extent and in which 
way between-firm performance differences are related to the previously established 
11  Considering the lower absolute level of income inequality and the relative importance of industry 
level wage bargaining.
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between-firm wage variance and how this relationship has developed over time. Overall, 
the link between firm-level performance and wage heterogeneity is found to be strong. 
Several studies have found a positive and relatively strong relation between firm-level 
productivity and profitability measures and average firm-level wages (e.g., Abowd & 
Lemieux, 1993; Van Reenen, 1996; Faggio et al., 2010; Barth et al., 2016). 
However, most of these studies use average firm- or industry-level wages as their variable 
of interest and consequently do not (fully) account for differences in the workforce 
composition of these firms. See Card et al., (2018) for an extensive overview of the literature 
on this subject. Any linkage between increasing firm-level productivity differences and 
growing mean firm wage variance can be attributed to two potential sources: (i) increasing 
heterogeneity in firm wage premiums paid to all workers, where the differences in wage 
premiums are related to differences in productivity levels, or (ii) increasing heterogeneity 
in average worker quality between high- and low productivity firms. The former source 
could mean that, for example, limited technology diffusion and/or (labor) market 
imperfections lead to higher concentrations of economic activity which results in wage 
premium differences. The latter could mean that firms are increasingly incentivized and/or 
able to select certain (skill levels of) workers. Since most empirical studies on the subject 
do not make a distinction between these two different sources, it is unknown to what 
extent firm-level productivity heterogeneity is associated with different wages for similar 
workers because of rent-sharing differences or with varying wages because of differences in 
workforce composition. Firms that hire more skilled workers will probably generate higher 
revenue and pay higher wages, not taking this into account will lead to an upward bias in 
the estimated relation between firm performance and firm wages (Card et al., 2018). 
Theoretical explanations for the parallel existence of productivity and wage differences 
between firms are also based on these two potential sources. For example, differences 
in productivity could come from different adaptation rates of technological progress 
which in turn could instigate firm-level differences in productivity (and/or profitability) 
per employee (Caselli, 1999). However, in a competitive (labor) market, these productivity 
differences alone would not lead to different wages for similar workers since labor mobility 
and product market competition would eliminate these differences. Concepts like fair 
wages, compensating differentials, efficiency wages or the existence of certain (labor) 
market frictions have been suggested to explain why firms would share their captured rents 
with their workers (Groshen, 1991). Rent-sharing with workers creates incentives for firms 
to critically assess their workforce composition in order to reduce the scope of activities 
for which these rents are shared with their employees. Firms can do this for example 
by choosing to outsource or offshore part of their production, use external workers or 
focus more on their core-competencies. This is also reflected by the declining existence of 
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large vertically integrated firms because of decreasing market transaction costs (Prahalad 
& Hamel, 1990; Katz & Krueger, 2019; Goldschmidt & Schmieder, 2017). Furthermore, 
heterogeneous workers, heterogeneous firms and complementarities between workers’ 
and firms have been introduced to bargaining- and job-search models to explain worker 
sorting and assortative matching (Kremer & Maskin, 1996; Cahuc et al., 2006; Håkanson 
et al., 2020). 
The primary goal of this study is to examine the relation between firm performance 
and firm-level wages. To account for observed and unobserved heterogeneity in worker 
quality at the firm-level, we apply the two-way fixed effects methodology [AKM model] 
as introduced by Abowd et al., (1999) and further developed by Card et al., (2013). This 
methodology enables us to split firm average wages into a “pure” firm wage premium, 
a part coming from firm-level average unobserved worker skills and a part coming from 
firm-level average worker observables. In the second step, we regress these different 
components of firm average wages on a set of various measures of firm performance. This 
way we can test to what extent the relationship between the performance of companies 
and the wages of employees depends on rent-sharing or the sorting of employees. Next 
to that, the within-firm standard deviation of worker fixed effects is used to measure the 
within-firm dispersion of workers’ skills in order to study the relation between firm-level 
productivity and within-firm worker quality heterogeneity and wage variance.
We find that better-performing firms, on average, pay higher wages. Moreover, the strength 
of this link between firm performance and firm mean wages is increasing over time. For 
example, the correlation between labor productivity, measured as value-added per FTE, 
and firm mean wages has increased from 0.12 in period 1 (2001-2004) to 0.2 in period 4 
(2013-2016). Variance decompositions based on these regressions show that the share 
of total between-firm wage variance that can be accounted for by between-firm labor 
productivity differences has grown from 15.5% to 21.3% in this period. Although we find 
lower correlations when using firm-level profitability (measured as quasi-rents per FTE), a 
similar development as with labor productivity is observed.
These results indicate that better-performing firms, on average, pay higher wages than 
their less well-performing counterparts. Furthermore, the divergence of wages between 
firms with different performance levels, as well as the importance of firm performance for 
wages, has been growing over time. The evolution of this positive relationship between 
firm performance and firm mean wages over time is mostly due to growing heterogeneity 
in unobserved worker skills between firms and for a smaller part because of divergence in 
rent sharing by firms. This means that good workers increasingly cluster together in high 
productivity and therefore high wage firms, as already predicted and observed by Kremer 
3
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& Maskin (1996). We also observe that better performing firms, next to a workforce with 
higher average skills, also have a workforce with more heterogeneous skills. 
Depending on the measure of firm performance, the results show that about 30-40% of 
the inequality in the level of average firm wages between more and less productive firms is 
due to differential rent sharing and 55-65% can be attributed to workforce heterogeneity. 
Furthermore, changing differences in rent sharing between firms with different performance 
levels can only account for 2.5-3.5% of the total increase in between-firm wage variance 
over time. In contrast, changing differences in workforce composition between more- and 
less productive firms are associated with 8-15% of the total increase in between-firm wage 
variance. These findings indicate that worker sorting between more- and less productive 
firms is the main channel through which firm-level productivity heterogeneity can be linked 
to firm-level wage variance. 
The existence of rent-sharing and complementarities between workers’ and firm skills 
create incentives for firms to search and select workers with high- and matching skills. A 
natural next step would be to investigate how some firms are able to select a workforce 
with higher or better matching skills than other firms. A possible explanation might be 
found in firm-level choices, structures and policies concerning the nature of the relationship 
between workers and firms (e.g., Katz & Krueger, 2019; Song et al., 2019; Berlingieri et 
al., 2017; Goldschmidt & Schmieder 2017). Firms can, for example, differ to what extent 
they rely on their permanent workers or make use of external workers, outsource parts 
of their production or use temporary workers. In an explorative analysis, we estimate 
the relation between the aforementioned components of firm wages and the firm-level 
choices concerning the use of these alternative work arrangements, flexible workers or 
outsourcing parts of their production to outside firms. The findings suggest that firms that 
make more use of flexible or short-term employer-employee relations pay lower wage 
premiums to their regular workers and have, on average, a lower quality workforce. On the 
other hand, firms that make more use of contract workers or outsourcing of their inputs 
pay higher wage premiums to workers on their payroll and have a higher quality workforce.
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2, the data- collection, selection and 
management is described and the wage decomposition process is explained. Section 3.3 
presents some illustrative descriptive figures. In section 3.4 the estimation strategies are 
discussed and the results presented. Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Data selection 
3.2.1 Data selection and sampling strategies
This chapter makes use of several different longitudinal micro-datasets collected by Statistics 
Netherlands (CBS) covering the period 2001-2016. For the analyses, the sample is divided 
into four periods of four years each: 2001-2004, 2005-2008, 2009-2012 and 2013-2016. 
Data is collected on the job-level, the person-level, and the firm-level. Firms are defined 
as “business units” and identified by their unique identification code. In the remainder of 
this chapter the words firm, establishment and business-unit are used interchangeably, 
but all refer to the business-unit as defined by CBS Netherlands. The main goal of this 
chapter is to establish to what extent the link between firm performance and worker wages 
reflects rent-sharing between the firm and their workers or it reflects differences in the 
skill composition of the firms’ workforce. Therefore, the main aim of the data merging 
process is to allow for a match between the firm-level outcomes of the worker-level wage 
estimations and the firm-level production statistics. To achieve this, data management and 
data analysis consists of two consecutive stages. First, we need to estimate the worker- 
and firm-specific pay components of each job in each of the four periods. This is estimated 
on the full population of firms and workers that fulfill our criteria and are available in 
the employer-employee wage data, which results in a larger sample than the sample of 
firms for which financial and performance data is available. In the second stage, firm-level 
aggregate outcomes of these worker-level estimates are merged with firm production 
statistics. This results in the firm-level unbalanced panel which is used in the main analyses 
for this chapter. 
3.2.2 First stage
In the first stage, characteristics of all jobs are matched with wage information for these 
jobs using the unique job identifier as used by CBS. Workers can have multiple jobs per year; 
these can be multiple jobs at the same firm or different jobs at different firms. If a worker 
has multiple jobs at the same firm in the same year, the data is aggregated at the person-
level using the unique personal identification code, and these different jobs are treated as 
the same single job. If a worker has different jobs at multiple firms in a specific year, we 
attach the worker to the firm where the worker has the highest earnings in that year. The 
size of each job is calculated using the number of days a worker has worked relative to the 
number of days a worker could have worked given the length of the contract.12 Earnings are 
calculated as constant full-time yearly gross wages, which are converted to 2015 euros using 
the Consumer Price Index. To ensure workers in our sample have a sufficient attachment to 
12  This could lead to biased results since we do not account for any differences in hours per day worked, 
however we assume that the number of hours worked per day has remained relatively stable over time. 
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the labor market, and to improve comparability with related studies, we only use workers 
between the ages 20-60 that work at least two days per week, have a job of more than 0.25 
FTE per year and earn at least the minimum wage. Furthermore, only firms that employ at 
least the equivalent of five full-time workers per year and are active in a manufacturing or 
service industry are included in this study. 
The two-way fixed effects model, as developed by Abowd et al., (1999) and Card et al., 
(2013), estimates firm wage premiums as a firm fixed effect based on wage changes of 
workers who are employed by at least two different firms (in at least two distinct years) 
in the same period. Worker quality is therefore derived from the wage a worker earns 
independent from its observable characteristics and the firm wage premium. The firm fixed 
effects can only be estimated correctly if all firms and workers in the sample are connected 
through worker mobility. This means that, ideally, the sample should contain all the 
workers that ever worked for any of the firms in the sample, as well as all the firms where 
any of these workers ever worked. Furthermore, early studies using this kind of models 
reported low or even negative correlations between the firm- and worker fixed effects, 
suggesting there is no positive or even negative assortative matching. Abowd et al., (2004) 
and Andrews et al., (2008 & 2012) show that these correlations are biased downward due 
to the ‘limited mobility bias’. The limited mobility bias leads to an overestimation of the 
person fixed effects and a corresponding underestimation of the firm fixed effects in smaller 
subsamples and for firms with limited mobility of workers between firms in the sample 
period. In the previous chapter we already addressed some of the relevant methodological 
concerns with regard to the two-way fixed effects model. As an extra safeguard, the sample 
only includes firms that have at least five workers that move between two firms in a specific 
sample period. Since our sample is complete (contains all connected workers and firms in 
the respective industries) and we do observe positive and increasing correlations between 
worker- and firm-fixed effects, we think that these concerns are sufficiently covered. 
The sample selection process results in four samples, of four years each, with 10.8 to 11.8 
million worker observations per period. These worker observations consist of 3.1 to 3.4 
million unique workers hired by 60 to 80 thousand unique firms. The workers and firms 
in these periods are all connected through worker mobility and all fulfill the previously 
mentioned conditions. Using these samples, the AKM estimations decompose the individual 
yearly earnings of all workers into a firm-specific and two worker-specific components. 
The AKM model decomposes the log of the wage (wijt) of a worker (i), employed at a specific 
firm (j) in a specific year (t) into the sum of a yearly time-variant covariate index (ßxijt), an 
estimated worker effect component (γip) and an estimated firm-specific component (λjp). 
The worker- and firm-effects are estimated per period (p). The time-variant covariate index 
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includes year dummies, a polynomial in age, years of experience at the current employer, 
the fulltime ratio of the job and the interaction of all these covariates with a gender 
dummy.13 
 
The worker-specific components are aggregated at the firm-level and measure (i) the 
average earnings related to observable worker characteristics (age, gender, size of the 
job and experience) and (ii) average earnings related to unobservable skills (based on 
the worker fixed effects) of the employees of each firm. Finally, we calculate the standard 
deviation of the unobservable worker quality (worker fixed effects coefficients) of each 
firm as a measure of skill heterogeneity at the firm-level. Since worker- and firm-fixed 
effects have to be interpreted as the wage difference relative to the last worker and firm 
in the sample, these cannot be compared across time periods (Abowd et al., 1999). For 
this reason, all worker- and firm-fixed effects are normalized for each period to an average 
value of zero. This way the worker- and firm-fixed effects reflect the wage difference (in log 
points) relative to the average worker and firm in each sample period. 
3.2.3 The second stage
In the second stage, the firm-level aggregates of the estimated individual wage components, 
based on the AKM estimations using the full universe of workers and firms, are merged 
with the firm-level production statistics. The merging process is performed using the 
unique business-unit identification code. The firm production statistics database includes 
information about among others turnover, profit, value-added, wage costs, depreciation, 
outsourcing, contract workers and the number of employees at the business unit level. The 
production statistics database is based on yearly surveys conducted among roughly 25.000-
30.000 firms in services and manufacturing. After cleaning of the data and matching with 
the firms in the wage data, this results in 16 to 21 thousand firms per year for which we 
have observable measures of firm performance as well as the aggregate estimated wage 
components. The sampling strategy of the production statistics has changed over time and 
in all waves of these surveys, large firms are oversampled. To counteract any potential 
effects this, or possible outliers or measurement errors in the sampling data, can have 
on the results, some measures have been taken. All firm observations for which value-
added was not available or had less than 5 employees in a specific year have been dropped, 
only firms for which there are at least two observations per four year period are taken 
into account, all firm-level production statistics are averaged over the four year periods 




positive and increasing correlations between worker- and firm-fixed effects, we think that these 
concerns are sufficiently covered.  
The sample selection process results in four samples, of four years each, with 10.8 to 11.8 
million worker observations per period. These worker observations consist of 3.1 to 3.4 million 
unique workers hired by 60 to 80 thousand unique firms. The workers and firms in these periods 
are all connected through worker mobility and all fulfill the previously mentioned conditions. 
Using these samples, the AKM estimations decompose the individual yearly earnings of all 
workers into a firm-specific and two worker-specific components.  
The AKM model decomposes the log of the wage �𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� of a worker (𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤), employed at a specific 
firm (𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗) in a specific year (𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤)  into the sum of a yearly time-variant covariate index �𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�, an 
estimated worker effect component �𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�  and an estimated firm-specific component �𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�. The 
worker- and firm-effects are estimated per period (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝). The time-variant covariate index includes 
year dummies, a polynomial in age, years of experience at the current employer, the fulltime 
ratio of the job and the interaction of all these covariates with a gender dummy. 13   
(3.1)  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +   𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     
The worker-specific components are aggregated at the firm-level and measure (i) the average 
earnings related to observable worker characteristics (age, gender, size of the job and 
experience) and (ii) average earnings related to unobservable skills (based on the worker fixed 
effects) of the employees of each firm. Finally, we calculate the standard deviation of the 
unobservable worker quality (worker fixed effects coefficients) of each firm as a measure of 
skill heterogeneity at the firm-level. Since worker- and firm-fixed effects have to be interpreted 
as t wage difference rela ive to the last worker and firm in the sample, these cannot be 
compared across time periods (Abowd et al., 1999). For this reason, all worker- and firm-fixed 
effects are normalized for each period to an average value of zero. This way the worker- and 
firm-fixed effects reflect the wage difference (in log points) relative to the average worker and 
firm in each sample period.  
3.2.3 The second stage 
In the s cond stage, the firm-level aggregates of the estimated individual wage components, 
based on the AKM estimations using the full universe of workers and firms, are merged with 
the firm-level production statistics. The merging process is performed using the unique 
 
13 To capture any systematic differences in the effect of the worker covariates on wages for men and women. 
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and winsorized at the 0.1% and 99.9% level for every 2-digit industry-year combination. 
Furthermore, all of the presented results in this chapter are based on firm- and worker 
population weighted samples. 
To be able to study the relation between firm performance and the different components 
of firm wages, we need the firm-level aggregates of the individual estimated wage 
components, as well as the observable measures of firm performance for all firm 
observations. Therefore, attention is limited to a smaller subsample than the full universe 
of workers and firms used in the AKM estimations in the first stage of the analyses. This 
results in our final unbalanced panel of 132.111 firm-period observations. Divided over 
the four periods, these firm-period observations reflect the employers of 6.9 to 7.4 million 
worker observations consisting of 2.1 to 2.3 million unique workers employed at 29 to 36 
thousand unique firms per each four-year period. This subpopulation represents 45.9-48.8 
percent of all firms and covers 63-63.6 percent of all workers used in the full sample. The 
 Period Period 1:  Period 4:  Change of Period 1:  Period 4: Change of
  (2001-2004) (2013-2016) period 1 to 4 (2001-2004) (2013-2016) period 1 to 4
 Variance of  0.185 (100%) 0.255 (100%) 0.070 (100%) 0.157 (100%) 0.227 (100%) 0.070
 log wages      (100%)
 Variance mean  0.004 (2.3%) 0.005 (1.9%) 0.000 (0.6%) 0.004 (1.4%) 0.003 (1.5%) -0.000
 covariates      (-0.2%)
 Variance of mean  0.029 (15.5%) 0.053 (20.6%) 0.024 (34.0%) 0.022 (14.3%) 0.048 (21.0%) 0.025
 worker effects      (36.2%)
 Variance of firm  0.013 (6.9%) 0.018 (7.0%) 0.005 (7.0%) 0.010 (6.2%) 0.015 (6.5%) 0.005 
 fixed effect      (7.1%)
 Covariance worker  0.013 (6.9%) 0.026 (10.4%) 0.014 (19.6%) 0.005 (3.3%) 0.019 (8.1%) 0.013
 & firm effects      (19.1%)
 Between firm  0.067 (36.1%) 0.115 (44.9%) 0.048 (68.2%) 0.045 (28.5%) 0.089 (39.2%) 0.044
 wage variance      (63.6%)
 Worker-year  11,879,080 10,859,096  7,481,753 6,907,553 
 observations 
 Firm-period  78,522 59,916  36,006 29,252 
 observations 
 Sample largest connected sample of workers and Only (workers of) firms for which production  
  firms fulfilling the selection criteria statistics are available
Table 3.1 Sample comparison variance decompositions based on AKM estimations
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main results of the AKM decompositions for both samples are presented in Table 3.1.14 
The results show that the absolute level of wage variance, as well as the between-firm 
share of wage variance, is lower for the used subpopulation of matched firms compared to 
the full universe of workers and firms. However, the growth of individual wage variance and 
the development of all components of interest are almost identical in both samples. Still, 
firms in the used subsample are on average larger firms and therefore do not necessarily 
represent the development of firm performance and productivity for the smaller firms (van 
Heuvelen et al., 2018). 
3.2.4 Firm performance
Firm performance is a hard concept to grasp. Even if one would focus on one of its elements, 
say productivity or profitability, there are numerous ways to define and measure this. The 
preferred measures of firm performance in this chapter are real value-added per full-time 
employee (FTE) for labor productivity and quasi-rents per FTE for profitability. Value added 
per FTE is the most common way to measure labor productivity in the literature and widely 
available in most firm-level databases. The biggest drawback of value added per FTE is that 
labor costs themselves are directly part of this measure and it does not take into account 
any differences in the quality of workers and / or the use of capital. Quasi-rents reflect the 
(temporary) surplus of firm value-added above input costs at market prices. Practically 
this means that quasi-rents reflect value-added when accounted for the outside options 
of workers and capital costs. Outside options of workers are typically proxied by average 
wages in the same industry (Van Reenen, 1996; Gürtzgen, 2009). The downside of this 
method is that it does not account for any differences in worker quality between firms. 
Therefore, we follow Abowd & Allain (1995) and Hirsch & Mueller (2020) in controlling for 
unobserved worker quality of each firm when estimating the alternative wages of workers 
to better capture their true outside options. In other words, we calculate the opportunity 
costs of the workers for each firm. First, we calculate the alternative wages of workers as 
follows:
The alternative wage (wagejp)  for workers of firm j in period p is calculated as the average 
wages per two-digit industry wsp, plus the deviation between the average unobserved 
worker quality of firm j and the average unobserved worker quality in the relevant two-
digit industry s  (γjp – γsp ) plus the difference between the firm fixed effect of a specific firm 
14  This table only shows the results for the most relevant wage components; therefore, it is not possible 
to sum individual components to the “between-firm” subtotal.
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not account for any differences in worker quality b tw en firms. Therefore, w  follow Abowd 
& Allain (1995) and Hirsch & Mueller (2020) in controlling for unobserved worker quality of 
each firm when estimating the alternative wages of workers to better capture their true outside 
options. In othe  words, we calculate the opportunity costs of the workers for each firm. First, 
we calculate the alternative wages of workers as follows: 
(3.2)    log  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤� 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = log𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤�𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + �𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + �𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 10� 
The alternative wage ( 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤� 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )  for workers of firm j in period p is calculated as the average 
wages per two-digit industry 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤�𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , plus the deviation between the average unobserved worker 
quality of firm j and the average unobserved worker quality in the relevant two-digit industry s 
�𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�  plus the difference betw en th firm fixed ffect of a specific irm and the 10
th 
percentile of the distribution of the firm fixed effect in each two-digit industry �𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 10�.  
Hence, the alternative wage of workers is determined by the average wage in the industry, the 
quality of the workforce of a firm and the size of the firm wage premium, both relative to the 
other firms in the same industry. Including the alternative wages in estimations has as a 
consequence that worker quality heterogeneity is indirectly taken into account. We use this 
alternative wage calculation as a control variable in all regressions where the relationship 
between labor productivity and firm wages are estimated and use it directly to calculate the 
quasi-rents of firms. The quasi-rent at the firm-level is defined as: 










The quasi-rents per employee (full-time) are calculated as the value-added per employee net of 
the estimated costs of replacing labor (alternative wages of workers) and the estimated costs of 
capital (depreciation costs per employee). Using depreciation is necessary because there is no 
information about the capital stock of firms. Besides value-added and quasi-rents per employee, 
turnover and profits per employee are used as well for robustness checks.  
3.2.5 Firm policy 
Next to this, we have created and selected a set of variables which could reveal something about 
the way firms (are able to) select their workforce, the degree by which employees have to 
directly compete with external workers and the labor protection of employees. The first set of 
variables is based on the worker-level databases. The variable “mini-job” measures the 
percentage of workers per firm that did not fulfill our selection criteria to be taken into account 
for the AKM estimations. These are workers with jobs that are too short, too small or have a 

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and the 10th percentile of the distribution of the firm fixed effect in each two-digit industry 
(λjp – λsp 10). Hence, the alternative wage of workers is determined by the average wage in 
the industry, the quality of the workforce of a firm and the size of the firm wage premium, 
both relative to the other firms in the same industry. Including the alternative wages in 
estimations has as a consequence that worker quality heterogeneity is indirectly taken into 
account. We use this alternative wage calculation as a control variable in all regressions 
where the relationship between labor productivity and firm wages are estimated and use it 
directly to calculate the quasi-rents of firms. The quasi-rent at the firm-level is defined as:
The quasi-rents per employee (full-time) are calculated as the value-added per employee net 
of the estimated costs of replacing labor (alternative wages of workers) and the estimated 
costs of capital (depreciation costs per employee). Using depreciation is necessary because 
there is no information about the capital stock of firms. Besides value-added and quasi-rents 
per employee, turnover and profits per employee are used as well for robustness checks. 
3.2.5 Firm policy
Next to this, we have created and selected a set of variables which could reveal something 
about the way firms (are able to) select their workforce, the degree by which employees have 
to directly compete with external workers and the labor protection of employees. The first 
set of variables is based on the worker-level databases. The variable “mini-job” measures 
the percentage of workers per firm that did not fulfill our selection criteria to be taken into 
account for the AKM estimations. These are workers with jobs that are too short, too small or 
have a lower wage than the minimum wage. This variable serves as a measure for the ease by 
which workers can be replaced with (cheaper) outside options. The variable “leave in 2 years” 
measures the percentage of workers that leave a firm within two years of starting to work 
at that firm. Here, firms that stop existing or merge/get acquired with/by another firm are 
excluded. This variable serves as a proxy for the number of temporary workers at a firm since 
we have no information about the length or permanence of labor contracts of workers. The 
“churning rate” is calculated as the difference between actually observed worker flows per 
year and the necessary job flows given the change in employment during a year. The churning 
rate is proven to be a proper proxy for the external openness of firms to the job market and 
the extent by which their employees are easily substituted (Burgess, 2000; Ohlert, 2016). 
The second set of variables is based on firm-level production statistics. The variable “temp 
agency” measures the percentage of employees of a firm that was a temporary help agency 
worker or on-call worker. The variable “contract worker” is defined as the percentage of 
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workers working as a contract worker, independent contractor or freelancer. On first sight, 
this division might seem arbitrary, but prior literature shows that workers and jobs in these 
two groups tend to differ significantly. Workers in the first group are on average workers 
in lower wage-groups, with lower education levels and seem to be in a more vulnerable 
labor market position than the average worker. Workers in the second group are more 
often higher educated and in higher predicted wage groups (Katz & Krueger, 2019). We 
assume that firms that rely more on “temp agency” workers will have a workforce that 
does more generic work and is relatively easier to replace while firms that rely more on 
“contract workers” will have more specialized workers that are harder to replace. The last 
selected variable is the percentage of total input costs of firms that were outsourced to 
other firms. Firms that outsource parts of their production process are able to specialize 
more on those activities with the highest value-added, which should theoretically lead to 
higher productivity and therefore wages for the remaining workers. See table 3.A.1 in the 
appendix for summary statistics of all these variables, and Table 3.A.2 for the pairwise 
correlation coefficients of the most used variables.
3.3 Illustrative descriptives
3.3.1 Productivity dispersion
In order to get some sense about the level and evolution of firm-level performance 
heterogeneity, we will start with a descriptive overview of a few particularly striking 
developments concerning firm-level performance, wages and labor shares. Figure 3.A.1 
in the Appendix presents an overview of the development of labor productivity of firms 
per quintile of labor productivity. The quintiles are determined, for each period, at the 
worker level (weighted for the number of worker observations) in order to control for 
differences in firm size between different productivity quintiles. In the period 2001-2016 
the productivity dispersion between firms, measured as value-added per FTE, has increased 
especially between the 5th quintile (employees of the most productive firms) and the rest. 
However, this figure shows the productivity development in absolute terms and without 
taking differences in industry developments into account. Figure 3.1 below displays the 
same information but now as a cumulative change over time and measured relative to the 
average labor productivity at the respective 2-digit industry level. Between 2001 and 2016, 
the average productivity of the most productive firms has increased by almost 30% relative 
to the average productivity in their 2-digit industries. In sharp contrast, the average labor 
productivity of firms in the lower four quintiles has remained constant or even decreased 
relative to the average labor productivity in their respective industries.15 
15  When performing the same analysis using 3-digit industry averages a similar picture emerges, 
3
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Figure 3.1 Cumulative change in value-added per FTE relative to mean industry value-added per FTE 
per quintile of value-added per FTE
A logical next step would be to see to what extent these increased productivity differences 
between firms in the different quintiles of labor productivity are also reflected by 
differences in the evolution of average wages between these groups of firms. Figure 3.2 
below presents an overview of the cumulative change of labor productivity as well as the 
average wages of firms per quintile of labor productivity between 2001 and 2016. The 
quintiles are determined at the worker level per each 2-digit industry in order to make 
sure that the results are not driven by developments in specific industries or by changes 
in industry compositions over time. The results show that the wages of the workers of 
the most productive firms (5th quintile) are almost 30% higher in 2016 than in 2001. This 
is a strikingly large increase compared to the wage development of workers in the other 
productivity quintiles, but also remarkably lower than the more than 45% increase in labor 
productivity of the most productive firms. Workers in quintiles 2, 3 and 4 received on 
average wage gains relatively close to the increase in labor productivity, for the workers 
in these productivity quintiles labor productivity as well as wages are 11% to 18% higher. 
Labor productivity of the workers in the first quintile, the 20% of the workforce working 
for the least productive firms per 2-digit industry, increased by 11% but this group received 
lower real wages in 2016 than in 2001.  
however using the 2-digit industry classification is preferred because there are not enough observations 
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Figure 3.2 Productivity and wage growth per quintile of value-added per FTE, change between 2001 
and 2016
Overall, these results confirm that, on the aggregate level, real wage growth has fallen 
behind real labor productivity growth, as is observed in many other OECD countries (e.g., 
Pessoa & Van Reenen, 2013; Schwellnus et al., 2017). But when digging below the surface 
of the aggregate level, a different picture emerges. For the majority of workers, the 60% of 
the workforce employed by firms with around median labor productivity, real wages and 
labor productivity have been growing at about the same pace. The suggested decoupling 
of real wage growth and labor productivity growth is, in contrast to popular opinion, mostly 
visible at the tails of the labor productivity distribution; real wages have only been growing 
slower than labor productivity for the workers of the least productive and workers of the 
most productive firms per industry. 
3.3.2 Labor share
A similar development is observed in the analysis of the labor share in the sample. The 
labor share is generally measured as the portion of gross domestic product paid out in 
compensation of labor. In this chapter, the labor share measures the total labor costs of 
firms, which consists of more relevant labor costs than just wage costs, divided by the total 
value-added of firms. Several studies have shown that the aggregate and/or sectoral labor 
shares in the United States, and several other OECD countries, have declined in recent 
decades (e.g., Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2013; Elsby et al., 2013; Salomons, 2018). The 
aggregate labor share in the sample used for this study shows a similar trend, as depicted 
in figure 3.A.2 in the appendix. The total labor costs as a portion of total value-added has 
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is not calculated on the aggregate level, but at the firm-level and weighted for worker 
observations, it turns out to be at a higher level in general, and increasing from 0.77 to 0.8 
in this same period. This suggests that the employers of the average worker have a higher 
labor share in 2016 than in 2001, but that the total value added produced by firms with a 
relatively low labor share has increased over time. 
To explore the micro-level anatomy that underpins the aggregate decline in the labor share 
into somewhat more detail, we follow Kehrig & Vincent (2017) in showing the changing 
distribution of labor shares and value added in our sample. To generate Figure 3.3, all firms 
in the sample are allocated to different bins based on their labor shares. The figure shows 
the share of all workers in the sample employed by firms in these bins, the share of total 
value added generated by firms in these bins and the average wages paid by firms in these 
bins. This procedure is carried out for 2001 as well as 2016. Figure 3.3 demonstrates the 
micro-level developments that are the foundation of the decline in the aggregate labor 
share quite clearly. The distribution of workers (illustrated by the dotted line) over firms 
with different labor shares has remained fairly stable over time, but the share of total 
value-added produced by the relatively low-labor share firms has increased significantly. 
For example, firms with a labor share of less than 0.2 (20%) employed, in 2001 as well as in 
2016, about 1% of all workers in our sample, but the share of total value added produced 
by these firms increased from 4% to 12% in this timespan. This example is illustrative for 
the shift of economic activity toward relatively low-labor share firms that has apparently 
been taking place in the Netherlands and already described by amongst others Autor et al., 
(2017) for the United States. 
Relatedly, the average wages paid by firms in 2001 appear to be remarkably evenly 
distributed between firms with different labor shares, in 2016 it can be easily observed 
that firms with low-labor shares pay on average higher wages that their higher-labor share 
counterparts. Using the same allocation of firms into their labor share bins as used in 
Figure 3.3, Figure 3.A.3 in the Appendix displays the share of total labor costs, share of 
total value-added and share of total profits per labor share bin for 2001 and 2016. Again, 
especially the shift of activity toward the firms in the lowest labor share bin stands out, 
where for example the share of profits generated by these firms has increased from 8% to 
25% of total profits. 
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Figure 3.3 Share of total value-added and average fulltime wages over the distribution of labor shares
Despite this noteworthy development, it mostly concerns a relatively small fraction of all 
workers and firms, which cannot, on its own, account for the observed overall increase in 
productivity and wage dispersion between (groups of) firms. In order to illustrate how the 
same development looks like when using larger and equal fractions of workers per bin, 
we display the development of the distribution of value-added, profits, productivity and 
average of firms per quintile of labor shares. As before, the quintiles are determined at 
the worker level per each 2-digit industry. The results are presented in Figure 3.A.4 and 
3.A.5 in the appendix. Not surprisingly, a similar shift of economic activity can be observed. 
The share of total value added produced by the 20% of the workforce employed by firms 
with the lowest labor shares rose from 29% in 2001 to 40% in 2016, while the shares of 
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decreased. The share of total profits generated by these workers and firms increased from 
51% in 2001 to a stunning 67% 2016. 
Returning to the relationship between productivity and wages, Figure 3.A.5 shows the 
change in value-added per FTE and wages per FTE for the different labor share quintiles. 
Any decoupling of wages and productivity has occurred only for the workers employed by 
the firms in the lowest labor share quintile. Productivity of these low-labor share firms has 
increased by almost 50% while the wages paid by firms in this group have increased by 
‘only’ 20%. Paradoxically, this means that if wages and productivity would have developed 
together (at the firm-level), wage inequality would have been higher and not, as often 
suggested, lower. To make sure that the above presented findings are not biased due to 
sample selection or shocks in specific years, we show the development of profits and value-
added per quintile of labor shares per year in Figure 3.A.6 in the Appendix. 
The presented illustrative figures all hint at a process where firm performance and mean 
wages paid by firms are growing apart together. This dispersion in firm-level performance 
seems to be primarily driven by firms at the productivity frontier, and by firms with a 
relatively low labor share, versus the rest of the workers and firms. 
3.4 Empirical specification and results
3.4.1 Firm performance and firm mean wages
In the second step of this empirical study, we investigate the (development of the) 
relationship between the different components of firm wages and several proxies that 
measure firm performance. More specifically, we are interested in understanding the 
link between firm performance and the in the previous section estimated pure firm- and 
worker-components of firm mean wages. However, we will start by an OLS regression to 
estimate the correlation between average firm-level wages and firm-level measures of firm 
performance using the following equation:
 
In this equation Wjsp measures the observed firm-level mean wages of firm j in industry s 
in period p , Wjp is the alternative wages of the workers in the firm16, FTEjp is the average 
number of employees in full-time equivalents and Depjp denotes the average capital 
depreciation per employee, all are measured per firm j and averaged per period p. Different 
16  See equation 3.2 in section 2.1 for an explanation of how this variable is constructed.
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the development of the distribution of value-added, profits, productivity and average of firms 
per quintile of labor shares.  As before, the quintiles are determined at the worker level per each 
2-digit industry. The results are presented in Figure 3.A.4 and 3.A.5 in the appendix. Not 
surprisingly, a similar shift of economic activity can be observed. The share of total value added 
produced by the 20% of the workforce employed by firms with the lowest labor shares rose 
from 29% in 2001 to 40% in 2016, while the shares of total value added produced by the firms 
and workers in all other quintiles of labor shares decreased. The share of total profits generated 
by these workers and firms increased from 51% in 2001 to a stunning 67% 2016.  
Returning to the relati ship between productivity and w ges, Figure 3.A.5 shows the change 
in value-added per FTE and wages per FTE for the different labor share quintiles. Any 
decoupling of wages and productivity has occurred only for the workers employed by the firms 
in the lowest labor share quintile. Productivity of these low-labor share firms has increased by 
almost 50% while the wages paid by firms in this group have increased by ‘only’ 20%. 
Paradoxically, this means that if wages and productivity would have developed together (at the 
firm-level), wage inequality would have been higher and not, as often suggested, lower. To 
make sure that the above presented findings are not biased due to sample selection or shocks in 
specific years, we show the development of profits and value-added per quintile of labor shares 
er y ar in Fig re 3.A.6 in the Appendix.   
The presented illustrative figures all hint at a process where firm performance and mean wages 
paid by firms are growing apart together. This dispersion in firm-level performance seems to 
be primarily driven by firms at the productivity frontier, and by firms with a relatively low labor 
share, versus the rest of the workers and firms.  
3.4 Empirical specification and results 
3.4.1 Firm performance and firm mean wages 
In the second step of this empirical study, we investigate the (development of the) relationship 
between the different components of firm wages and several proxies that measure firm 
pe formance. More specifically, we ar  nterested in understanding the link between firm 
p rformance and the in the pr vious sectio  estimat d pure firm- a d worker-components of 
firm mean wages. However, we will start by an OLS regression to estimate the correlation 
between average firm-level wages and firm-level measures of firm performance using the 
following equation: 
(3.4) ln𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1 ln𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2 ln𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3 ln𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4 ln𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   

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combinations of fixed effects are used in our estimations where δp, γs, ρj and λj refer to 
the inclusion of respectively period, 3-digit industry, COROP-region and firm dummies. 
Finally, FPjp refers to one of the four proxies for firm performance; value added, turnover, 
quasi-rents or profits per FTE. All estimations use establishment age and a multi-plant firm 
dummy as a control variable. Since the constructed measure of quasi-rents already consists 
of the alternative wage of workers and depreciation per FTE, these variables are excluded 
as control variables in the estimations using quasi-rents as a proxy for firm performance.17 
Table 3.2 presents the core results of a group of OLS regressions in which firm mean 
wages are regressed (in turn) on four different proxies of firm performance as described 
17  See equation 3.3 in section 2.1 for an explanation of how quasi-rents are calculated.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 0.161** - - - 0.028** - - -
 (0.0045)    (0.0066)   
 - 0.113** - - - 0.027** - -
  (0.0029)    (0.0043)  
 - - 0.077** - - - 0.010** -
   (0.0029)    (0.0027) 
 - - - 0.033** - - - 0.005*
    (0.0019)    (0.0017)
 0.253** 0.284** - 0.236** 0.240** 0.242** - 0.269**
 (0.0507) (0.0467)  (0.0585) (0.0427) (0.0423)  (0.0493)
 0.021** 0.025** 0.023** 0.026** -0.022** -0.021* -0.023* -0.025*
 (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0066) (0.0067) (0.0074) (0.0072)
 -0.002 0.001 - 0.008** -0.003 -0.002 - 0.004
 (0.0007) (0.0008)  (0.0009) (0.0059) (0.0055)  (0.0059)        
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 3-digit 3-digit 3-digit 3-digit No No No No
 Corop Corop Corop Corop No No No No
 No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
 0.642 0.640 0.620 0.589 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.950
 132,082 132,082 122,143 114,928 132,104 132,104 122,163 114,946
LN value-added per FTE
LN turnover per FTE
LN quasi-rent per FTE
LN profit per FTE
LN alternative wage
LN FTE employees









Estimations on firm-level, weighted for worker observations. Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
firm-level and reported in the parantheses (* p<0.01, ** p<0.001)
Table 3.2 OLS regressions of LN mean firm wages on set of firm performance measures
3
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in equation 3.4.18 All observations are at the firm-level and weighted for the number of 
average worker observations per firm per period, they are measured per four-year period 
and all observations are pooled for the entire observation period 2001-2016. Models 1-4 
in Table 3.2 show the results of the estimations including industry and region dummies, 
equation 5-8 show the results of the same estimations including establishment dummies 
instead. 
The results for model 1-4 in Table 3.2 show positive and highly significant correlations 
between all proxies of firm performance and the mean wages paid by firms. The size of this 
positive relation differs between the different proxies used, with the lowest correlation for 
profits per worker (0.033) and the highest for value added per worker (0.161). This means 
that, keeping the other variables in the model constant, firms with a 10% higher value 
added per FTE pay wages that are 1.61% higher. Adding firm-fixed effects to the model 
(models 5-8), which changes the scope from explaining between-firm differences to within-
firm differences, leads to a considerable drop in these correlations. Now an increase in 
productivity of 10%, measured as value added per FTE, is accompanied by a 0.28% increase 
in wages. Another finding worth mentioning is that, on average, larger firms (measured 
as the number of full-time workers) pay higher wages, but an increase in size over time is 
associated with a decrease in wages paid. 
3.4.2 Firm performance and firm wages over time
The estimations discussed above test the general relation between firm performance 
and firm wages, in which the observations of all four time periods are pooled. In order to 
show the link between the development of productivity dispersion and wage dispersion 
over time, equation 3.4 is estimated again, but now with some small adjustments. For 
each period and 3-digit industry, firms are allocated to their respective firm performance 
quintile (weighted for worker observations). Instead of using the actual observed 
measures of firm performance (value added and quasi-rents), we use dummies for these 
quintiles and present the developments of their respective coefficients in the estimation 
of equation 3.4. The results are presented in Figure 3.A.7 in the appendix and are shown 
relative to the firms in the 3rd quintile. The results show that, corrected for firm size, capital 
depreciation, alternative wages (and therefore worker quality), region- and industry 
developments, differences in relative firm performance (within 3-digit industries) can 
be associated with increased firm wage dispersion over time. For example, in period 1 
(2001-2004) firms with the highest value-added per FTE (5th quintile) in their industry, 
keeping all previously mentioned factors constant, paid 12% higher wages than firms 
18  For robustness purposes, table 3.A.3 in the appendix shows the results of similar OLS regressions 
without industry and region dummies and including 5-digit industry and municipality dummies. 
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with median value-added per FTE (3rd quintile) in their industry. This difference between 
the 5th and 3rd quintile increased to 17% in period 4 (2013-2016). 
3.4.3 Firm performance and the different components of firm wages
The results in section 3.1 show the relation between firm performance and firm mean 
wages, and the development of this relation over time. We now turn to the analyses using 
the different estimated components of firm mean wages, as described in section 3.2.2, as 
main dependent variables. This allows us to test through which channels the relationship 
between firm performance and firm wages operates; (i) firm performance heterogeneity 
can be associated with rent sharing of firms, with their whole workforce, leading to wage 
differences between firms, or (ii) firm performance heterogeneity can be associated with 
differences in workforce quality which also shows up in wage differences between firms. 
It is reasonable to argue, given the estimated pure firm wage premium, that the former 
channel implies that the direction of causality is likely to work from performance to wages 
(except when workers are incentivized to put in more effort for higher wages). Yet, the 
direction of causality for the latter is more likely to be reversed (or endogenous). In other 
words, do better firms hire better workers, or does having better workers make it a better 
firm? 
The firm wage components are derived from the AKM estimations on the universe of 
firms and workers in the dataset and normalized between periods to make a comparison 
over time possible. Normalization is necessary since all estimated fixed effects per period 
are relative to one omitted firm and person. The procedure is performed using the same 
equation (equation 3.4) as in the analyses described above, only the dependent variables 
now measure the separate components of firm mean wages obtained through the AKM 
estimations. This means the models estimate how the previously obtained firm effects, 
the firm-level average of the estimated unobservable worker effects and the firm-level 
average of the estimated observable worker components are related to the observable 
measures of firm performance. Furthermore, the calculated within-firm dispersion of 
worker quality, measured as the standard deviation of the worker fixed effects, is regressed 
on firm performance to test if better performing firms have, on average, a more- or less 
dispersed workforce. All analyses are performed using our two preferred measures of 
firm performance; value added per FTE for labor productivity and quasi-rents per FTE 
for profitability. The results using value added per FTE as the main explanatory variable 
are presented in Table 3.3 (using industry and region dummies) and in Table 3.A.4 in the 
appendix (using firm dummies). 
3
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Table 3.3 OLS regressions of components of firm wages on labor productivity (value-added per FTE)
3.4.4 Labor productivity
The results in Table 3.3 show that rent-sharing between firms and workers, after controlling 
for worker sorting, explains only a relatively small part of the overall relationship between 
labor productivity and firm mean wages. With a correlation of 0.161 between firm mean 
wages and labor productivity, the correlation between the estimated firm-level wage 
premium and labor productivity is only 0.047. This means that, keeping the other variables 
in the model constant and controlling for worker quality heterogeneity, firms with a 10% 
higher value added per FTE pay wages that are 0.47% higher. Next to that, the wage premium 
for working at a larger firm is significant but almost negligible in size, as our estimations 
suggest that a 10% larger firm (measured by the number of workers in full-tile equivalents) 
pays on average 0.039% higher wages. Switching from this between-firm estimation to a 
within-firm estimation, which means adding firm-fixed effects to the model, we find no 
significant relation between labor productivity and the firm components in wages (see 
Table 3.A.4). So, while the results suggest that more productive firms pay higher wages to 
their workers, a firm that increases its labor productivity over time does not seem to share 
this increased labor productivity with its workers. 
 LN mean  Firm fixed Mean person Mean SD person
 firm wages effect fixed effect covariates fixed effects
 0.161** 0.047** 0.106** 0.009** 0.031**
 (0.0045) (0.0016) (0.0033) (0.0009) (0.0014)
 0.253** 0.041 0.230** -0.018 0.032
 (0.0507) (0.0210) (0.0439) (0.0192) (0.0168)
 0.0212** 0.0039** 0.0075** 0.0098** 0.0079**
 (0.0019) (0.0007) (0.0016) (0.00047) (0.00049)
 -0.0015 0.00002 -0.0019** 0.00041 0.00183**
 (0.00074) (0.00032) (0.00054) (0.00018) (0.00024)
        
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 No No No No No 
 0.642 0.373 0.597 0.762 0.462
 132,082 132,082 132,082 132,082 132,082
Dependent variable:
LN value-added per FTE
LN alternative wage
LN FTE employees








Estimations on firm-level, weighted for worker observations. Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
firm-level and reported in the parantheses (* p<0.01, ** p<0.001)
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On the contrary, the results in Table 3.3 and Table 3.A.4 show that most of the correlation 
between labor productivity and wages can be explained by differences in (unobserved) 
worker quality. The correlation between labor productivity and the average quality of the 
workforce, measured as the firm-level mean worker-fixed effect, can account for 65% of the 
correlation between firm-level labor productivity and wages. To put this into perspective, 
firms with a 10% higher value added per FTE pay on average 1.61% higher wages, of which 
1.06% is because they have higher quality workers, who would have received this part of 
their higher wage in a different firm as well.19 The within-firm estimations show an even 
larger role for worker quality heterogeneity (Table 3.A.4), indicating that an increase in 
labor productivity of 10% is associated with an increase in wages of 0.28%, of which 0.25% 
is due to increased worker quality. This implies that 90% of the within-firm correlation 
between labor productivity and wages over time can be accounted for by the sorting and 
matching of workers. This is remarkably high compared to related studies on the subject 
(e.g., Card et al., 2018; Alvarez et al., 2018).
3.4.5 Profitability
Value-added, our preferred measure of labor productivity, contains labor-costs itself 
and does not account for workers’ abilities and capital intensity of firms. Because of 
this, we employ quasi-rents as a second proxy for firm performance, which does take 
these factors into account. More concretely, quasi-rents reflect the profitability of firms 
in excess of the outside wage options of workers and capital costs. Quasi-rents is closer 
to profitability than to labor productivity, and already corrects for worker heterogeneity 
between firms. However, the general idea behind the estimated relation stays the same; 
total factor productivity variation leads to differences in quasi rents per worker (and/or 
labor productivity per worker) that causes wages to differ relative to the alternative outside 
wages. 
The results in Table 3.4 show that rent-sharing of firms can explain almost 40% of the 
correlation between quasi-rents and firm mean wages, while roughly 55% of the overall 
wage elasticity is due to correlation with unobserved worker quality. This is a slightly higher 
rent-sharing elasticity as compared to the results for value added, but still relatively low 
compared to related studies on the subject. Utilizing the time-dimension of the dataset, 
by adding firm dummies to the models, we do find a dominant role for rent-sharing in the 
correlation between firm performance and wages, albeit with a very low wage elasticity in 
general. The results presented in Figure 3.A.6 suggest that a 10% increase in quasi-rents is 
associated with a 0.12% increase in the firm wage-premium. 
19  Since the worker fixed effects are estimated based on workers switching between firms, they reflect 
the part of their wages which are worker-related and independent of the employer. 
3
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Table 3.4 OLS regressions of components of firm wages on firm rents (quasi-rent per FTE)
3.4.6 Worker heterogeneity
Next to regressing the estimated components of firm mean wages on firm performance, 
we also test if better performing firms, compared to other firms, differ in the heterogeneity 
of their workforce. Theoretically, the relation between the two is ambiguous; it could be 
that better performing companies use employees with more diverse qualities utilizing the 
cognitive distance between its workers (Nooteboom et al., 2007), or that better performing 
companies focus more on their core tasks which should lead to a more homogeneous 
workforce (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). The within-firm skill dispersion is measured as 
the standard deviation of the estimated unobserved worker skills. In all models that use 
skill dispersion as the dependent variable the firm-level average worker skills are added 
as a control variable next to the usual control variables. This is done to counteract the 
possibility that firms with different average worker quality have a more homogeneous or 
heterogeneous workforce, separate from the role of firm performance. The results suggest 
that better performing firms have a more heterogeneous workforce, but the results give 
no proof that a change in performance is related to a change in the internal dispersion of 
workers’ skills relative to the skills of the average worker. 
3.4.7 Direction of causality
As mentioned earlier, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to test or make claims about 
the direction of causality between firm performance and firm wages. Because this study 
focuses on the (development of) the relationship between firm performance and (the 
different components of) firm wages, studying correlations is sufficient for the task at hand. 
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 LN mean  Firm fixed Mean person Mean SD person
 firm wages effect fixed effect covariates fixed effects
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 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 No No No No No
 0.642 0.373 0.597 0.762 0.462
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this issue partially. However, we did estimate some simple two-stage least square regressions 
to get an explorative idea about the direction of causality. This is especially relevant 
concerning worker quality. It can be that better performing firms are more attractive for 
better workers, or that better performing firms are more able or willing to search for better 
workers, which would mean that the causality goes from performance to wages. Contrary, 
it can also be that firms perform better because they have better workers, implying that 
wages (and therefore quality of workers) affect performance. Next to that, because wages 
(labor costs) are part of value added, it can be argued that our previous results concerning 
labor productivity overestimate the actual correlation between productivity and wages. 
On the other hand, wages are a cost for firms, so when wages increase (ceteris paribus), 
profitability will decrease. Because of this negative relation, it can be that the results 
concerning quasi-rents are biased downward (Margolis & Salvanes, 2001).
We use estimated total factor productivity (TFP) as an instrument for labor productivity 
and profitability. The literature on the interpretation, methodological issues and proper 
measurement of total factor productivity is rich (see amongst others Solow, 1957; Prescott, 
1998; Hulten, 2007; van Beveren, 2012 for an extensive overview), with the by now well-
known simultaneity and endogeneity bias as the main problems. Despite these potential 
issues, the basic idea remains the same. Any measure based on output per worker can 
come from differences in productivity as well as from differences in inputs. Total factor 
productivity is an attempt to properly measure the output per unit of input (Prescott, 
1997). We calculate TFP as the residual (jt) of a firm-level regression of value added (VAjt) 
on labor costs (LCjt), depreciation costs (Depjt) and material costs (Mjt). The estimations 
are carried out on a yearly unbalanced panel of firms including firm (λj) and year (δt) fixed 
effects. The estimation takes the following form:
The obtained residuals show a correlation with firm wages and its components of 0.1 
or lower, and correlation with value added and quasi-rents per worker of 0.6 or higher 
(see Table 3.A.2). The results of the second-stage regressions using TFP as an instrument 
for value added per FTE are shown in Table 3.A.5. The findings confirm the direction and 
significance of the previous results, although the size of the coefficients is considerably 
lower. The coefficient for the relationship between labor productivity and wages drops from 
0.161 to 0.0496, and the rent-sharing parameter drops from 0.0409 to 0.0097. Despite the 
fact that we do not want to draw too many conclusions from this analysis, it does open up 
the possibility that our previous results overestimated the effect of productivity on wages. 
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3.4.8 Development over time
The analyses of the firm- and worker components of firm wages thus far do not exploit the 
longitudinal nature of the created dataset, or only by adding period and/or firm fixed effects. 
To inspect the development over time, we first repeat the procedure as described in section 
3.4.2 by regressing, for each period separately, the firm- and worker components of firm 
wages on the previously described dummies for the performance quintiles measured at the 
industry level. Figure 3.A.8 in the appendix shows the evolution over time of the coefficients of 
these dummies regarding the estimated firm wage premiums. As a reminder, the coefficients 
for the 3rd quintile are omitted in all figures because these serve as a reference point, which 
means that the results have to be interpreted as relative to firms in the 3rd quintile in the 
same 3-digit industry. The results show that, corrected for all control variables and measured 
at the industry level, there is little dispersion in firm wage premiums between firms with 
different labor productivity levels. Although there is somewhat more dispersion in firm wage 
premiums between firms with different profitability levels, it is limited and mostly applies to 
firms in the highest productivity quintile. In the first period, wage premiums of firms in the 
highest quasi-rents per FTE quintile were 3.4% higher compared to firms in the 3rd quintile 
in the same industry. In the last period, this difference increased to 4.9%. The difference 
between the 5th and 1st quintile increased by 2.8 percentage point, from 5.8% to 8.6%
A different picture emerges in Figure 3.A.9, which shows the same information for the mean 
worker fixed effects. This figure illustrates that worker quality heterogeneity is not only 
the most important source of wage differences between firms with different performance 
levels in general, but also the driving force behind the increased wage dispersion between 
firms with different performance levels over time. Again, the dispersion is most visible 
for firms in the highest quintile; for labor productivity the coefficient of the 5th quintile 
dummy increased from 0.078 to 0.125, for profitability it increased from 0.057 to 0.103. 
This means that for both measures of firm performance, the difference in average worker 
quality (reflected by the worker component of wages) between the firms in the 5th and 3rd 
quintile has increased by almost 5 percentage points between the first and fourth period. 
3.4.9 Variance decomposition
Although these results show that wage premiums, but especially mean worker quality, 
has diverged between the firms with different performance levels, they do not take the 
underlying variance of both the dependent and independent variables into account. Since 
we are interested in the relation between the (changed) variance of both, we follow Ohlert 
(2016) and apply a regression-based variance decomposition based on Fields (2002). This 
method uses the obtained regression coefficients, the variance of the dependent variable 
and the covariance between the dependent and an independent variable to decompose 
wage variance into its determinants. The Fields method calculates the share of wage 
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variance that can be accounted for by firm performance variance in a specific period. The 
calculation takes the following form:
ShareFP is the share of the variance of the firm wage variable that is attributable to the 
firm performance variable, β1 refers to the regression coefficients of the specific firm 
performance measure as shown in equation 3.4, Cov(lnFP, lnW) is the covariance between 
the firm performance and firm wage variables Var (lnW) and is the variance of the firm 
wage variable. First, we apply equation 3.6, for each period separately, to the different 
regression estimations of the firm wage variables on the firm performance variables. Next, 
the contribution of the firm performance variables to the change in the firm wage variance 
between period 1 and 4 can be calculated as follows:
The calculated πFP (Var(lnW )) measures which share of the changed variance in firm wages 
is associated to (changes in) firm performance. The results of this decomposition exercise 
for labor productivity is shown in Table 3.5, the results for profitability are presented in 
Table 3.A.7 in the appendix.
Table 3.5 Fields (2002) decomposition of firm wage variance into firm performance shares (firm 
performance measured as value added per FTE)
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The results of Table 3.5 have to be interpreted as follows. In period 1, the share of variance of 
firm mean wages that can be accounted for by labor productivity variance was 15.46%, this 
increased to 21.25% in period 4. Of the total increase in firm mean wage variance between 
the first and last period, 27.7% can be attributed to productivity differences between firms. 
Labor productivity explains 6.79% of firm wage premium variance in period 1, this increased 
to 15.21% in period 4, which means that 32% of the total increase in firm wage premium 
variance is due to labor productivity. However, the change in firm wage premium variance 
plays only a minor role in total firm wage dispersion (see Table 3.1). Because of this, the 
role of labor productivity in the total increase in firm wage variance, through the wage 
premium channel, is only 3.6%. In contrast, the change in the variance of the worker quality 
components of wages is for 26.3% attributable to labor productivity differences, this leads 
to the finding that differences in workforce composition between more and less productive 
firms explain 15% of the total increase in between-firm wage variance. The results for 
profitability (quasi-rents) show a similar pattern. However, not surprisingly, the shares of 
wage variance that can be associated with differences in profitability is lower (15.9%), as 
was the case with all previous results, and the wage premium channel is (relatively) slightly 
more important relative to the worker quality channel (2.6% versus 7.9%) . 
3.4.10 Firm worker policy
Now it is established that the link between firm performance and firm wage differences 
is mostly due to difference in worker quality, we explore some of the firm-level employee 
policies and characteristics that could potentially explain part of the differences in workforce 
quality between firms. The selected variables all reveal something about the nature of the 
relationship between employers and employees or the degree by which transactions are 
internalized. These variables are; the percentage of mini-jobs20, the percentage of temp 
agency workers, the percentage of workers leavings within two years of starting a job, the 
churning ratio, the percentage of contract workers and the percentage of inputs that is 
outsourced to external firms. In all estimations we study the relation between the extent 
by which firms make use of the aforementioned worker policies and the wages paid to their 
regular employees, this means that all findings concerning wage premiums and worker 
quality only apply to the regular workers which are on the payroll of firms. 
First, the variables are added, one by one, to the estimation as shown in equation 3.4. The 
results of these estimation are shown in Table 3.A.8 and depict the correlation between 
firm wages and the aforementioned firm worker policy variables. The findings suggest 
that firms with more mini-jobs, that make more use of temp agency workers, have more 
20  These mini-jobs are the jobs not fulfilling our selection criteria, the wages of these workers are not 
included in the wage variables. 
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workers that leave relatively fast after the start of employment and firms with a higher 
churning ratio pay on average lower wages to their regular in-house workers. Firms that 
make more use of contract workers or outsource a larger part of their inputs to external 
firms pay, on average, significantly higher wages to their regular workforce. These results 
hold when adding all variables into the same estimation at once, as shown in column 7.
In Table 3.6, the different components of firm wages are regressed on the selected ‘firm 
worker policy’ variables and the usual control variables. The firm wage premiums are lower 
 Dependent variable LN mean Firm fixed  Mean person Mean SD person fixed
  firm wages effect fixed effect covariates effects
 LN value-added per FTE 0.155** 0.0427** 0.109** 0.0034** 0.0334**
  (0.0048) (0.0016) (0.0036) (0.0008) (0.0015)
 % mini-job workers -0.848** -0.354** -0.398** -0.0963** 0.0532**
  (0.0342) (0.0120) (0.0174) (0.0099) (0.0092)
 % temp agency workers -0.0997** -0.0033 -0.0984** 0.0020 -0.0071
  (0.0264) (0.0101) (0.0226) (0.0046) (0.0086)
 % leave within 2 years -0.161** -0.0481** -0.0692** -0.0437** 0.0215**
  -0.0095 (0.0040) (0.0070) (0.0022) (0.0026)
 Churning ratio -0.0488* 0.0052 0.141** -0.195** 0.0236**
  (0.0149) (0.0059) (0.0123) (0.0041) (0.0055)
 % contract workers 0.160** 0.0473** 0.104** 0.0082 -0.0380**
  (0.0308) (0.0113) (0.0294) (0.0081) (0.0106)
 % inputs outsourced 0.0153* 0.0005 0.0155* -0.0007 -0.0062*
  (0.0046) (0.0033) (0.0053) (0.0025) (0.0022)
 LN alternative wage 0.287** 0.0619* 0.232** -0.0066 0.0202
  (0.0501) (0.0199) (0.0420) (0.0168) (0.0158)
 LN FTE employees 0.0228** 0.0039** 0.0129** 0.0059** 0.0091**
  (0.0019) (0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0004) (0.00054)
 LN depreciation per FTE -0.0011 0.0002 -0.0015* 0.0003 0.0016**
  (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.00049) (0.00014) (0.0002)
 Fixed effects:         
 Period Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Industry 3-digit 3-digit 3-digit 3-digit 3-digit
 Region Corop Corop Corop Corop Corop
 Establishment No No No No No
 Adjusted R-squared 0.642 0.373 0.597 0.762 0.462
 Observations 108,060 108,060 108,060 108,060 108,060
Table 3.6 OLS regressions of components of firm wages on set of firm policy measures
Estimations at the firm-level, weighted for worker observations. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the firm-level and reported in the parentheses (* p<0.01, ** p<0.001)
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in firms with more mini-jobs and firms that make more use of short-term labor relations. 
Firms that make more use of external contract workers pay a higher wage premium to all 
their regular workers. Firms with more mini-job workers and more employees that leave 
within two years not only pay lower wage premiums, the average quality of their workforce 
is lower as well. Furthermore, firms that make more use of temp agency workers do not 
pay lower wage premiums to their regular employees, but do have employees with a lower 
average unobserved quality. On the other hand, firms with a higher churning ratio, more 
contract workers and firms that outsource a larger part of their inputs, on average have a 
higher average quality of workers. In the last column of Table 3.6, the results concerning 
the relation between the firm worker policy variables and the within-firm heterogeneity of 
the workforce are presented. Firms that make more use of mini-job workers, rely more on 
short-term workers and firms that have a higher churning ratio have a more heterogeneous 
workforce. In contrast, firms that make more use of contract workers and outsourcing have 
a lower dispersion of worker quality.21 
Overall, the results show that firms that make more use of flexible labor, or small worker 
contracts, pay lower wage premiums, have a lower and more heterogeneous workforce 
quality. Firms that make more use of contract workers or outsourcing pay higher wages, 
mostly because their regular employees are of higher and more homogeneous quality. 
These findings are in line with the conclusions of Katz & Krueger (2019) that alternative 
work arrangements come in different forms and with different characteristics. One could 
argue that most of these differences can be related to the bargaining position of the firm 
and/or the workers concerning the work arrangement. 
3.5 Conclusion and discussion
There is increasing consensus that the rising wage inequality observed in most OECD 
countries is mostly a between-firm phenomenon. This study investigates to what extent 
these differences in wages between firms can be related to differences in performance 
of firms in the Netherlands. We match job-level administrative data with plant level 
survey and administrative data for the years 2001-2016. Using a two-way fixed effects 
approach (Abowd et al., 1999), it is possible to decompose individual wages into a firm 
wage premium and an unobserved worker quality component. This allows us to make 
a distinction between the part of firm mean wages that is due to rent-sharing and the 
part that is due to worker sorting. The obtained wage components serve as dependent 
variables in our empirical estimations to study in which way between-firm performance 
21  See Table 3.A.9 for the within-firm estimations of the same models as shown in Table 3.6.
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differences are related to between-firm wage variance, and how this relationship has 
developed over time.
The descriptive analyses reveal a pattern of dispersion between, especially, the most 
productive firms and the rest. Labor productivity and wages of firms in the highest 
productivity group have developed significantly faster compared to those of the firms in all 
other productivity groups. A similar diverging development can be observed between firms 
with different labor shares; firms with low labor shares account for an increasing share of 
total value added and profits, while the number of these firms and their workers is stable. 
Despite the fact that the labor share is declining on the aggregate level, which means that 
aggregate wages did not grow as fast as aggregate productivity, this does not hold on the 
micro level. There seems to be a trend in which a growing part of economic activity is 
shifting towards a relatively small group of highly productive companies with a relatively 
low labor share, even within industries. The wages of workers of these high productivity 
(and low labor-share) firms have increased the most in absolute terms, but the least in 
relative terms compared to the increase in productivity of these firms. If anything, more 
rent-sharing of firms with its workers would lead to more, and not less, wage inequality. 
The empirical results show the existence of a positive and increasing correlation between 
firm performance and wages paid by firms. The magnitude of this correlation differs 
between the various measures of firm performance, but for all used performance proxies 
the correlation is significant, positive and increasing over time. Worker quality heterogeneity 
between firms with different performance levels is more important than wage premium 
differences in explaining the relationship between performance and wages. Firms that 
perform better pay higher wages, partially because they pay a higher wage premium, but 
mostly because they hire better workers. The results hold for the different robustness tests 
and the two-stage least squares estimations. The within-firm estimations reveal that an 
increase in labor productivity is associated with an increase in wages, which is for 90% 
because of worker sorting. Contrary, a change in profitability is a significant predictor of a 
change in the firm wage premium, albeit with a rent-sharing coefficient of only 1.2%. 
Besides the importance of worker sorting for the correlation between firm performance 
and wages, worker sorting also explains the majority of the increased wage differences 
between firms with contrasting productivity and profitability levels. The wage differential 
between firms in the highest and lowest productivity (profitability) quintiles increased 
from 19% (16%) to 29% (22%), for both productivity and profitability this is for ¾ due to 
differences in worker quality and for ¼ due to differences in wage premiums. We applied a 
variance decomposition method (Fields, 2002) to calculate the share of (the change of) total 
between firm wage variance that can be attributed to firm performance heterogeneity. The 
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findings show that rent-sharing differentials between firms of different performance levels 
accounts for only 2.5-3.5% of the total increase in between-firm wage variance. Workforce 
composition differences between more- or less well performing firms however can be 
associated with 8-15% of the total increase in firm wage variance. Overall, we conclude 
that firm-level wages and performance are growing apart, together. For the most part this 
is because of segregation in the labor market where high-productivity, high-profitability 
and high-wage firms are increasingly able to attract and keep high-quality workers. 
As a final explorative analysis, we study to what extent the worker- and firm-components 
of wages can be associated with a set of variables that measure some aspects of the 
relation between firms and workers. We find that firms that make more use of flexible labor 
contracts, workers with small jobs and temp agency workers, pay lower wages. This is both 
because these firms pay lower wage premiums as well as having a lower average quality 
workforce. It could mean that the workers of these firms are easier interchangeable, have 
a weaker bargaining position or compete more directly with import and/or automatization. 
Firms that make more use of external contract workers pay higher wage premiums and 
have a higher quality workforce, firms that make more use of outsourcing also pay higher 
wages, but only because their workers are of higher quality. 
This study’s main findings show that wage differentials between firms with heterogeneous 
levels of performance, as well as performance differences between firms themselves, are 
increasing over time. The co-divergence of firm wages and performance is mainly due 
to greater heterogeneity in the quality of the workforce between firms. However, this 
study’s work is mostly descriptive. Future studies need to better understand exactly how 
and in which direction the observed divergence in wages, performance, and workforce 
composition of firms relate to each other. 
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22  This chapter is part of the broader evaluation of the Wbfo 
commissioned by the Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands and 
published in Weitzel et al., (2018). Evaluatie wet beloningsbeleid 
financiële ondernemingen. Jan Verhoeckx is the lead author and has 
been the main contributor in all stages of this study, including idea 
generation, data management, data analysis, results interpretation 
and writing the chapter. This chapter is based on CBS microdata, 
funded by the Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands.  
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4.1 Introduction
One of the factors generating most public resentment regarding the 2007-2008 global 
financial crisis, and its aftermath, is the perceived role of banks and bankers in contributing 
to the causes of this crisis through excessive risk-taking, especially in combination with 
the bailouts of several banks by taxpayers’ money. This has spurred much debate among 
the public, scholars, regulators, and policymakers concerning one of the main suspects in 
causing this excessive risk-taking by bankers; their bonuses. Public discontent about financial 
sector earnings is understandable given the high growth of wages in the pre-crisis period 
(Philippon & Reshef, 2013) and the important role of financial sector wages in the increase 
in overall wage inequality (Bell & Van Reenen, 2010). The incentives in compensation 
packages in the financial industries are believed to have been often misaligned and having 
too short of a time horizon, both regarding the determination of the results and regarding 
the relevant risks that are taken into account for establishing the risk-compensated results. 
This has led to excessive risk-taking to realize short-term results and is generally regarded 
as one of the causes of the financial crisis (e.g., Diamond & Rajan 2009; Rzepczynski, 2013; 
Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011; Dewatripont & Freixas, 2012). 
Increasing consensus among legislators about the possible negative role of bonuses has 
resulted in the introduction of several new regulations to discourage excessive risk-taking 
and short-termism among bankers. In 2014, the European Union (EU) introduced a bonus 
cap for employees, of all banks operating in the EU, that are identified as “material risk-
takers”, i.e., employees in a position to affect the risk profile of the financial institution 
that employs them.23 In practice, the bonus cap applies to all employees of banks with an 
annual salary that exceeds €500,000 and all employees in senior positions (Kleymenova & 
Tuna, 2018). The EU bonus cap limits the variable pay of all employees to whom it applies 
to 100% of the fixed remuneration, this limit can be extended to a 2:1 ratio (200%) with the 
approval of a qualified majority of the shareholders. 
Legislators in the Netherlands went further. The Remuneration Policy Act for financial 
enterprises (Wbfo, Wet beloningsbeleid financiële ondernemingen) entered into force on 
7 February 2015. This law contains several rules that oblige financial companies to pursue 
a controlled remuneration policy and limits the possibilities for variable remuneration. 
The most important difference between the Dutch and the EU rules is the bonus cap for 
financial companies. The Wbfo states that the variable remuneration that a financial firm 
can grant to its employees may not exceed 20% of the annual fixed remuneration. This 
23  Besides the bonus cap, the new EU law (CRD IV) also contains rules concerning, amongst others, 
minimum levels of deferral, payment in instruments, “clawback” and “malus” ratios.  
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bonus cap applies to all employees of financial companies that fall under the Wbfo, and 
not only to “identified staff” as in the EU rules. Because of this, the Dutch bonus cap goes 
further than the European bonus cap, both in depth and in scope.24 
This chapter is part of the broader evaluation of the Wbfo commissioned by the Ministry 
of Finance of the Netherlands. The purpose of the evaluation is twofold; to determine 
(i) whether the goals of the bonus cap to limit excessive risk-taking have been achieved 
and (ii) to what extent undesirable adverse side effects for financial companies did occur, 
especially with regard to attracting and retaining qualified employees. The primary goal of 
this chapter is about the latter; we study the possible negative unintended consequences 
of the bonus cap concerning the competitiveness of financial companies in the labor 
market. Financial companies to which the bonus cap applies compete in the labor market 
with both foreign and domestic companies that are not covered by the same strict rules. 
The stricter rules in the Netherlands could, therefore, make it more difficult for financial 
companies that fall under the Wbfo to attract and retain qualified personnel. Related to 
this is the potential effect of the bonus cap on the level of overall remuneration. If financial 
companies raise the levels of fixed remuneration to offer a competitive salary, the overall 
remuneration (per worker) may remain the same or even increase, even if a bonus cap is 
introduced (Murphy, 2013; Colonnello et al., 2018). 
We exploit the introduction of the bonus cap in the Netherlands as a quasi-experiment to 
test if this affected the probability of financial industry employees to change the industry 
in which they are employed. In order to do this we created a matched employer-employee 
panel database for the years 2010-2016 which enables us to track the movement of 
employees over time.25 Because the Dutch bonus cap, unlike the EU bonus cap, applies 
to all employees of the financial companies which fall under the cap, all financial sector 
employees in the upper half of the income distribution are included in this study.26 However, 
the bonus cap does not apply to all sub-industries, and therefore firms and employees, 
within the financial sector. This allows us to distinguish bonus-cap (sub-) industries from 
non-bonus cap (sub-)industries in the financial sectors.27 We use the non-bonus cap 
24  The bonus cap is lower (20% versus 100%), the bonus cap applies to a larger group of financial 
institutions and applies to all employees of these institutions instead of only material risk-takers.
25  Unfortunately, there was no information available for 2017 at the time of this study, which limits the 
period since the bonus cap is fully effective to only 1 year.
26  We restrict the sample to employees in the upper half of the income distribution because we expect 
that any effects of the bonus cap are most likely to present themselves for ‘qualified’ personnel. Since 
all other studies on the subject restrict their samples to executives only, we do test to what extent our 
findings differ for different income groups.
27  When we refer to bonus cap industries, we mean all subindustries in the Financial sector to which the 
bonus cap applies. When we refer to non-bonus cap industries, we mean all subindustries in the Financial 
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financial industries as a control group to evaluate the consequences of the regulatory 
change for the national and international mobility of bonus-cap financial industry workers 
(treatment group). Using a Difference-in-Difference approach we can compare the worker 
flows to and from bonus cap industries since the introduction of the bonus cap with the 
worker flows to and from non-bonus cap industries since the introduction of the bonus 
cap, and the worker flows to and from both industries in the period before the introduction 
of the bonus cap. We use the same methodology to study the effect of the bonus cap on 
overall income development in the bonus cap industries. The analyses regarding the labor 
market transitions are estimated using individual-level logistic regression techniques and 
include year and industry fixed effects and a set of industry-, firm- and individual-level 
control variables. 
The main finding is that the probability that an employee leaves a bonus cap industry 
for another (non-financial) industry in the Netherlands has increased by 0.65 percentage 
points (22.54%) in 2016, the first year that the bonus cap was fully effective. We cannot 
attribute this to a specific industry; there are no indications of an increase in outflow to, for 
example, software companies or consultancy firms. We do, however, observe a significant 
increase of 0.25 percentage points in the probability of outflow to the “related industries”.28 
The increased probability of outflow from a bonus cap industry to other industries in the 
Netherlands is smaller for higher age groups, and higher for higher-income groups or 
employees with at least a bachelor diploma or equivalent.29 The largest observed change 
is for employees below 40 years with at least a bachelor diploma; since 2016 there is a 
1.19 percentage point (27.69%) increased probability that these employees leave a bonus 
cap industry. We do not find any evidence that there is a decrease in the probability that a 
bonus cap employee recently entered the industry, or of a change in the probability that a 
bonus cap industry employee migrated to or from the Netherlands since the introduction 
of the bonus cap. Because of differences in the income development of employees in bonus 
cap and non-bonus cap industries since 2013, which violates the parallel trend assumption 
of the Difference-in-Difference approach, it is not possible to make any statements about 
the effect of the bonus cap on wages in the financial industries.
The bonus debate cannot be viewed separately from a wider academic discussion about 
the determinants of executive pay. In this debate, two main opposing theoretical views 
sector to which the bonus cap does not apply.
28  Related industries is the combination of four industries we identified with relatively high labor 
mobility to and from the financial sector. See section 4.2.1 for a more extensive explanation. 
29  The estimated change in the probability that an employee leaves a bonus cap industry is only 
significantly different between the age groups “up to 30 years” and “51 and older”. We do not find 
statistically significant differences between the other age, education, and income groups. 
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can be identified; ‘the shareholder value view’ and ‘the rent extraction view’ (Abudy et al., 
2020; Edmans et al., 2017). Both theoretical approaches are based on Agency Theory, but 
have different assumptions about when and where the agency problem manifests itself. 
The shareholder value view regards labor contracts as a solution to the agency problem 
between the shareholders and the executives and employees of a firm. This relation is 
affected by information asymmetries and conflicts of interest which creates the risk that 
the agent pursues its self-interest instead of the principal’s interest (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). This could lead to lower than optimal levels of both private effort and risk-taking 
by bankers (Lefebvre & Vieider, 2014). The main goal of establishing a performance-based 
variable remuneration system is to align the interests of the principal and the agent to 
stimulate employees towards the desired behavior in the interest of the principal. In this 
view, executive pay is the efficient outcome of a competitive labor market where (financial) 
companies compete for talents and their optimal contracts are designed to maximize 
shareholder value. Therefore, increasing earnings merely reflect the increasing marginal 
productivity of executives (Gabaix & Landier, 2008). If this is true, any regulations that 
limit the possibilities for shareholders to incentivize their executives and other (risk-taking) 
employees would lead to higher levels of fixed remuneration, suboptimal levels of value 
creation and risk-taking and a loss of competitiveness in the labor market (Murphy, 2013). 
In contrast, the rent extraction view suggests that executives have discretionary and/or 
bargaining power, relative to the shareholders, and can use this discretionary power to 
influence their labor contracts. This power enables them to extract rents at the costs of 
the shareholders (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003), which might explain the existence of a large and 
growing finance wage premium (Célérier and Vallée, 2015; Böhm et al., 2018). According 
to the rent extraction view contracts can be the source, and not the solution, of an agency 
problem. A lack of necessary market forces enables executives to influence their contracts 
which could result in insufficient incentives or incentives that stimulate excessive risk-
taking and short-termism (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Edmans et al., 2017). For example, if 
bankers, compared to the bank owners, expect to benefit more from risk-taking, while 
the costs of these risks are passed on to the bank owners, the banker has an incentive to 
take risks at a level that would be excessive from the perspective of the owner(s) of the 
bank (Bebchuk, 2009; Hakanes & Schnabel, 2014). In addition, if competition for bankers 
drives up the remuneration above the optimal level, this creates a negative externality 
for the shareholders of the bank and increases the default risk of banks (Thanassoulis, 
2012). Even if incentive contracts minimize the agency problem between shareholders and 
bankers successfully, they could still lead to excessive risk-taking from a public point of 
view. Because bank failures are, at least partially, paid for by taxpayers, private costs of 
risk-taking are lower than public costs. Shareholders could therefore have little incentives 
to fully internalize the potential costs of ‘excessive’ risk-taking into the remuneration 
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contracts of bankers (Kleymenova & Tuna, 2018). All these arguments hint at the existence 
of certain market failures in the labor market for bankers which could justify the need for 
government regulation in this sphere.
Although theoretical predictions about the risk-taking effects of bonuses are relatively 
straightforward, it is quite difficult to empirically prove the existence of causal effects. 
Contracts are endogenous by nature and any outcome will correlate with a large number 
of observable and unobservable variables at different levels (Edmans et al., 2017). We, 
therefore, have to rely on or (i) observational studies without causality claims or (ii) studies 
that exploit policy changes or use laboratory experiments to identify causal relations. Prior 
empirical evidence suggests that incentive pay in the banking industry is positively and 
significantly related to bank value and has no significant relation with risk-taking (e.g., 
Houston & James, 1995). However, several more recent studies do find positive correlations 
between incentive contracts and risk-taking in the financial industry (e.g., Cheng et al., 
2011; Bebchuk et al., 2010; DeYoung et al., 2013; Bhagat & Bolton, 2014; Efing et al., 2015). 
Limiting incentive payments, by for example a bonus cap or taxation of bonuses, could 
then lead to less (excessive) risk-taking. The results of several experimental studies seem 
to confirm that limiting the maximum bonus decreases risk-taking by decision-makers 
(e.g., Kleinlercher et al., 2014; Hartmann & Slapnicar, 2015; Weitzel et al., 2018), but can 
also lower the chosen effort level (e.g., Harris et al., 2018). This confirms the theoretical 
predictions of Hakanes & Schnabel (2014) that a bonus cap can potentially reduce risk-
taking, but can also lead to a lower than optimal level of effort and value creation.  
The possible existence of unintended consequences of introducing a bonus cap have, thus 
far, received relatively little attention in academic literature. The international mobility of 
top managers has grown significantly in recent decades (Greve et al., 2015), and the share 
of foreign executives in the banking and insurance industries is relatively high (Staples, 
2008; Greve et al., 2009). It is argued that in this highly competitive labor market, high 
wages and bonuses are necessary to attract the most talented and skilled human capital 
(Philippon & Reshef, 2012; Murphy, 2013). The top talents within the financial sector often 
have rare and highly specialized skills that are not only applicable to their current employer 
or industry, but also within related (financial or non-financial) industries. As a result, these 
employees are, compared to employees from other industries, remarkably mobile at the 
national and the international level. Introducing a bonus cap could, therefore, lead to a 
competitive disadvantage in the labor market for firms that are affected by these rules. For 
example, the introduction of the EU bonus cap has increased the CEO turnover rates for 
UK banks relative to US banks (Kleymenova & Tuna, 2018), and the intended risk-reducing 
effects of a bonus cap can be offset by labor market mobility (Asai, 2016). Closest to this 
study, and to our knowledge the only other work that directly studies the collateral damage 
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created by limiting the variable ratio in the compensation of bank executives, is the work 
of Colonnello et al. (2018). The authors exploit the introduction of the EU bonus cap to 
analyze the effect on human capital in the banking industry and the compensation policies 
of EU banks. Their findings show no evidence of an increased outflow of executives from 
banks that are affected by the bonus cap, but since they also observe an increase in fixed 
earnings this could partially be due to the timely increase in fixed earnings, which offsets 
the loss of variable earnings.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data, data selection and 
discusses the empirical strategy which is used in this chapter. Section 4.3 presents some 
illustrative descriptive figures and tests the parallel trends assumption. Section 4.4 discusses 
the results of this study. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Data selection and empirical strategy
4.2.1 Data selection
For this study we combine several longitudinal micro-data sets collected by Statistics 
Netherlands to create a matched employer-employee dataset that covers all employees, 
and their employers, working in the Netherlands in the period 2010-2016.30 Employees are 
identified based on their unique individual anonymized personal identification code, jobs are 
identified by unique job identification codes, both are allocated by Statistics Netherlands. 
Using these identification codes, the various micro-data files are matched per employee 
and job per year. The individual-level information mainly comes from the “System of 
Social Statistical Files” (SSB). The generated matched database contains information about 
personal characteristics, job characteristics, wages, and possible international migration 
movements for all workers during this period. Wages are converted to constant 2015 euros 
using the Consumer Price Index and are weighted for the number of social insurance days 
per job to calculate the full-time equivalent. As a final addition, employees are matched to 
the education database which contains information about the highest obtained diploma. 
However, this database is based on yearly surveys because of which the information is only 
available for about half of all employees in our dataset.31  
The sample initially contains all jobs, of all employees, in the Netherlands for the 2010-2016 
period. Because employees can have several jobs and/or employers per year, employees 
30  As stated earlier, this unfortunately limits our study to only 1 year of data since the introduction of 
the bonus cap.
31  For this reason, we do not use the education data in our main analyses.
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are linked to their main job; the job with the highest gross earnings in a specific year. It can 
be reasonably expected that any potential effects of the bonus cap on the labor mobility of 
employees in the financial industries will be most relevant for «qualified personnel» with 
a sufficient attachment to the firm and/or labor market. For this reason, we only include 
employees in our main sample with a part-time factor of at least 0.5 FTE and full-time 
earnings in the upper half of the income distribution of the specific 3-digit industry in 
which they are active.32 These are gross real incomes from around 50 to 60 thousand euros 
per year, depending on the specific year and industry. In one of the robustness tests we 
add the completion of a bachelor’s degree, or equivalent, as a selection condition for the 
research sample.
Firms are defined as “business units” and can be identified by their unique business unit 
identification code. All employees are matched to the business unit that employs them 
using the main job of each employee and the general business register (ABR). The ABR 
contains information about various key characteristics of each business unit active in the 
Netherlands such as the type of company, the industry in which this firm is active, the 
municipality of the firm and the number of people employed by the firm. The industry 
classification is based on the 5-digit level of “De Standaard Bedrijfsindeling” (SBI 2008). 
This is a hierarchical classification of economic activities that Statistics Netherlands uses, 
among other things, to allocate business units to the (sub-)industry of their main activity. 
The core goal of this chapter is to establish whether the probability of employees entering 
or leaving a financial firm, active in a specific financial (sub-)industry, has changed due 
to the implementation of the bonus cap. Therefore, we first need to be able to observe 
to which employees, firms, and industries in the financial sector the bonus cap applies. 
Unfortunately, using the available information, it is not possible to determine exactly which 
employees receive a bonus and for which specific employees the bonus legislation does or 
does not apply. However, it is possible to utilize the industry classification (SBI) to observe 
whether employees work for a firm in a financial sector (sub-)industry to which the bonus 
cap applies. In consultation with the Ministry of Finance, we grouped all financial industries 
(at the 5-digit level) into “bonus cap industries” and “non-bonus cap industries”. Industries 
for which, given the available industry classification, it is not possible to determine with 
certainty whether the bonus cap applies are not taken into account in our main analyses.33 
32  Besides, the mobility of employees at the lower end (mainly lower 25%) of income distribution is 
more volatile, which could strongly influence any results.
33  In later robustness tests, we do check if relaxing the degree of certainty by which we can assume 
whether the bonus cap applies to specific industries affects the main results. However, relaxing these 
conditions leads to a violation of the parallel trends assumption and therefore severely limits the reliability 
of the results.
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The most important bonus cap industries (in terms of size) are the banking sector (excluding 
the central bank) and the insurance sector. The most important non-bonus cap industries 
(in terms of size) in the financial sector are the pension sector, financial holding companies, 
and investment institutions. A detailed overview of our grouping of financial industries is 
shown in Table 4.A.1 in the appendix. 
Secondly, we need to be able to observe worker flows between firms and industries by 
tracking the movement of employees over time. By comparing the (main)employers of 
individual employees in a specific year with the (main)employers in a prior or subsequent 
year, it is possible to identify employees who have changed their employer, industry or 
labor market position.34 35 If an employee changes their assigned “main job”, and this main 
job is linked to an employer in another (sub-)industry, this is regarded as between-industry 
labor market mobility. We generated binary variables that measure if an employee made 
a certain labor market transition between two specific years. This means that it has been 
established for all employees whether they make a certain movement between industries 
(value = 1) or do not make this move (value = 0) in the transition between two consecutive 
years. This does not include employees leaving or entering the labor market. In addition, 
we establish whether an employee, who is not observed in a previous or subsequent year in 
the database, has immigrated to the Netherlands or has emigrated from the Netherlands. 
The way we are able to observe labor market transitions does have some consequences 
for the estimation strategies. All transitions are observed as a change between two 
consecutive years, while all other information is year specific. For example, we do observe 
which employees are employed in a different industry in 2016 as in 2015, but all other 
information is specific for or 2015 or 2016. 
Any effect of the bonus cap on labor mobility between industries will probably be more 
relevant for some non-financial industries than others. Based on the worker flows between 
industries for the years 2010 to 2014 (before the introduction of the bonus cap), we have 
identified 4 non-financial industries with a relatively high inflow and outflow from and to 
the financial sector. We regard these industries as “related” because they can be considered 
a realistic alternative for employees in the financial sector. The related industries are: (I) 
software development and consulting, (II) general consulting firms, (III) technical consulting 
firms and (IV) property management, trading and leasing.36 
34  Whenever possible, adjustments have been made for entry and exit of firms, spinoffs and mergers & 
acquisitions. For example, if more than 5 employees leave a firm for the same other firm in one year, and 
this is at least 5% of all employees of one of these two firms, we have not considered this as labor mobility.
35  Labor market position refers to whether an employee is without a job, goes into retirement or 
migrates into or out of the Netherlands.
36  These “related industries” account for 24.41% of the inflow into the financial sector from other 
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The compiled database contains annual data of approximately 249 to 275 thousand 
employees and 8 to 11 thousand firms active in the financial sector in the Netherlands. 
After selection based on job size, income and the used distinction between bonus cap and 
non-bonus cap industries, the main research sample covers observations of approximately 
91 to 124 thousand employees per year. For all these employees we have mapped the 
labor market transitions between consecutive years and the yearly gross real full-time 
income. This enables us to observe which employees have changed their employer and/
or industry in two consecutive years, whether they have entered or left the labor market, 
how their overall wages developed over time and whether they have migrated to or 
from the Netherlands.37 As an indication, Table 4.A.2 in the Appendix shows some basic 
characteristics of employees in the bonus cap and non-bonus cap industries for 2016.38 
4.2.2 Empirical strategy
The introduction of the Dutch bonus cap in February 2015 is used as a natural experiment 
to study if, and how, capping the variable ratio of financial employee remuneration affects 
the probability that these employees change the industry, or country, in which they are 
employed. To be able to estimate this possible effect we adopt a Difference-in-Difference 
(DiD) approach that uses the employees of financial companies active in industries to 
which the bonus cap does not apply as a control group. The DiD design is based on the 
comparison between the means of four different groups of observations. It compares the 
outcome of the treatment group after the treatment with the outcome of three groups 
that are not affected by the treatment; (i) the treatment group prior to the treatment, (ii) 
the control group prior to the treatment and (iii) the control group after the treatment. 
The DiD method assumes that the trend of the control group, in combination with the 
included covariates, serves as an adequate predictor for the trend that would be observed 
in the treatment group if the treatment would not have taken place. Any deviation in the 
outcome of the treatment group compared to the predicted counterfactual outcome 
(based on the trend of the control group and the included covariates) is attributed to the 
treatment (Lechner, 2011). 
As a consequence, the main assumption of the DiD approach is that both groups 
experienced parallel trends in the outcome variables prior to the treatment, this means 
industries in the Netherlands and 32.12% of the outflow of employees from the financial sector to other 
industries in the Netherlands.
37  Only migration from and to more “advanced” countries is included in the analysis since the chances 
are greater that companies in these countries will compete with Dutch companies for qualified personnel.
38  Table 4.A.2 shows the number of employees and firms, the average gross full-time annual income, 
the percentage of employees from abroad and the percentage of highly skilled employees (At least a 
bachelor’s degree or equivalent). Education data is not available for all employees, these characteristics 
are based on a smaller sample size.
4
PS_JVerhoeckx_def.indd   101 03-05-21   10:13
G R O W I N G A PA R T TO G E T H E R
102
that any differences between the treatment and control group prior to the treatment 
should be constant over time. Besides a visual inspection of the trends of both groups prior 
to the treatment, we test this assumption more formally by using placebo tests in which the 
period of implementation varies to see if this reveals any statistically significant differences 
in development between the treatment- and control-group in the pre-treatment period. 
Some other important underlying assumptions are that (in absence of randomization) 
the assignment of the treatment is independent from the outcome, that any confounders 
varying across the treatment- and control-group are time invariant and that any time-
varying confounders are group invariant.39 40 This makes a correct distinction between 
the treatment and the control group and a correct distinction between the period before 
and after the treatment of great importance (e.g., Blundell & costa Dias, 2009; Imbens & 
Wooldridge, 2009; Lechner, 2011; Wing et al., 2018). 
The applied procedure to distinguish the treatment group from the control group is 
explained in the previous section. The choices and considerations concerning the timing of 
the treatment deserve some substantiation as well. The bonus cap took effect, retroactively, 
on 7 February 2015. However, the law provides for a transitional provision; during 2015 the 
bonus cap did not apply to employees who were already employed by a financial enterprise 
on 1 January 2015 and who are entitled to variable compensation under their contract. For 
employees who entered into service after 1-1-2015, the bonus cap applied immediately, 
but the bonus cap only became fully effective for all other employees from 1-1-2016.41 
This means that any possible effect of the bonus cap on labor mobility may already have 
occurred in 2015, but is more likely to be only visible in 2016. This is especially the case 
because of the way labor mobility is observed in our dataset. Labor market transitions 
are observed as a change in the main job between two consecutive years. As a result, an 
employee who changes industries in the second half of 2015, and therefore still has the 
‘old’ job as the main job assigned in 2015, is attributed to a labor market transition in 
39  Some financial industries are excluded from the bonus cap because of the fear that it would undermine 
their competitiveness in the labor market too much. Therefore, any relation between assignment of the 
bonus cap and the outcome is more likely to lead to an underestimation than an overestimation of any 
negative effect.
40  We attempt to circumvent this potential problem by adding industry, firm and individual-level control 
variables which could affect the probability of making a labor market transition. A possible time- and 
group-variant confounding factor that comes to mind is a change in earnings (because of the bonus cap), 
but this is implicitly the effect we are looking for. Another confounding factor could be the European bonus 
cap (or other banking regulations) which was applied prior to the Dutch bonus cap, although the EU bonus 
cap only applies to a select number of employees, we cannot exclude the possibility that this has affected 
labor mobility prior to the introduction of the Dutch bonus cap.
41  Several exemptions exist related to the bonus cap, but only under special conditions and with the 
shareholders’ approval. Since we cannot observe to which employees these exemptions apply, we do not 
take this into account.
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2016. For the reasons discussed in this paragraph, it is not possible to determine an exact 
pre- and post-treatment period, however we do think that 2016 is the most valid option. 
Accordingly, the years 2010 to 2015 will serve as the pre-treatment period and the period 
since 2016 as the post-treatment period in which a possible effect could occur.42 43 
The different possible labor market transitions we take into account in our analyses 
estimating the effect of the bonus cap on employee outflows are (i) leaving a bonus cap 
industry for another industry in the Netherlands, (ii) leaving a bonus cap industry for the 
“related industries” in general, (iii) leaving a bonus cap industry for a specific “related 
industry” and (iv) leaving a bonus cap industry to migrate out of the Netherlands. When 
we estimate the effect of the bonus cap on employee inflows, we take the same possible 
transitions into account in reverse, for example the probability of entering a bonus cap 
industry from another industry in the Netherlands. Figure 4.1 can be used as an illustration 
to explain the comparison made to estimate whether the outflow of employees to other 
industries in the Netherlands has changed since the introduction of the bonus cap. In this 
case we test whether the probability that an employee in a “bonus cap industry” makes 
a transition as represented by the arrows “A” has changed significantly compared to the 
probability that an employee in a “non-bonus cap industry” makes a transition as indicated 
by the arrows “B” since the introduction of the bonus cap.
Figure 4.1 Visualization of employee outflow
42  As a robustness check we estimate all models as well with the assumption that 2015 is in the post-
treatment period. 
43  Unfortunately, this means that we have only one year of data available for the post-treatment period.
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We employ separate logistic regression estimations for each possible labor market 
transition of interest an employee active in the financial sector can make.44 The equations 
take the following form for all estimations concerning the effect of the bonus cap on the 
probability of outflow from a bonus cap industry:
In this equation, Yijs,t+1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if employee i, who is 
employed by firm j, active in industry s, in year t makes a certain labor market movement 
in the transition to the next year t+1. For example, if an employee who works in a bonus 
cap industry in 2015 leaves this industry to work in another industry in the Netherlands in 
2016. BCs is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the industry s in which the employee is active 
is a bonus cap industry, Pt is an indicator for whether the year t+1 is after the introduction 
of the bonus cap and BCsPt is the interaction between these two variables. The included 
control variables are reflected by Xit, Yit  and  Zit  which are vectors of respectively individual-, 
firm- and industry-level covariates which could affect the probability of leaving (or entering) 
an industry.45 We further add industry (λs) and year (δt)  fixed effects to each estimation. 
This makes β12 our coefficient of main interest. It measures the change in the probability 
that an employee leaves a bonus cap industry relative to non-bonus cap industries from 
before to after the introduction of the bonus cap. 
To study the effect of the bonus cap on employees entering the financial sector we employ 
almost the same estimation as shown in equation 4.1:
The main difference is that we now use observations from a specific year t to test the 
probability that an employee made a certain labor market movement in the transition 
from the previous year t-1. In essence, this means that we estimate the probability that an 
employee is new to a specific industry. For the wage development analyses we apply a simple 
linear regression, in combination with the DiD approach, to test if the earnings of employees 
in the bonus cap industries have developed different relative to the earnings of employees in 
non-bonus cap industries from before to after the introduction of the bonus cap:
44  We employ logistic regressions because of the binary nature of the dependent variable and the fact 
that results are similar to linear probability models. We convert all outcomes to (marginal) probabilities to 
make interpretation of the results more straightforward.
45  These covariates include the age group, gender, size of the job, years at the employer, a dummy which 




since the introduction of the bonus cap. In this case we test whether the probability that an 
employee in a "bonus cap industry" makes a transition as represented by the arrows "A" has 
changed significantly compared to the probability that an employee in a "non-bonus cap 
industry" makes a transition as indicated by the arrows “B” since the introduction of the bonus 
cap. 
Figure 4.1: Visualization of employee outflow 
 
We employ separate logistic regression estimations for each possible labor market transition of 
interest an employee active in the financial sector can make.44 The equations take the following 
form for all estimations concerning the effect of the bonus cap on the probability of outflow 
from a bonus cap indust y: 
(4.1) 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 =  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽12𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  + ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
In this equation, 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if employee i, who is 
employed by fir  j, active in industry s, in year t makes a certain labor market movement in 
the transition to he n xt year t+1. For example, if an employee who orks in a bonus cap 
industry in 2015 leaves this industry to work in another industry in the Netherlands in 2016. 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the industry s in which the employee is active is a 
bonus cap industry, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an indicator for whether the year t+1 is after the introduction of the 
bonus c p and 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is th  interaction between these two variables. Th  included control 
 
44 We employ logistic regr ssions because of the binary nature of the dep ndent variable and the fact that results 
are similar to linear probability models. We convert all outcomes to (marginal) probabilities to make interpretation 
of the results more straightforward. 
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variables are reflected by 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and 𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 which are vectors of respectively individual-, firm- 
and industry-level covariates which could affect the probability of leaving (or entering) an 
industry.45 We further add industry (𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) and year (𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) fixed effects to each estimation. This 
makes 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽12 our coefficient of m in interest. It measures th  chang in the probability th t an 
employee leav s a bonus cap industry relative to non-bonus cap industries from before to after 
the introduction of the bonus cap.  
To study the effect of the bonus cap on e l s tering the financial sector we employ 
almost the same estimation as shown in equation 4.1: 
(4.2) 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 =  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽12𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  + ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
The main difference is that we now use observations from a specific year t to test the probability 
that an employee made a certain labor market movement in the transition from the previous 
year t-1. In essence, this means that we estimat  the probability that an employee is new to  
specific industry. For the wage development analyses we apply a simple linear regression, in 
combination with the DiD approach, to test if the earnings of employees in the bonus cap 
industries have developed different relative to the earnings of employees in non-bonus cap 
industries from before to after the introduction of the bonus cap: 
(4.3) 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽12𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  + ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 In these estimations the dependent variable  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 measures the log of the fulltime yearly 
wages of employee i, employed by firm j, active in industry s in year t.   
4.3 Illustrative descriptives and parallel trends tests 
4.3.1 Labor mobility between financial sector and other industries 
To get some sense about the level and evolution of labor market mobility, international 
migration and income development in the financial industries, we will start with a short 
descriptive overview of these developments. This is of particular interest given the parallel 
trends assumptions of the DiD approach, which we test more formally using a Placebo test 
strategy. As we are primarily interested in any effects on the mobility of qualified personnel, 
all figures and tables will only show the results of employees in the upper half of the income 
distribution of the industry in which the employee is active. To provide an initial overview, 
 
45 These covariates include the age group, gender, size of the job, years at the employer, a dummy which measures 
if employee is a foreigner, the annual fulltime wage, the size of the firm, and the growth of the industry. 
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In these esti mati ons the dependent variable lnWijst measures the log of the fullti me yearly 
wages of employee i, employed by fi rm j, acti ve in industry s in year t. 
4.3 Illustrati ve descripti ves and parallel trends tests
4.3.1 Labor mobility between fi nancial sector and other industries
To get some sense about the level and evoluti on of labor market mobility, internati onal 
migrati on and income development in the fi nancial industries, we will start with a short 
descripti ve overview of these developments. This is of parti cular interest given the parallel 
trends assumpti ons of the DiD approach, which we test more formally using a Placebo 
test strategy. As we are primarily interested in any eff ects on the mobility of qualifi ed 
personnel, all fi gures and tables will only show the results of employees in the upper half 
of the income distributi on of the industry in which the employee is acti ve. To provide an 
initi al overview, fi gure 4.2 shows the development of the labor mobility of employees in 
the fi nancial sector in the Netherlands.46 
Figure 4.2 Labor mobility fi nancial sector (bonus cap and non-bonus cap industries)
The level of labor mobility (both infl ow and outf low) of employees working in non-bonus 
cap industries is relati vely high compared to the labor mobility of employees working in 
bonus cap industries (both before and aft er the introducti on of the bonus cap). Although 
46  The fi gure only includes employees who change their employer and sub-industry within the 
Netherlands, this means employees entering and leaving the bonus and non-bonus cap fi nancial industries. 
Employees who leave or enter the labor market and employees who leave or enter the Netherlands are 
not included in this fi gure. 
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variables are reflected by 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and 𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 which are vectors of respectively individual-, firm- 
and industry-level covariates which could affect the probability of leaving (or entering) an 
industry.45 We further add industry (𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) and year (𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) fixed effects to each estimation. This 
makes 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽12 our coefficient of main interest. It measures the change in the probability that an 
employee leaves a bonus cap industry relative to non-bonus cap industries from before to after 
the introduction of the bonus cap.  
To study the effect of the bonus cap on employees entering the financial sector we employ 
almost the same estimation as shown in equation 4.1: 
(4.2) 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 =  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽12𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  + ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
The main difference is that we now use observations from a specific year t to test the probability 
that an employee made a certain labor market movement in the transition from the previous 
year t-1. In essence, this means that we estimate the probability that an employee is new to a 
specific industry. For the wage development analyses we apply a simple linear regression, in 
combination with the DiD approach, to test if the earnings of employees in the bonus cap 
industries have developed different relative to the earnings of employees in non-bonus cap 
industries from before to after the introduction of the bonus cap: 
(4.3) 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽12𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝜑𝜑𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  + ∈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 In these estimations the dependent variable  𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 measures the log of the fulltime yearly 
wages of employee i, employed by firm j, active in industry s in year t.   
4.3 Illustrative descriptives and parallel trends tests 
4.3.1 Labor mobility between financial sector and other industries 
To get some sense about the level and evolution of labor market mobility, international 
migration and income development in the financial industries, we will start with a short 
descriptive overview of these developments. This is of particular interest given the parallel 
trends assumptions of the DiD approach, which we test more formally using a Placebo test 
strategy. As we are primarily interested in any effects on the obility of qualified personnel, 
all figures and tables will only show the ults of employe s in the upper half of the incom  
distribution of the industry in which the employee is active. To provide an initial overview, 
 
45 These covariates include the age group, gender, size of the job, years at the employer, a dummy which measures 
if employee is a foreigner, the annual fulltime wage, the size of the firm, and the growth of the industry. 
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there is a difference in the level of labor mobility between bonus cap and non-bonus cap 
industries, the trends in the period before the introduction of the bonus cap seems to 
be relatively similar. This is the first indication that the parallel trends assumption is not 
violated.47 In the 2015-2016 period, the outflow of employees from bonus cap industries 
increased from 2.86% to 3.41% per year. The inflow of employees in bonus cap industries 
also increased during this period, from 1.68% to 1.97% per year. Both the inflow and 
outflow of employees in non-bonus cap industries remained fairly constant during the 
period since the introduction of the bonus cap. Some industries have been identified as 
“related”. These are industries with a relatively high degree of affiliation with the financial 
sector based on labor mobility between 2010 and 2014. Figure 4.A.2 in the appendix shows 
the inflow and outflow of employees between the total of these related industries and 
the financial industries (bonus cap as well as non-bonus cap). Figure 4.A.3 displays a more 
detailed overview of the worker flows between the bonus cap industries and the specific 
related industries (including non-bonus cap industries). 
The main assumption of the DiD approach with multiple pre-treatment periods is that the 
treatment- and control-group experienced a similar development in the pre-treatment 
period. Although visual inspection of the trends in both groups does not give cause 
for concern, we chose to test this more formally. We apply a “placebo experiment” by 
pretending that the treatment happened earlier than it actually did to test if this reveals 
any statistically significant differences in development between both groups in the 
pre-treatment period. If we would find such differences this could be proof of or (i) an 
anticipation effect, or (ii) a violation of the parallel trend assumption (Lechner, 2011). Table 
4.1 shows the results of the placebo test for the outflow of financial sector workers to 
other industries within the Netherlands, see Table 4.A.3 in the appendix for a similar test 
concerning the inflow of workers. The findings give no reason to worry about any violation 
of the parallel trends assumption, we do not find evidence of a significant difference in 
development between the bonus cap and non-bonus cap industries before the introduction 
of the bonus regulation.
47  So far, we only took sub-industries into account for which we are certain whether or not the bonus 
cap applies. Figure 4.A.1 shows the development of labor mobility when we relax these conditions and 
include industries to which the bonus cap “most likely” does or does not apply. It is clearly visible that the 
“parallel trend” assumption is not met.
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Table 4.1 Placebo test for ‘parallel trends’ assumption: outflow from financial sector. Based on 
Difference-in-Difference model to estimate change in probability of outflow from bonus cap industries to 
another industry in the Netherlands. Year of introduction differs for each model (629,262 observations)
4.3.2 Bonus cap and non-bonus cap industries
The composition of the treatment and control group is, besides the correct timing of the 
treatment, the second important choice that has to be made. As mentioned in section 
4.2.1 and shown in Table 4.A.1, we used the 5-digit industry classification in consultation 
with the ministry of Finance to group industries into bonus cap and non-bonus cap financial 
industries. However, for some financial (sub-)industries it was not possible to group them 
with enough certainty. For this reason, we only used industries in our main analyses for 
which we are sure whether the bonus cap does or does not apply. As an extra test we 
estimate the probability of outflow from and inflow to bonus cap industries on a larger 
sample, which also includes industries to which the bonus cap “most likely” does or does 
not apply. Visual inspection of the aggregate data (Figure 4.A.1) suggests that for this 
broader classification the parallel trend assumption probably does not hold. To be sure 
of this, we performed two placebo tests, as is done to generate Table 4.1, on this larger 
sample using the broader classification of bonus cap and non-bonus cap industries. The 
results, which are displayed in Table 4.A.4 and 4.A.5, confirm that the labor mobility already 
deviates between both groups before the introduction of the bonus cap. This means that 
when using the “broader” classification, there is no parallel trend prior to the introduction 
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Estimations of individual level logit regressions based on equation 4.1. Coefficients present marginal 
probabilities in percentage points, percentage change reported in the parentheses. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the 5-digit industry level. Regressions include 5-digit industry and year fixed 
effects as well as the age group, gender, size of the job, years at the employer, foreigner dummy, annual 
fulltime wage, size of the firm and growth of the industry as control variables. (* p<0.01, ** p<0.001)
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4.3.3 International migration
A major concern of policymakers concerning the new bonus rules is the possible influence 
this has on the international competitive position of Dutch financial companies. The 
bonus rules can have as an effect that the Dutch financial sector is less interesting for 
internationally mobile employees, which could lead to less international inflow and/or 
more international outflow of employees. To map this, Figure 4.3 shows the international 
mobility of employees in bonus cap and non-bonus cap industries. The international 
migration flows are fairly stable over time in the period before the introduction of the 
bonus cap. Since the introduction there has been an increase in the percentage of workers 
who recently (in the last year) immigrated to the Netherlands, this increase occurred for 
both the bonus cap and the non-bonus cap industries, but is much stronger for the non-
bonus cap industries. This increase in international inflow was accompanied by a decrease 
in international outflow, again for both industries. However, the decrease in the outflow 
from non-bonus cap industries was preceded by a sharp increase in outflow in the transition 
years 2014-2015. Upon visual inspection, it can be concluded that the outflow of workers 
for both types of industries followed similar trajectories until 2014, but the recent increase 
in the international outflow from non-bonus cap industries seems to possibly violate the 
parallel trend assumption.
Figure 4.3 International mobility of employees in the financial sector (bonus cap and non-bonus cap 
industries)
To test this concern more formally, we performed two placebo tests on the international 
migration flows of financial sector workers before the introduction of the bonus cap. The 
results are depicted in Table 4.A.6 and 4.A.7 in the appendix. Although the results confirm 
that the international outflow of workers from bonus cap industries, relative to the outflow 
from non-bonus cap industries, decreases one year before the introduction of the bonus 
cap, this difference turns out to be not statistically significant. Since there is no statistical 
evidence for a difference in development in international migration between bonus cap 
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and non-bonus cap employees prior to the bonus cap, we conclude that the parallel trends 
condition is sufficiently met.
4.3.4 Overall remuneration
An analysis of the development of financial sector wages since the introduction of the 
bonus cap is relevant for our core goal because of the possibility that a fall in the variable 
remuneration may be compensated by an increase in fixed remuneration which could 
limit the labor market effect of the bonus cap (Murphy, 2013; Colonnello et al., 2018). 
Unfortunately, it is not possible for us to observe the variable and fixed components of 
the overall remuneration of financial sector employees or to observe which employees 
received a variable compensation in general. Figure 4.A.4 shows the average real income 
development of employees in the financial sectors.48 The average real income of employees 
in bonus cap and non-bonus cap industries has undergone a similar development until 
2013. From 2014, the real incomes of employees in the non-bonus cap industries increase, 
the real incomes of employees in the bonus cap industries show a slight decrease during 
this period. The information in this figure does not take any other factors that may influence 
total wages into account. The difference in development is not caused by certain income 
groups. Figure 4.A.5 in the appendix shows the cumulative development of the average 
real income of the various income deciles. These figures show that remuneration in bonus 
cap industries has decreased, relative to those in non-bonus cap industries, since 2013-
2014. This is an indication that the “parallel trends” assumption is probably not met.
Visual inspection of the aggregate data reveals a violation of the parallel trend assumption. 
This would mean that a difference in earnings development had already arisen before the 
introduction of the bonus cap which would severely limit the reliability of our empirical 
strategy. We perform two placebo tests to study whether this is still the case once we shift 
our focus from aggregate data to predicted probabilities, taking into account a range of 
other factors that can affect employee earnings. To do this, we again employ a “Difference-
in-Difference” approach to do a placebo test. The estimated coefficients represent the 
(percentage points) difference in development between the earnings of employees in the 
bonus cap industries relative to the earnings of employees in non-bonus cap industries. 
First, we test the applicability of a DiD approach by carrying out a set of estimations, as 
shown by equation 4.3, in which we pretend, for each estimation, that the introduction 
of the bonus cap took place in a different year. This approach should be able to reveal 
any differences in development between both groups in the pre-treatment period. The 
48 As with the previous figures, a distinction is made between the average real income in bonus cap and 
non-bonus cap industries and only employees in the upper half of the income distribution are included.
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results in Table 4.A.8 in the appendix show that in 2016, taking a range of other potentially 
influencing factors into account, the overall earnings in bonus cap industries are 7.15 
percentage points lower compared to the earnings in non-bonus cap industries and the 
period before 2016. However, the results also show that this difference in development 
already occurred several years before the introduction of the bonus cap. To test in which 
year this divergence of financial sector employees’ earnings started, we carried out the 
same estimation on all combinations of two consecutive years. The results in Table 4.A.9 
in the appendix show that bonus cap industry earnings experienced a 9.46 percentage 
points lower development compared to non-bonus cap earnings between 2013 and 2015 
(5.74 in 2013-2014 and 3.72 in 2014-2015). In 2016 there is no significant difference in 
income development between both industries. These results provide a strong indication 
that other confounding events in the financial sector are causing the difference in income 
development, which leaves us unable to make any statements about the effect of the 
bonus cap on financial sector employees’ overall remuneration.
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Results labor mobility between financial sector and other industries
We first discuss the analyses in which we investigate whether there is a change in the 
probability that a bonus cap industry employee leaves this industry for another industry in 
the Netherlands. The logit regression model based on equation 4.1 estimates odds ratios, 
these are transformed into probabilities which allows us to calculate the marginal effect 
of the introduction of the bonus cap on our binary outcome variables. This means that 
it shows the marginal change in the predicted probability, keeping all control variables 
constant, that an employee makes a certain transition in the labor market because of the 
introduction of the bonus cap. 
The results in Table 4.2 show that since 2016, keeping the other variables in the model 
constant, the probability that an employee moves from a bonus cap industry to another 
industry in the Netherlands has increased by 0.65 percentage points. This is at least in part 
due to an increase in the probability of an employee leaving a bonus cap industry for one 
of the “related industries” by 0.25 percentage point, we cannot attribute this finding to 
more specific industries or a spillover effect from bonus cap industries to non-bonus cap 
industries. Table 4.3 provides a more intuitive explanation of how to interpret the findings 
of Table 4.2. The table shows the estimated probabilities that an employee will transfer to 
another industry in the Netherlands. In the 2010-2015 period, the estimated probability of 
outflow from a non-bonus cap industry was 3.38% per year. In 2016 this increased to 3.48%. 
In the 2010-2015 period, the estimated probability of outflow from a bonus cap industry 
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was 2.96% per year. In 2016 this increased to 3.71%. This means that the probability of 
outflow from bonus cap industries has increased by 0.65 percentage points more than the 
probability of outflow from non-bonus cap industries.
Table 4.3 Interpretation of the results presented in Table 4.2 (model 1)
Besides the possibility that the introduction of the bonus cap influences the probability to 
leave a bonus cap industry, it is theoretically just as likely that it influences the probability of 
employees to enter a bonus cap industry. We test this by performing the same estimations 
as used to generate the results presented in Table 4.1, but then reversed, as shown in 
Table 4.2 Difference-in-Difference estimation: outflow from financial sector. Estimation of the marginal 








































Estimations of individual level logit regressions based on equation 4.1. Only employees in the upper 
half of the income distribution in their respective industry are included. Coefficients present marginal 
probabilities in percentage points, percentage change reported in the parentheses. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the 5-digit industry level. Regressions include 5-digit industry and year fixed 
effects as well as the age group, gender, size of the job, years at the employer, foreigner dummy, annual 







 Before 2016 In 2016 Difference 
   (percentage points)
 3.38% 3.48% 0.10
 
 2.96% 3.71% 0.75
 
 -0.42 0.23 0.65%-point**
(* p<0.01, ** p<0.001)
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equation 4.2. This means that we test whether there is a change in the probability that 
an employee, who is observed in a bonus cap industry in 2016, was previously active in a 
different industry. The findings presented in Table 4.A.10 in the appendix do not provide 
any statistically significant evidence that there was a change in 2016 in the probability that 
a bonus cap employee has recently entered that industry. 
4.4.2 Individual characteristics
The results presented in the previous section show the average predicted change in 
the probability of leaving or entering a bonus cap industry since the introduction of the 
bonus cap. However, it is reasonable to expect that any effect of the bonus cap is not 
homogeneous for employees with different characteristics; certain groups of employees 
are more mobile than other groups of employees due to a more luxurious labor market 
position or for example their age. Young and skilled workers with relatively high incomes 
can be expected to be more mobile in the labor market.
To test this, we calculated the predicted marginal effect of the introduction of the bonus cap 
on the probability of leaving a bonus cap industry per age- and income-group. This enables 
us to observe to what extent the effect of the bonus cap depends on the age and income 
of employees. The results are displayed in figure 4.4. All employees are allocated to four 
different age groups and ten different income groups of five percentiles each. It appears 
that the change in the probability of outflow decreases with the age group of employees. 
However, only the difference between the lowest age group (up to 30 years) and the 
highest age group (from 51 years) is statistically significant. Furthermore, the probability 
of outflow since the introduction of the bonus cap increases with the income group of 
employees. However, there are no statistically significant differences in the probability of 
outflow between the different income groups.
 
As an additional test we repeated the estimations concerning the predicted change in- and 
outflow to and from bonus cap industries on a sample with only employees below the 
age of 40 with at least a bachelor’s degree or equivalent. The results in Table 4.A.11 in 
the appendix show that for this more mobile group of employees there has been a 1.19 
percentage point increase in the probability that they leave a bonus cap industry for another 
industry in the Netherlands. For this more selective group, as with the larger sample, we 
find no clear evidence of a change in the likelihood that these employees recently entered 
a bonus cap industry. 
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4.4.3 International migration
Our findings thus far show that there has been an increase in the outflow from bonus 
cap industries to other industries in the Netherlands since the introduction of the new 
legislation. The biggest fear from a policymaker perspective, however, would be an 
increased outflow or decreased inflow of financial sector employees to and from other 
Figure 4.4 Marginal probability of outflow per age- and income-group. Adjusted predictions of marginal 
probability based on estimates as depicted in model 1 of table 4.1 (99% confidence interval)
4
PS_JVerhoeckx_def.indd   113 03-05-21   10:13
G r o w i n G A pA r t to G e t h e r
114
countries. This could be an indication that the bonus cap affected the international 
competitive position of the financial sector in the Netherlands. For this reason, we have 
merged our employer-employee matched dataset with the individual-level international 
migration database, which records the official migration to- and from the Netherlands. 
This enables us to establish whether an employee, who is not observed in a previous or 
subsequent year in the database, has immigrated to the Netherlands or has emigrated 
from the Netherlands. When an employee who works in the financial sector immigrated 
to the Netherlands in the same year or the year before, we see this as immigration to the 
Netherlands. When an employee who works in the financial sector emigrated from the 
Netherlands in the same year or the following year, we see this as emigration from the 
Netherlands. We use this in combination with the same estimation strategy used so far to 
assess whether the introduction of the bonus cap has been accompanied by a change in the 
probability that an employee in the financial sector will emigrate abroad or the probability 
that a financial sector employee has recently immigrated to the Netherlands. The results 
of these estimations are presented in Table 4.A.12 in the appendix and reveal no evidence 
of a significant change in the probability of international migration, in both directions, in 
2016. This means that we do not find proof of a change in the competitiveness of the Dutch 
financial sector on the international labor market. 
4.5 Conclusion 
There is probably no sector in the economy where the remuneration of employees leads 
to as much debate, and is as controversial, as the financial sector. This debate goes further 
than just the amount of compensation, it is mainly about the structure of the compensation. 
The variable component of financial sector remuneration allegedly encourages employees 
to take excessive risks without taking sufficient account of the interest of customers, their 
employers or society. The recognition that bonuses may have been one of the factors 
causing the 2007-2008 financial crisis led to the introduction of several regulatory activities 
concerning financial sector remuneration. These regulations are intended to limit this type 
of excessive risk-taking behavior. The most striking is the introduction of the EU bonus cap 
and the Dutch bonus cap. In February 2015, the Dutch government introduced several rules 
that limit the possibilities of financial companies to make use of variable remuneration 
structures. The Dutch bonus cap, which limits the variable-to-fixed compensation ratio to 
20%, is the strictest of its kind and limits the maximum variable component at a lower ratio 
(20% vs 100%) than the already relatively strict EU bonus cap. 
The desirability of having a bonus-cap in the financial sector depends on the trade-off 
between the possible benefits of reduced ‘excessive’ risk-taking and rent-extraction by 
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financial sector workers compared to the possible costs in terms of lower than optimal 
levels of risk-taking or reduced competitiveness in the labor market. If performance-
related pay is an important instrument for shareholders to align the interests of financial 
sector workers with theirs, as suggested by the shareholder value view, limiting the 
possibilities to do so would lead to suboptimal levels of risk-taking or effort by financial 
sector workers (e.g., Lefebvre & Vieider, 2014; Hakanes & Schnabel, 2014; Harris et al., 
2018). From this perspective, the size of compensation packages reflects the marginal 
productivity of financial sector employees (Gabaix & Landier, 2008), and operate in a highly 
competitive labor market where high wages and bonuses are necessary to attract the most 
suitable employees (Philippon & Reshef, 2012). Any limitations in the size or structure of 
compensation packages would lead to a loss of competitiveness in the labor market and 
negatively affect the quality of workers of financial sector firms (Murphy, 2013). 
However, if employees in the financial sector have bargaining power over the owners of 
companies in the financial sector, as suggested by the rent extraction view, the existence of 
a finance wage premium (Célérier and Vallée, 2015; Böhm et al., 2018) could be a symptom 
of rent-extraction by financial sector workers (Thanassoulis, 2012). From this perspective, 
performance-related pay could lead to excessive risk-taking at the expense of shareholders 
or even society (Bebchuk, 2009). While this reasoning could justify introducing a bonus-
cap to minimize risk-taking by employees in the financial, it could still induce a loss of 
labor market competitiveness if this results in lower total earnings compared to relevant 
alternative foreign or domestic industries.
An evaluation of this type of regulation ultimately comes down to a cost-benefit analysis. Are 
the intended benefits achieved or, in other words, does a bonus cap lead to less excessive 
risk-taking and rent-extraction by financial sector workers? Secondly, at what price? This 
chapter is about the latter. The introduction of such regulations in a highly competitive 
and global market can entail costs. Employees of the financial sector are relatively highly 
skilled and mobile, both nationally and internationally, compared to employees from other 
industries. This could have as an unintended consequence that introducing a bonus cap for 
these employees negatively affects the competitiveness of financial companies operating 
in and from the Netherlands. More specifically, it can have negative consequences for 
financial companies to attract and retain qualified employees.
In this study, we exploit the introduction of the Dutch bonus cap as a quasi-experiment to 
investigate to what extent this affected the probability of financial sector workers to change 
their industry. To be able to study this, a matched employer-employee panel database 
has been created for the years 2010-2016 which enables us to track the movement of 
employees over time. The empirical design relies on a Difference-in-Difference approach 
4
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in which we use the employees for who the bonus cap applies as our treatment group and 
the employees for who the bonus cap does not apply as our control group. Unfortunately, 
we are not able to observe to which individual employees the bonus cap applies, because 
of which we have to rely on a distinction based on the 5-digit level sub-industry in which 
the firm that employs them has their main activity. Contrary to the EU bonus cap, the 
Dutch bonus cap applies to all employees of firms that are subject to the law. That is why 
we focus on a much broader group of employees than is customary in the few available 
studies on this subject. By using a Difference-in-Difference approach we can compare the 
worker flows to and from bonus cap industries since the introduction of the bonus cap 
with the worker flows to and from non-bonus cap industries since the introduction of the 
bonus cap, and the worker flows to and from both industries in the period before the 
introduction of the bonus cap. One possible drawback is the fact that we only have data 
available until 2016, which means we have to base our results on a relatively short period 
since the introduction of the bonus cap.
Our main finding is rather straightforward; the probability that a financial sector employee 
leaves a bonus cap industry to work in another (non-financial) industry in the Netherlands 
has increased by 0.65 percentage points in 2016, the first year that the bonus cap was 
fully effective for all employees. This increase in the relative probability of outflow does 
not occur before 2016, which reinforces the likelihood that this is not caused by other 
confounding factors. Part of the increased outflow can be attributed to industries that 
we have identified as related industries. This only applies to the outflow to the related 
industries as a whole, we find no statistically significant change in outflow to a specific 
sector. We also find no proof of a change in the probability that financial sector employees 
recently entered the financial sector, this applies both to the inflow as a whole as well as 
to the inflow from specific (sub-) industries. However, financial sector employees are not 
a homogeneous group and any effect of the bonus cap on their mobility will probably be 
different for employees with different characteristics. The increased probability of outflow 
from a bonus cap industry, to other industries in the Netherlands, decreases with age and 
increases with income. The probability that a bonus cap industry employee leaves a bonus 
cap industry and emigrates abroad or recently immigrated to the Netherlands has not 
changed since the bonus cap was introduced.
Related to the competitiveness of financial companies in the labor market is the possible 
effect of the bonus cap on remuneration structures. If fixed rewards increase due to the 
introduction of the bonus cap, the average total earnings (per person) may remain the 
same, even though a bonus cap is introduced. If this is the case, the bonus cap may have a 
weaker or even no effect on the attractiveness of financial companies in the Netherlands. 
Unfortunately, we only have data available about total earnings per person (fixed and 
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variable). As a result, it is not possible to investigate whether fixed incomes have changed 
since the introduction of the bonus cap, only the development of overall earnings can be 
analyzed. We observe a decrease in earnings in bonus cap industries relative to earnings 
in non-bonus cap industries. However, this divergence in earnings already started in 2013, 
two years before the introduction of the bonus cap. As a result, it is highly unlikely that this 
difference in remuneration (as a whole) was caused by the introduction of the bonus cap. 
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5.1 Summary
Wage inequality is increasing in most advanced economies in the world. Traditionally, 
technological change, globalization, and changing labor market institutions are the main 
suspects for causing this increase in wage inequality. These causes have in common that 
they can be skill-biased, that is, have a more favorable outcome for workers with certain 
skills (e.g., Bound & Johnson, 1989; Katz & Murphy, 1992). In the western context, this 
should lead to higher relative demand and therefore wages for high-skilled workers and 
lower relative wages for less-skilled workers. 
The supply- and demand-based models do remarkably well in explaining wage differences 
between groups of workers with different skill levels. Empirical studies based on these 
theories, however, show that a large and increasing fraction of overall wage inequality 
remains unexplained and occurs within groups of workers with similar observable skills 
(e.g., Juhn et al., 1993; Katz & Autor, 1999). Although this could be because of some 
unobserved measure of skills, some studies observed that wage differences between 
seemingly similar workers are related to the industry or even the firm in which workers are 
employed (e.g. Krueger and Summers, 1998; Van Reenen, 1996). These findings opened 
the door for a relatively new explanation for the observed increase in wage inequality: 
differences in average wages paid by firms. 
The notion that the firm is an important determinant for individual wages gained momentum 
after the seminal work of Abowd et al., (1999), which was the first study to use firm- and 
individual-level fixed effects to identify the individual and firm components of wages. The 
authors show that the firm matters for wage determination, even when unobservable 
worker skills are taken into account. Since then, various studies, using different versions of 
the AKM methodology, have investigated the role of firms in wage inequality and all find 
an important role for firms in explaining the level of wage inequality. More interestingly, 
however, several recent studies show that although within-firm wage inequality is still the 
main cause for the level of overall wage inequality, the majority of the increase in wage 
inequality is because of increasing between-firm wage differences (e.g., Card et al., 2013; 
Barth et al., 2016; Song et al., 2019). 
In chapter two, we create a longitudinal employer-employee matched database covering 
all workers and firms active in the manufacturing and service industries in the Netherlands 
between 1999 and 2015 to study if this development is also occurring in the Netherlands. 
The first main finding is that it does. We find that within-firm wage inequality can account 
for approximately 65% (first period) to 55% (last period) of the level of individual wage 
inequality. However, of the overall increase in wage inequality, about two-thirds can be 
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attributed to divergence in the average wages paid by firms. Individual wage variance 
increased by almost 7 log points between 1999 and 2015, this is driven by a 5 log points 
increase in between-firm wage variance, and a 2 log points increase in within-firm wage 
variance.
Between-firm wage differences can consist of three different components. We apply two-
way fixed effects regression models based on the methodology of Abowd et al., (1999), 
Card et al., (2013) and Song et al., (2019) to estimate the relative importance of the three 
potential sources in explaining the evolution of wage inequality. First, increasing wage 
differences between firms might occur due to increasing between-firm heterogeneity 
in wage premiums, which means that firms increasingly pay different wages to similar 
workers. We observe this as a rising variance in firm-fixed effects. Second, there could be 
increasing between-firm heterogeneity in unobservable worker skills, which would mean 
that firms increasingly differ in the average quality of their workers. We observe this as 
an increase in the variance of the firm-level average worker fixed effects and refer to this 
as worker segregation. Third, it may be that between-firm heterogeneity in workers’ skills 
is increasingly correlated with differences in firm wage premiums. This would mean that 
firms not only increasingly differ in the average quality of their workforce, but that the 
average quality of the workforce is also increasingly related to the average wages that firms 
pay independent of the worker quality (wage premium). We observe this as the covariance 
between firm fixed effects and the firm-level average worker fixed effects and refer to this 
as worker sorting.
We find that all three components matter and contribute to the observed divergence of firm-
level wages, which can account for about 70% of the rise in individual wage inequality. The 
most important factor is worker segregation; the increased variance in firm-level average 
worker effects explains about 32% of rising individual wage inequality. Worker segregation 
is not a source of wage inequality itself; it merely reflects the fact that workers who possess 
comparable marketable skills, and therefore receive similar wages, are increasingly likely to 
work for the same firms. Worker sorting accounts for about 20% of the increase in overall 
wage inequality. This means that high-skilled high-wage workers are increasingly likely to 
work for high-wage firms and low-skilled low-wage workers for low-wage firms. Divergence 
in wage premiums, i.e., different wages paid by different firms to similar workers, contributes 
approximately 10% to rising inequality. The remaining 30% of increased wage inequality is 
within-firm wage inequality, and mainly due to the greater heterogeneity of the quality of 
workers within firms. Taking stock, increasing heterogeneity in workers’ skills is the primary 
driver of growing wage inequality. However, these differences in skills manifest themselves 
increasingly between firms as opposed to within firms, leading to increasing differences in 
workforce compositions and wages of firms.
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Firms are not only becoming more heterogeneous in the wages they pay, increasing 
divergence between firms is occurring in more domains. This is best visible in productivity 
and profitability levels. It is widely accepted that there is substantial between-firm 
heterogeneity in performance, even within narrowly defined industries (Syversen, 2011). 
What is new, however, is the recognition that these differences seem to be increasing over 
time (Van Reenen, 2018). Global productivity growth is slowing: companies at the global 
frontier are doing well, but the rest of the companies seem to be falling behind (e.g., OECD, 
2015; Andrews et al., 2016). Firm mark-ups are increasing on average, but again this is 
primarily driven by firms at the edge of the frontier (Calligaris et al., 2018). A growing share 
of economic activity is shifting towards a smaller number of high-productivity firms with a 
relatively low labor-share, decreasing the aggregate labor share in the economy (Autor et 
al., 2017; Kehrig & Vincent, 2017).
In chapter three, we study if, and how, the development of firm-level performance and 
wage differences in the Netherlands are intertwined. The relationship between firm 
performance and wages is likely to be influenced by heterogeneity in the workforce 
composition of firms. To counter this potential endogeneity, we first apply the two-way 
fixed effects regressions used in chapter 2 to estimate, for each firm and period, the firm- 
and the worker-components of firm-level average wages. In the next step, the firm-level 
aggregate outcomes of the worker-level wage regressions are merged with firm-level 
production statistics. This procedure allows us to not only investigate the relation between 
firm performance and firm wages, but also make a distinction between the role of firms 
and worker quality in this relationship.
The first findings are descriptive. The globally observed divergence of firm performance 
also applies to the Netherlands, especially between the best performing firms in each 
industry, and the rest. Firms at the productivity frontier are becoming more productive, 
relative to the average firm in their industries, the remaining 80-90% is not. Economic 
activity is shifting towards the most productive firms in each sector. These most productive 
firms generally have a relatively low labor-share, even though they pay relatively high 
wages. This reallocation of activity to low-labor share firms causes the aggregate labor 
share to decline, while for most workers, the labor share of their employer has increased. 
Furthermore, real wage growth, again on the aggregate level, is lower than real labor 
productivity growth. This decoupling of productivity and wages is less visible at the level 
of the firm; for the majority of the workers real wage growth has been remarkably similar 
to real labor productivity growth. Overall, these descriptive findings hint at a process of 
segregation between a select group of firms that is able to capture a growing share of the 
market, leaving an ever-smaller share for all other firms. 
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The core analyses reveal that wage differences between firms with different performance 
levels are increasing over time, as is the strength of the relationship between performance 
and wages. This development is primarily because of increased heterogeneity in workforce 
composition between more- and less-productive firms, and only for a small part because 
of increased divergence in firm wage premiums paid by firms with different performance 
levels. These findings show that the increased sorting of workers between firms with 
varying levels of performance is the primary channel through which firm-level productivity 
heterogeneity translates into between-firm wage inequality. In an explorative analysis, we 
find indications of a role for firm-level policies concerning the use of external workers, 
flexible workers, and outsourcing in the ability of firms to select a lower- or higher-quality 
workforce.
The financial sector plays a significant role in the recent growth of wage inequality (Bell 
& Van Reenen, 2014). High wages in the financial industry are more likely to be caused 
by market imperfections than in other sectors. The explicit and implicit guarantees that 
financial companies enjoy can create opportunities for companies and employees in this 
sector to extract rents for their benefit. Circumstantial evidence for this possibility is the 
existence of a large and growing finance wage premium that is independent of the quality 
of employees (Célérier and Vallée, 2015; Böhm et al., 2018). However, it is not the level 
of wages that gives the most cause for concern, but the structure of the compensation 
packages. Remuneration in the financial sector consist for a relatively large part of bonuses, 
and these bonuses could provide incentives for taking excessive risks at the expense of 
shareholders and society (e.g. Bebchuk et al., 2010; Bhagat and Bolton, 2014; Efing et al., 
2015). Government policies to counter this potential problem gained momentum due to 
the global financial crisis. The Netherlands implemented the most far-reaching regulation 
in this aspect: a bonus cap of 20% of the fixed remuneration for all employees of financial 
companies to which the cap applies. Besides the question of whether a bonus cap is 
actually successful in reducing excessive risk-taking, there is the possibility that such a 
policy could have unintended consequences for the competitiveness of financial companies 
(e.g. Murphy, 2013). Financial sector employees are relatively mobile between industries 
and countries, and high wages are seen as necessary to attract and retain the most skilled 
workers (Philippon & Reshef, 2012; Murphy, 2013).
In chapter four, we exploit the introduction of the Dutch bonus cap as a natural experiment to 
study its effect on the labor mobility of financial sector employees. We employ a Difference-
in-Difference approach for which financial sector employees employed in subsectors to 
which the bonus cap does not apply to serve as the control group. This method essentially 
implies that the labor mobility of ‘bonus cap’ employees, since the introduction of the 
bonus cap, is compared to the labor mobility of ‘non-bonus cap’ employees and the period 
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before the implementation of the bonus cap. The main finding is an increased probability of 
0.65 percentage points that a bonus cap employee leaves the sector for any other industry 
in the Netherlands. The size of the effect is larger for workers in a lower age-group, in a 
higher-income group, and for workers with at least a bachelor diploma or equivalent. We 
find no evidence of an effect on the probability of worker inflow, or international migration 
to and from the Netherlands.
5.2 Implications and policy relevance
Because of the tendency to focus on disposable income and purchasing power, income 
inequality levels in the Netherlands seem relatively low and stable. For this reason, income 
inequality itself is currently not considered to be among the most urgent topics of public 
and political debate. However, inequality can be measured in many different ways. This 
dissertation shows that gross wage inequality is increasing, not surprisingly fast, but the 
variance of gross full-time wages did increase from 0.19 to 0.26 (35%) between 1999 
and 2015. However, what is more interesting is that the majority of the increase in wage 
inequality is occurring between firms. This development is particularly relevant because it 
tells a bigger story with further-reaching implications than just about wage inequality; it 
tells a story of growing segregation. Segregation between workers with different skill levels, 
segregation between firms with varying performance levels, and the apparent combination 
of these two. 
Wage and performance divergence between firms, and the firm-level co-divergence of 
wages and performance, can have multiple economic causes and explanations. No matter 
the economic reasons, growing firm wage and performance differences are hard to explain 
from a purely competitive (labor) market perspective. Why would firms increasingly differ 
in the rents they acquire, and why would these firms be able and willing to pay higher (or 
lower) wages to seemingly similar workers than other firms do? Why might some firms, 
even with similar wage premiums, attract better workers than other firms? And most 
important, why would these developments be increasing over time? The various potential 
explanations for these developments have in common that they suppose the (increased or 
decreased) existence of certain (labor)market frictions.
One potential explanation relates to the benefits of and, therefore, incentives for firms 
to search for a good match with workers. Technological change and globalization might 
increase the incentives for sorting by increasing productivity differences between firms 
and/or enhancing the complementarity between the skills of both workers and workers 
and firms (e.g., Acemoglu, 1999; Caselli, 1999; Kremer & Maskin, 1996; Grossman & 
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Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; Eeckhout & Kircher, 2011; Bombardini et al., 2018; Håkanson et 
al., 2020). This incentivizes firms to search for better matches with workers, resulting in 
increased worker quality heterogeneity and, in turn, between-firm wage and performance 
divergence. Although this seems like a valid potential explanation, the existence of structural 
and increasing differences in performance and/or wage premiums has to at least partially 
derive from heterogeneity in market power, rent extraction, or technology diffusion.
Another potential explanation relates to the costs of searching for and matching with 
the right workers. Increased worker quality heterogeneity could be the result of reduced 
market frictions such as search and matching costs (Shimer & Smith, 2001; Eeckhout & 
Kirchner, 2011), lower market transaction costs regarding the use of alternative work 
arrangements (Katz & Krueger, 2019), offshoring (Kremer and Maskin 2006; Grossman 
& Rossi-Hansberg, 2008), or domestic outsourcing (Goldschmidt & Schmieder, 2017). 
These developments might make (some) firms better able to search for and match with 
the right workers, increase worker sorting, and, in turn, result in between-firm wage and 
performance divergence. 
Both explanations suppose that some firms can better take advantage of developments 
such as globalization, technological change, changing institutions, or the rise of alternative 
work arrangements than other firms do. Combining these two explanations could even 
create a self-reinforcing mechanism towards more segregation between workers and firms. 
If some firms pay higher wages to similar employees, the higher wages provide incentives 
for these companies to outsource the activities, and therefore employees, with the lowest 
added value. As the structure of firms becomes more focused on core competencies, the 
average workers’ skill composition of firms will diverge. Growing differences in workforce 
compositions, combined with the existence of any skill-biased developments or skill 
complementarities, will lead to increased heterogeneity in firm rents and, therefore, wage 
premiums.
Relatedly, productivity differences between firms, in combination with increased consumer 
price sensitivity due to technological changes (price transparency) and globalization 
(competition in the product market), may result in increasingly concentrated product 
markets and subsequently product market power (e.g., Kehrig & Vincent, 2017; De Loecker 
et al., 2020; Autor et al., 2020). An important open question is to what extent this observed 
increase in product market concentration is related to labor market concentration, labor 
market power (such as monopsony power), worker sorting, and wage inequality in general 
(e.g., Manning, 2011; Azar et al., 2020). 
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Although the focus of this thesis is not on the underlying causes, which leaves us with 
insufficient insights to claim all of the developments described in the previous paragraphs 
are happening, there are some indications in this direction. The findings in this thesis 
show that the Dutch labor market is becoming more segregated and that the “best” firms 
are distancing themselves from the rest. We observe increasingly concentrated markets, 
reflected by a continuous reallocation of economic activity and profits towards the most 
productive (and lowest labor-share) firms in each industry. Not only are markets becoming 
more concentrated, but several studies also find evidence of rising mark-ups and profit 
shares for the most successful firms (e.g., De Loecker et al., 2020; Barkai, 2019; Syverson, 
2019). The ‘winners’ of this development are recently named the so-called ‘superstar’ firms, 
companies who are able to exploit their superior productivity to capture an ever-growing 
share of the ‘winner takes most’ type of markets (e.g., Autor et al., 2020). The increased 
digitalization and use of IT are often mentioned as possible drivers of the ‘superstar firm’ 
phenomenon (e.g., Autor et al., 2020; Bessen, 2017 & 2018; Calligaris et al., 2018). IT 
platforms can cause between-firm productivity differences by creating global economies of 
scale or even natural monopolies through network- or platform-effects, increasing returns 
to skill differences by being skill-biased, and facilitating the reallocation of market shares 
to the most productive and efficient firms. Although we do not study the role of IT, we 
find evidence of a similar reallocation of market shares towards a select number of high-
productivity firms.
A substantial part of national as well as global productivity growth can be attributed to 
frontier firms, and we find evidence that this holds for the Dutch markets as well (e.g., 
Andrews et al., 2016; Berlingieri et al., 2017). Although employees of the most productive 
firms have experienced the most substantial wage increases in the last two decades, this 
study shows that their productivity levels have grown even faster. Paradoxically, this means 
that the often-claimed decoupling of productivity growth and wages seems to be almost 
non-existent at the level of the average firm, and most relevant for the already high-wage 
earners of the most productive firms out there. The most productive firms are generally 
characterized by having relatively low labor-shares, which means that any reallocation of 
economic activity towards these most productive firms causes the aggregate labor share 
to decline.
We observe “the growing apart together” of firm-level performance and wages; the 
correlation of this is mainly due to increased segregation of employees between 
companies. The level of wage and productivity divergence between firms is not necessarily 
cause for alarm yet, and we do not know what the future will hold. Still, if we speculate by 
extrapolating the trend of the last two decades into the future, the economic landscape 
might be in the process of undergoing some significant changes. From a policy perspective, 
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the main question is whether these developments are caused by policies such as 
institutional changes, regulations, or lax anti-trust regulation or if they are part of economic 
evolution, which includes a changing nature of competition. Some policy changes, such as 
the increased flexibility of the labor market, may, of course, have contributed. Perhaps 
policies aimed at a greater diffusion of technology can somewhat curb the observed trend. 
But the fact that our findings and the findings of related studies show similar patterns, 
independent of the country or industry under investigation, hints at a more structural 
evolution in our market economies. 
Does this mean governments should try to intervene? On the one hand, the described 
developments do not necessarily have to lead to negative outcomes for consumers. After 
all, the ‘winning’ firms may have achieved their dominant position through competitive 
means, and consumers enjoy the availability of low-price high-quality products and services 
produced by the most productive firms. But there are some dangers and potentially harmful 
implications as well. Although the market power enjoyed by high-productivity firms might 
not translate into increased consumer prices yet, it may be exercised in their (supply) 
networks to extract rents or lead to future price increases. This might already be happening, 
given the observed increase in firm mark-ups (e.g., De Loecker et al., 2020). The current 
positions can be achieved through fair competition; there is no guarantee the dominant 
firms will not use their acquired (market) power in the future to protect their position by 
raising barriers to entry. These companies may not even have gained their position through 
superior competition, but by being the first-mover or lucky winner in markets whose 
structure increasingly exhibits characteristics of natural monopolies. Moreover, increased 
market concentration can harm economic dynamism, lower innovation incentives, and limit 
technology diffusion, reducing overall productivity and economic growth in the long run. 
Large dominant firms might be increasingly able to lower dynamic competition through 
increased investments in intangibles and software (e.g., Akcigit & Ates, 2019; Bessen et al., 
2020). Declining job opportunities for the average workers, declining productivity growth 
for the average firm, and a declining aggregate labor share might leave the average firms 
and workers with an ever-smaller piece of the pie.
The possible consequences are not only economic in nature. The increased segregation of 
employees between more and less successful firms also has social implications. Employees 
with different educational levels were already separated in the school they attended, and in 
the neighborhood, or city, where they live, they are now also increasingly segregated in the 
companies that employ them. Low-wage workers may be losing access to good jobs at high-
wage companies, which in itself increases overall wage inequality. Increased segregation 
between low- and high-skilled workers leads to increased differences in the quality of 
networks of workers, which in turn could lead to more inequality in opportunity for their 
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children, making inequality persistent over generations. Besides, due to the increased 
flexibility of the labor market, the employees with below-average bargaining positions 
are more likely to be at the mercy of temporary and flexible contracts that offer them 
fewer rights and livelihoods, which makes these employees especially vulnerable during a 
negative economic shock. If the high- and low wage companies also differ in the provision 
of, for example, health care, pensions, social security, and disability, then segregation in 
the labor market will automatically translate into increasing social inequality. Moreover, 
if an ever-decreasing percentage of the population can produce a growing share of total 
production, what will happen to the rest? What will the position of the non-winners be? 
Is it sustainable in the long term that society sees (full-time) working as the standard? And 
what will the consequences be for the social welfare state? These are big open questions 
that, if the observed developments continue in the future, will have to return to the center 
of the public and political debate. 
In the financial sector, the Dutch government has chosen to focus on one of the possible 
symptoms stemming from market imperfections by introducing a bonus cap. One can 
debate the effectiveness of such a policy concerning its aim to lower risk-taking by financial 
sector employees. Still, most arguments against the bonus cap aim at the collateral damage 
it cap might create for the competitiveness of the financial sector in the Netherlands. 
Implementing a bonus cap in a globally competitive industry with relatively mobile 
employees could make it harder for financial companies to attract and retain high-skilled 
employees. This would especially be true if introducing the bonus-cap, limiting the variable 
components of wages, would lead to lower overall wages. We find some confirmatory 
evidence for an adverse effect on the attractiveness of financial firms in the labor market in 
the form of an increase in the probability that an employee will leave a bonus cap industry. 
However, given the limitations of our research methodology and data availability, it is not 
possible to make well-substantiated claims about the (long-term) implications of the bonus 
cap.
5.3 Limitations 
All three studies in this thesis are of an empirical nature and based on longitudinal Dutch 
micro-level data collected by Statistics Netherlands (CBS). This means that certain problems 
regarding the data apply to all three studies. Over time there have been some changes in 
sample selection, definitions, and measurements. We tried to test and, if possible, correct 
for any differences in variables over the years and applied population-based weights 
whenever relevant and possible. However, there are still some minor breaks in the data 
that could potentially affect comparisons over time. Furthermore, since there is no data 
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available about the number of hours individuals work per day, the size of the jobs and full-
time wages are estimated based on the number of days. 
A more elementary limitation of this thesis is that, although we talk about the skill 
levels of employees, these are all deduced from the wages that workers receive. We do 
not have education data for all employees or any information about the occupation of 
employees or alternative productivity or skill measures. Therefore, we have to assume 
that any wage differences not explained by basic observables, the firm, or the industry 
in which an individual works reflects this individual’s skills. For example, if employees’ 
skills or characteristics are consistently over- or undervalued, as reflected by wages, or 
asymmetrically rewarded in certain sectors or by certain companies, this would lead to 
structural over- or underestimation of the skills of these workers. Furthermore, we do not 
consider any differences in workplace or employment conditions such as hours worked, 
safety, pension, holiday allowance, etcetera. Most criticism of our applied methodology, 
the two-way fixed effects models (AKM), is also aimed at the limitations of using wage 
data to assess the skill levels of employees, the firm wage premium, and the correlation 
between the two. 
A major trend in the Dutch labor market is the increased importance of temporary contracts 
and self-employment. Unfortunately, we cannot observe whether an employee has a 
temporary or permanent contract. Furthermore, self-employed workers are excluded from 
the study. This is not due to a lack of data availability but due to problems with comparing 
wages and profits. It would be very interesting to see to what extent the growing importance 
of flexible, temporary, and self-employed work influences overall wage inequality and what 
is the role of firms in this.
In chapter three, we merge the estimated wage components, derived from individual-level 
wage regressions applied to the whole universe of workers and firms in the Netherlands, 
with firm-level production statistics. Firm-level production statistics are based on yearly 
surveys in which larger firms are overrepresented. Although we find that the evolution of 
wage inequality is rather similar for this smaller group of relatively larger firms, we cannot 
exclude the possibility that this selection effect influences our results. Besides, we do not 
know to what extent our findings in chapter three also apply to, the workers of, smaller 
firms.
The observed trends are not limited to the Netherlands since related studies found 
comparable results for other countries. This makes it increasingly important that wage 
inequality research based on employer-employee matched databases is scaled up to a 
cross-country level so that (differences in) developments in the labor markets of multiple 
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countries can be examined simultaneously. The most important limitation is that, no matter 
how interesting the findings are, we only observe developments and not the causes of 
these developments. There are many suggested causes of the growing divergence between 
firms and workers, stemming from both empirical and theoretical work. It is highly likely 
that many of these play a role and probably influence each other. There is a need for 
large-scale studies that connect cross-country, cross-industry, and cross-firm differences in 
technology, institutions, globalization, competitiveness, digitalization, outsourcing, market 
and firm structures with employer-employee matched databases to get a more coherent 
picture of what is happening and what is causing this. The jury is still out.
For several reasons, it is difficult to properly evaluate the effects of the Dutch financial sector 
bonus cap. We try to tackle some of these problems by using a “Difference-in-Difference” 
technique. Still, the law on the bonus cap was only in force for a short time at the time 
of the study, limiting the observations since the full implementation of the bonus cap to 
only one year. This short period makes it difficult to relate fluctuations in labor mobility to 
the bonus cap and exclude other factors such as economic circumstances or the recently 
implemented European bonus cap. The law has a transitional regime concerning the bonus 
cap, and employees may have anticipated the introduction of the law at an earlier stage. 
Moreover, we had to rely on sector-level data to distinguish employees to whom the cap 
applies from employees to whom it does not. It is also not possible to observe which 
employees have a variable component in their remuneration, which means that it cannot 
be estimated at the individual level whether the law affects working conditions. As a result, 
a strict distinction between the control and treatment groups is not possible. The results, 
therefore, need to be interpreted with proper caution.
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Appendix chapter 2
Table 2.A.1  Variance decomposition full-time wages. Larger sample: Workers>0.75*minimum wage & 
firm> 3 FTE, Only full-time workers
    Larger sample   Only full-time workers
 Year Observations Variance Variance  Observations Variance Variance
   wages between firms  wages between firms
 1999 4,132,389 0.223 0.085 2,958,300 0.184 0.061
 2000 4,250,894 0.222 0.083 3,048,536 0.185 0.060
 2001 4,306,351 0.226 0.085 3,066,156 0.188 0.062
 2002 4,316,751 0.226 0.089 3,002,612 0.187 0.062
 2003 4,237,892 0.226 0.090 2,879,515 0.185 0.063
 2004 4,150,311 0.233 0.097 2,797,482 0.190 0.068
 2005 4,138,065 0.242 0.104 2,818,454 0.193 0.070
 2006 4,118,694 0.259 0.116 2,732,753 0.208 0.078
 2007 4,341,620 0.264 0.117 2,894,877 0.213 0.079
 2008 4,404,944 0.265 0.117 2,939,802 0.213 0.079
 2009 4,346,188 0.270 0.122 2,836,505 0.210 0.080
 2010 4,258,026 0.275 0.124 2,741,541 0.212 0.081
 2011 4,303,406 0.282 0.129 2,734,960 0.215 0.083
 2012 4,255,709 0.290 0.136 2,692,269 0.220 0.087
 2013 4,119,484 0.294 0.138 2,592,225 0.228 0.089
 2014 4,094,093 0.295 0.142 2,554,777 0.228 0.091
 2015 4,151,989 0.300 0.146 2,576,847 0.236 0.095
 Change   0.077 (35%) 0.061 (72%)   0.052 (28%) 0.035 (57%)
 Share   79.40%    66.90%
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Table 2.A.2  Variance decomposition full-time wages different samples: Large (>1000 FTE) and Small 
(<1000 FTE) firms
    Larger firms (>1000 FTE)   Small firms (<1000 FTE)
 Year Observations Variance Variance  Observations Variance Variance
   wages between firms  wages between firms
 1999 1,223,916 0.212 0.077 2,582,165 0.183 0.065
 2000 1,260,239 0.210 0.074 2,664,997 0.184 0.065
 2001 1,262,671 0.212 0.072 2,702,558 0.187 0.067
 2002 1,288,920 0.219 0.080 2,684,433 0.187 0.069
 2003 1,286,232 0.215 0.080 2,608,577 0.186 0.069
 2004 1,262,967 0.225 0.090 2,552,409 0.192 0.074
 2005 1,258,227 0.236 0.098 2,544,951 0.198 0.079
 2006 1,247,015 0.248 0.108 2,545,882 0.217 0.089
 2007 1,281,785 0.254 0.110 2,719,673 0.223 0.091
 2008 1,302,332 0.254 0.110 2,765,236 0.224 0.092
 2009 1,319,907 0.257 0.112 2,679,742 0.224 0.094
 2010 1,304,887 0.257 0.114 2,625,664 0.229 0.093
 2011 1,297,021 0.264 0.119 2,673,969 0.235 0.097
 2012 1,279,788 0.272 0.127 2,643,214 0.242 0.103
 2013 1,230,133 0.273 0.124 2,535,732 0.244 0.103
 2014 1,203,746 0.273 0.127 2,538,021 0.245 0.106
 2015 1,229,595 0.279 0.131 2,564,720 0.250 0.109
 Change   0.066 (31%) 0.055 (71%)   0.066 (36%) 0.044 (68%)
 Share   82.40%    66.20%
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Table 2.A.3  Variance decomposition full-time wages different samples: Manufacturing and Service 
industries
    Manufacturing industries   Service industries
 Year Observations Variance Variance  Observations Variance Variance
   wages between firms  wages between firms
 1999 867,868 0.159 0.054 2,938,213 0.203 0.074
 2000 874,055 0.160 0.054 3,051,181 0.202 0.073
 2001 871,746 0.160 0.056 3,093,483 0.206 0.074
 2002 849,746 0.163 0.058 3,123,607 0.207 0.077
 2003 814,946 0.162 0.059 3,079,863 0.205 0.078
 2004 788,593 0.170 0.065 3,026,783 0.212 0.083
 2005 765,443 0.177 0.071 3,037,735 0.220 0.090
 2006 721,954 0.190 0.076 3,070,943 0.236 0.100
 2007 734,729 0.195 0.078 3,266,729 0.242 0.102
 2008 743,921 0.197 0.080 3,323,647 0.242 0.102
 2009 727,355 0.197 0.081 3,272,294 0.244 0.105
 2010 703,285 0.202 0.081 3,227,266 0.247 0.105
 2011 700,560 0.207 0.083 3,270,430 0.253 0.110
 2012 689,984 0.214 0.089 3,233,018 0.260 0.116
 2013 669,953 0.225 0.093 3,095,912 0.261 0.114
 2014 660,882 0.229 0.097 3,080,885 0.260 0.117
 2015 658,086 0.242 0.103 3,136,229 0.263 0.120 
 Change   0.083 (52%) 0.049 (91%)   0.060 (30%) 0.046 (62%)
 Share   58.70%    76.60%
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Figure 2.A.1   Wage differences by individual percentiles 1999-2015: The firm group; 5-digit industry; 
3-digit industry; Municipality
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Figure 2.A.2   Wage differences by individual percentiles 1999-2015: Different samples of workers
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Figure 2.A.3   Wage differences by individual percentiles 1999-2015: Different samples of firms
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Table 2.A.4   Decomposition of wage variance after Mincer regressions with “skilled” dummies. Data: All 
employees (FTE>0.25) in service and manufacturing working for plants with FTE>5
 Year Obs Variance Variance Variance Covariance Between- Variance Variance Within-
   wages mean firm  mean firm covariates residual firm
    covariates effect covariates variance (D) (E) variance
    (A) (B) & firm (A+B+C)   (D+E)
      effect
      (C)
 1999 1,652,788 0.176 0.020 0.031 0.019 0.070 0.041 0.064 0.105
 2000 1,757,257 0.180 0.020 0.033 0.019 0.071 0.042 0.066 0.108
 2001 1,816,634 0.185 0.020 0.034 0.019 0.073 0.043 0.068 0.111
 2002 1,853,356 0.189 0.020 0.035 0.023 0.078 0.042 0.069 0.111
 2003 1,836,401 0.192 0.020 0.035 0.025 0.081 0.041 0.069 0.111
 2004 1,822,796 0.203 0.023 0.038 0.028 0.089 0.043 0.071 0.114
 2005 1,867,905 0.214 0.025 0.042 0.031 0.097 0.045 0.072 0.117
 2006 1,979,181 0.240 0.030 0.047 0.035 0.111 0.051 0.078 0.129
 2007 2,145,544 0.246 0.030 0.048 0.036 0.114 0.052 0.080 0.132
 2008 2,237,763 0.248 0.030 0.047 0.037 0.115 0.053 0.080 0.133
 2009 2,228,022 0.253 0.031 0.049 0.040 0.120 0.053 0.080 0.133
 2010 2,211,214 0.257 0.032 0.048 0.041 0.122 0.054 0.081 0.136
 2011 2,269,175 0.263 0.033 0.050 0.044 0.126 0.055 0.082 0.137
 2012 2,270,326 0.272 0.035 0.052 0.047 0.134 0.056 0.083 0.138
 2013 2,186,101 0.272 0.033 0.053 0.045 0.132 0.055 0.085 0.140
 2014 2,192,510 0.274 0.034 0.054 0.047 0.135 0.054 0.085 0.139
 2015 2,261,454 0.276 0.033 0.055 0.048 0.136 0.054 0.086 0.140
 Change   0.100 0.013 0.023 0.029 0.066 0.013 0.022 0.034
 Share   13.3% 23.4% 29.0% 65.7% 12.7% 21.6% 34.3%
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Table 2.A.5   Decomposition of wage variance after Mincer regressions. Larger sample 
(Workers>0.75*minimum wage & firm> 3 FTE)
 Year Obs Variance Variance Variance Covariance Between- Variance Variance Within-
   wages mean firm  mean firm covariates residual firm
    covariates effect covariates variance (D) (E) variance
    (A) (B) & firm (A+B+C)   (D+E)
      effect
      (C)
 1999 4,132,389 0.223 0.019 0.051 0.015 0.085 0.042 0.096 0.138
 2000 4,250,894 0.222 0.018 0.053 0.013 0.083 0.041 0.098 0.139
 2001 4,306,351 0.226 0.017 0.056 0.012 0.085 0.041 0.099 0.140
 2002 4,316,751 0.226 0.017 0.057 0.015 0.089 0.039 0.099 0.138
 2003 4,237,892 0.226 0.016 0.058 0.016 0.090 0.037 0.099 0.136
 2004 4,150,311 0.233 0.017 0.063 0.018 0.097 0.037 0.099 0.136
 2005 4,138,065 0.242 0.018 0.067 0.019 0.104 0.037 0.101 0.138
 2006 4,118,694 0.259 0.020 0.074 0.022 0.116 0.040 0.103 0.143
 2007 4,341,620 0.264 0.020 0.076 0.021 0.117 0.041 0.107 0.148
 2008 4,404,944 0.265 0.019 0.077 0.021 0.117 0.040 0.107 0.147
 2009 4,346,188 0.270 0.020 0.079 0.024 0.122 0.040 0.107 0.147
 2010 4,258,026 0.275 0.020 0.079 0.025 0.124 0.041 0.110 0.151
 2011 4,303,406 0.282 0.020 0.081 0.027 0.129 0.042 0.111 0.153
 2012 4,255,709 0.290 0.022 0.085 0.030 0.136 0.043 0.111 0.153
 2013 4,119,484 0.294 0.021 0.088 0.029 0.138 0.042 0.115 0.156
 2014 4,094,093 0.295 0.021 0.089 0.031 0.142 0.041 0.112 0.153
 2015 4,151,989 0.300 0.021 0.093 0.031 0.146 0.041 0.114 0.154 
Change  0.077 0.002 0.043 0.016 0.061 -0.002 0.018 0.016
 Share   2.5% 55.5% 21.4% 79.4% -2.5% 23.1% 20.60%
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Table 2.A.6   Decomposition of wage variance after Mincer regressions (only full-time workers)
 Year Obs Variance Variance Variance Covariance Between- Variance Variance Within-
   wages mean firm  mean firm covariates residual firm
    covariates effect covariates variance (D) (E) variance
    (A) (B) & firm (A+B+C)   (D+E)
      effect
      (C)
 1999 2,958,300 0.184 0.011 0.047 0.002 0.061 0.037 0.087 0.123
 2000 3,048,536 0.185 0.010 0.049 0.001 0.060 0.036 0.089 0.125
 2001 3,066,156 0.188 0.010 0.052 0.000 0.062 0.036 0.091 0.126
 2002 3,002,612 0.187 0.009 0.052 0.001 0.062 0.034 0.091 0.125
 2003 2,879,515 0.185 0.009 0.052 0.002 0.063 0.032 0.090 0.122
 2004 2,797,482 0.190 0.009 0.056 0.003 0.068 0.031 0.091 0.122
 2005 2,818,454 0.193 0.008 0.060 0.002 0.070 0.030 0.092 0.122
 2006 2,732,753 0.208 0.009 0.069 0.001 0.078 0.032 0.098 0.130
 2007 2,894,877 0.213 0.009 0.071 0.000 0.079 0.033 0.101 0.134
 2008 2,939,802 0.213 0.008 0.071 0.000 0.079 0.032 0.101 0.133
 2009 2,836,505 0.210 0.008 0.071 0.001 0.080 0.031 0.098 0.130
 2010 2,741,541 0.212 0.008 0.071 0.002 0.081 0.031 0.100 0.130
 2011 2,734,960 0.215 0.008 0.073 0.002 0.083 0.031 0.101 0.132
 2012 2,692,269 0.220 0.009 0.076 0.002 0.087 0.031 0.102 0.133
 2013 2,592,225 0.228 0.009 0.079 0.001 0.089 0.032 0.107 0.139
 2014 2,554,777 0.228 0.009 0.081 0.001 0.091 0.032 0.106 0.137
 2015 2,576,847 0.236 0.010 0.085 0.001 0.095 0.032 0.108 0.141
 Change   0.052 -0.001 0.037 -0.001 0.035 -0.004 0.022 0.017
 Share   -2.5% 72.1% -2.7% 66.9% -8.4% 41.5% 33.1%
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Table 2.A.7   Decomposition of wage variance after Mincer regressions (only larger firms>1000 FTE)
 Year Obs Variance Variance Variance Covariance Between- Variance Variance Within-
   wages mean firm  mean firm covariates residual firm
    covariates effect covariates variance (D) (E) variance
    (A) (B) & firm (A+B+C)   (D+E)
      effect
      (C)
 1999 1,223,916 0.212 0.017 0.045 0.014 0.077 0.040 0.096 0.135
 2000 1,260,239 0.210 0.015 0.047 0.012 0.074 0.039 0.097 0.136
 2001 1,262,671 0.212 0.014 0.048 0.010 0.072 0.039 0.101 0.140
 2002 1,288,920 0.219 0.013 0.053 0.014 0.080 0.037 0.102 0.139
 2003 1,286,232 0.215 0.011 0.054 0.015 0.080 0.034 0.101 0.135
 2004 1,262,967 0.225 0.012 0.060 0.018 0.090 0.034 0.101 0.135
 2005 1,258,227 0.236 0.013 0.066 0.019 0.098 0.034 0.103 0.137
 2006 1,247,015 0.248 0.015 0.071 0.022 0.108 0.036 0.104 0.140
 2007 1,281,785 0.254 0.015 0.072 0.023 0.110 0.037 0.107 0.144
 2008 1,302,332 0.254 0.014 0.073 0.023 0.110 0.037 0.107 0.144
 2009 1,319,907 0.257 0.014 0.074 0.024 0.112 0.038 0.107 0.145
 2010 1,304,887 0.257 0.014 0.075 0.025 0.114 0.036 0.107 0.143
 2011 1,297,021 0.264 0.014 0.079 0.026 0.119 0.036 0.108 0.144
 2012 1,279,788 0.272 0.016 0.082 0.029 0.127 0.037 0.109 0.145
 2013 1,230,133 0.273 0.013 0.084 0.027 0.124 0.035 0.114 0.149
 2014 1,203,746 0.273 0.014 0.084 0.030 0.127 0.034 0.111 0.146
 2015 1,229,595 0.279 0.014 0.086 0.031 0.131 0.033 0.114 0.147
 Change   0.066 -0.004 0.041 0.017 0.055 -0.006 0.018 0.012
 Share   -5.4% 61.9% 25.9% 82.4% -9.7% 27.3% 17.6%
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Table 2.A.8   Decomposition of wage variance after Mincer regressions (only smaller firms <1000FTE)
 Year Obs Variance Variance Variance Covariance Between- Variance Variance Within-
   wages mean firm  mean firm covariates residual firm
    covariates effect covariates variance (D) (E) variance
    (A) (B) & firm (A+B+C)   (D+E)
      effect
      (C)
 1999 2,582,165 0.183 0.015 0.042 0.008 0.065 0.038 0.080 0.118
 2000 2,664,997 0.184 0.014 0.045 0.006 0.065 0.037 0.082 0.119
 2001 2,702,558 0.187 0.014 0.048 0.006 0.067 0.036 0.084 0.120
 2002 2,684,433 0.187 0.014 0.047 0.007 0.069 0.035 0.083 0.118
 2003 2,608,577 0.186 0.014 0.047 0.009 0.069 0.034 0.083 0.116
 2004 2,552,409 0.192 0.014 0.050 0.009 0.074 0.034 0.084 0.118
 2005 2,544,951 0.198 0.015 0.054 0.010 0.079 0.033 0.086 0.120
 2006 2,545,882 0.217 0.017 0.061 0.012 0.089 0.036 0.092 0.127
 2007 2,719,673 0.223 0.017 0.063 0.011 0.091 0.037 0.096 0.132
 2008 2,765,236 0.224 0.016 0.064 0.012 0.092 0.036 0.096 0.132
 2009 2,679,742 0.224 0.016 0.065 0.013 0.094 0.035 0.095 0.130
 2010 2,625,664 0.229 0.016 0.064 0.013 0.093 0.037 0.099 0.136
 2011 2,673,969 0.235 0.017 0.066 0.015 0.097 0.037 0.100 0.137
 2012 2,643,214 0.242 0.018 0.069 0.017 0.103 0.038 0.100 0.138
 2013 2,535,732 0.244 0.017 0.071 0.014 0.103 0.037 0.104 0.142
 2014 2,538,021 0.245 0.017 0.073 0.015 0.106 0.037 0.102 0.139
 2015 2,564,720 0.250 0.017 0.077 0.015 0.109 0.037 0.104 0.141
 Change   0.066 0.002 0.035 0.007 0.044 -0.001 0.024 0.022
 Share   3.2% 52.3% 10.7% 66.2% -1.7% 35.5% 33.8%
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Table 2.A.9   Explanation different components of variance decomposition as shown in equation 2.6
 Symbol Letter Wage component
 Var(wijt ) - Variance of individual wages
 Var(βxjp) A Variance firm mean covariates
 Var(γjp) B Variance firm mean worker fixed effect
 Var (λijp) C Variance firm fixed effect
 2Cov(γjp,λijp ) D Covariance firm mean worker fixed effect & firm fixed effect
 2Cov(βxjp,λijp) E Covariance firm mean covariates & firm fixed effect
 2Cov(γjp,βxjp) F Covariance firm mean worker fixed effect & firm mean covariates
 - A-F Between-firm wage variance
 Var(γip-γjp) G Within firm variance covariates
 Var(βxijt-βxjp) H Within firm variance worker fixed effect
 2Cov(γip,βxijt) I Within firm covariance of worker fixed effects and covariates
 Var(it) J Variance of residual
 - G - J Within-firm wage variance
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Appendix chapter 3
Table 3.A.1   Summary statistics (weighted for worker observations)
Table 3.A.2   Pairwise correlation table most used variables (weighted for worker observations)
 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
 LN wages FTE 132,111 10.6400 0.2590
 LN alternative wages FTE 132,111 10.6152 0.1510
 Firm fixed effect 132,111 0.0146 0.1026
 Mean worker fixed effect 132,111 0.0177 0.1870
 SD worker fixed effect 132,111 0.3103 0.0840
 Labor share 132,111 0.8213 0.4177
 LN value-added FTE 132,111 11.2981 0.5637
 LN Quasi-rent FTE 122,163 10.4302 0.8952
 LN turnover FTE 132,111 12.3927 0.9773
 LN result FTE 114,952 9.3535 1.4383
 LN FTE 132,111 5.4564 1.9615
 % Mini jobs 132,111 0.0599 0.1002
 % Leave within 2 year 132,111 0.0289 0.0344
 Churning ratio 132,111 0.1612 0.1090
 % temp agency workers 130,832 0.0627 0.0801
 % contract workers 130,482 0.0175 0.0502
 % outsourcing/input 108,064 0.2484 0.3421
   LN wages  LN Firm Mean Labor LN value LN quasi- Total
  fte alternative fixed person share added per rent per factor
   wages effect fixed  FTE FTE produc-
     effect    tivity
         (TFP)
 LN wages fte -            
 LN alternative wages 0.527 -       
 Firm fixed effect 0.700 0.352 -      
 Mean person fixed effect  0.863 0.415 0.330 -     
 Labor share -0.023 -0.004 -0.015 -0.022 -    
 LN value added per FTE 0.535 0.265 0.392 0.462 -0.490 -   
 LN quasi-rent per FTE 0.417 0.160 0.363 0.340 -0.503 0.863 -  
 Total factor productivity 0.079 0.016 0.034 0.101 -0.701 0.631 0.619 -
 (TFP)
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Figure 3.A.1   Value-added per FTE per quintile of value-added per FTE (quintiles determined at the 
worker level)


































































































2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016
Labor	share	(labor	costs/value-added)
Aggregate Average	firm	(weighted	for	workers)
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Figure 3.A.3   Share of labor costs, value-added and profits over the distribution of labor shares (2001
and 2016)
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Figure 3.A.4   Share of value-added and profits per quintile of labor shares, quintiles at 2-digit industry 

















































































































Share of value-a ded  quintile of labor shares
quintiles at 2-digit industry level, eighted for worker observations
Share of profits per quintile of labor shares
quintiles at 2-digit industry level, weighted for worker observations
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Figure 3.A.5   Productivity (VA per FTE) and fulltime wages per quintile of labor shares, level and change. 
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Figure 3.A.6   Development share of profits, share of value-added and average wages per quintile of 
labor shares. Quintiles at 2-digit industry level, weighted for worker observations
	

















































Quintile	1 Quintile	2 Quintile	3 Quintile	4 Quintile	5
	
Figure	 3.A.6:	 evelop ent	 share	 of	 profits,	 share	 of	 value-added	 and	 average	 ages	 per	
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Table 3.A.3   OLS regressions of LN mean firm wages on set of firm performance measures
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 0.237** - - -  0.132** - - -
 (0.0106)    (0.0037)   
 - 0.123** - - - 0.097** - -
 (0.0049)    (0.0028)  
 - - 0.116** - -  0.062** -
  (0.0058)    (0.0022) 
 - - - 0.065** - - - 0.025**
   (0.0036)    (0.0015)
 - - - - 0.249** 0.285** - 0.234**
    (0.0460) (0.0429)  (0.0550)
 0.013 0.026** 0.017* 0.023* 0.022** 0.023** 0.023** 0.027**
 (0.0057) (0.0049) (0.0065) (0.0074) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0017)
 - - - - -0.001 0.005 - 0.006**
     (0.006) (0.006)  (0.0069)
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
 No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
 No No No No No No No No 
 0.309 0.267 0.209 0.181 0.715 0.712 0.704 0.683
 132,111 132,111 122,163 114,952 132,082 132,082 122,143 114,928
LN value-added  
per FTE
LN turnover per FTE
LN quasi-rent per FTE
LN profit per FTE
LN alternative wage
LN FTE employees









Estimations at the firm-level, weighted for worker observations. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the firm-level and reported in the parentheses (* p<0.01, ** p<0.001)
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Value-ad ed	p r	FTE	quintiles	at	3-digit	industr .	Regres i 	includes	firm	size,	
depreci tion,	alternative	wage,	region	dummies	and	3-digit	industry	dum ies	as	
control	variab






















Quasi-r nts	per	FTE	quintiles	at	3-digit	industr .	Regressi 	includes	firm	size,	
region	dummies	a d	3-digit	industry	dummi s	as	control	variables


















































Estimated	regression	co fficients	of rofit bility	quintil s	 	mean	firm	wages.	
Quasi-rents	per	FTE	quintil s	 	3-digi 	industry.	Regression	includes	firm	size,	
region	dummies	and	3-digit	industry	dummies	as	 les
1st	quintile 2nd	quintile 4th	quintile 5th	quintile
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Table 3.A.4   OLS regressions of components of firm wages on labor productivity (value-added per FTE)
 LN mean  Firm fixed Mean person Mean SD person
 firm wages effect fixed effect covariates fixed effects
 0.0280** 0.0017 0.0253** 0.0010 0.0066
 (0.0066) (0.00259) (0.00651) (0.00174) (0.00404)
 0.240** 0.041 0.225** -0.026 0.0025
 (0.0427) (0.0323) (0.0412) (0.0294) (0.0176)
 -0.022** -0.0053 -0.0087 -0.0083 -0.0057
 (0.0066) (0.0048) (0.0103) (0.0038) (0.0065)
 -0.0003 0.0004 0.00003 -0.00076* 0.00114*
 (0.00058) (0.00047) (0.00066) (0.00028) (0.00037)
        
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 No No No No No
 No No No No No
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 0.949 0.617 0.851 0.914 0.807
 132,104 132,104 132,104 132,104 132,104
Dependent variable:
LN value-added per FTE
LN alternative wage
LN FTE employees








Estimations at the firm-level, weighted for worker observations. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the firm-level and reported in the parentheses (* p<0.01, ** p<0.001)
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Table 3.A.5   IV regressions of components of firm wages on labor productivity (value-added per FTE). 
Value-added per FTE instrumented by lagged TFP.
 LN mean  Firm fixed Mean person Mean SD person
 firm wages effect fixed effect covariates fixed effects
 0.0496** 0.0127** 0.0388** -0.0019 0.0140**
 (0.0062) (0.0023) (0.0047) (0.0013) (0.0022)
 0.273** 0.0481 0.236** -0.0115 0.0336
 (0.0583) (0.0231) (0.0495) (0.0206) (0.0179)
 0.0292** 0.0059** 0.0133** 0.0099** 0.0093**
 (0.0023) (0.0007) (0.0019) (0.00049) (0.00052)
 0.0123** 0.0052** 0.0053** 0.0019** 0.0039**
 (0.0016) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.00035) (0.00045)
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 No No No No No 
 0.583 0.338 0.545 0.759 0.445
 123,794 123,794 123,794 123,794 123,794
Dependent variable:
LN value-added per FTE
LN alternative wage
LN FTE employees







Estimations at the firm-level, weighted for worker observations. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the firm-level and reported in the parentheses (* p<0.01, ** p<0.001)
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Table 3.A.6   OLS regressions of components of firm wages on firm rents (quasi-rent per FTE). 
Estimations on firm-level, weighted for worker observations.
Table 3.A.7   Fields (2002) decomposition of firm wage variance into firm performance shares. Firm 
performance measured as quasi-rents per FTE.
 LN mean  Firm fixed Mean person Mean SD person
 firm wages effect fixed effect covariates fixed effects
 0.010** 0.0122** -0.0042 0.0020 0.0017
 (0.0027) (0.0015) (0.0029) (0.0008) (0.0010)
 -0.0225 -0.0028 -0.011 -0.0086 -0.0060
 (0.0074) (0.0050) (0.0118) (0.0042) (0.0071)
         
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 No No No No No
 No No No No No
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
 0.949 0.623 0.850 0.915 0.811
 122,163 122,163 122,163 122,163 122,163
Dependent variable:









Estimations at the firm-level, weighted for worker observations. Robust standard errors are clustered at 












































































Estimations at the firm-level, weighted for worker observations. Decompositions are based on OLS 
regressions as shown in equation 3.4 including 3-digit industry and region fixed effects. Firm size and 
firm age are used as control variables. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm-level (* p<0.01, 
** p<0.001)
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1st	quintile 2nd	quintile 4th	quintile 5th	quintile
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Figure 3.A.9   OLS of mean person fixed effect on value-added and quasi-rents per FTE quintiles






















































1st	quintile 2nd	quintile 4th	quintile 5th	quintile






















































1st	quintile 2nd	quintile 4th	quintile 5th	quintile
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Table 3.A.8   OLS regressions of LN mean firm wages on set of firm structure/employee policy measures. 
Estimations on firm-level, weighted for worker observations.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
 0.156** 0.168** 0.167** 0.169** 0.169** 0.169** 0.155**
 (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0050) (0.0048)
 -0.914**      -0.848**
 (0.0503)      (0.0342)
  -0.0628*     -0.0997**
  (0.0215)     (0.0264)
   -0.228**    -0.161**
   (0.0097)    -0.0095
    -0.199**   -0.0488*
    (0.0172)   (0.0149)
     0.206**  0.160**
     (0.0276)  (0.0308)
      0.0230* 0.0153*
      (0.0082) (0.0046)
 0.260** 0.266** 0.248** 0.240** 0.239** 0.256** 0.287**
 (0.0487) (0.0577) (0.0595) (0.0583) (0.0576) (0.0546) (0.0501)
 0.0239** 0.0193** 0.0233** 0.0258** 0.0254** 0.0271** 0.0228**
 (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0019)
 -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0019 -0.0015 -0.0018 -0.0011
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007)
            
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 No No No No No No No 
 0.675 0.633 0.624 0.620 0.622 0.646 0.706
 132,104 132,104 132,104 130,825 130,475 108,060 107,187
LN value-added per FTE
% mini-job workers
% temp agency workers














Estimations at the firm-level, weighted for worker observations. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the firm-level and reported in the parentheses (* p<0.01, ** p<0.001)
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Table 3.A.9   OLS regressions of components of firm wages on set of firm structure/employee policy 
measures, establishment fixed effects. Estimations on firm-level, weighted for worker observations.
    LN mean  Firm fixed Mean person Mean SD person
 firm wages effect fixed effect covariates fixed effects
 0.0317** 0.0029 0.0273** 0.0014 0.0075
 (0.0079) (0.0031) (0.0079) (0.0022) (0.0050)
 -0.213* -0.0952* -0.0702* -0.0477 0.0907
 (0.0719) (0.0348) (0.0248) (0.0285) (0.0735)
 -0.0063 -0.0416 0.0287 0.0066 -0.0134
 (0.0351) (0.0268) (0.0371) (0.0107) (0.0161)
 -0.0149 -0.0278** 0.0314** -0.0184** -0.0008
 -0.0062 (0.0071) (0.0082) (0.0033) (0.0033)
 0.0224 -0.0270 0.121** -0.0718** 0.0010
 (0.0173) (0.0145) (0.0204) (0.0089) (0.0106)
 -0.0008 -0.0188 0.0110 0.00702 -0.0150
 (0.0311) (0.0226) (0.0483) (0.0173) (0.0224)
 0.0009 0.0044 -0.0054 0.0019 -0.0056
 (0.0083) (0.0067) (0.0070) (0.0029) (0.0035)
 0.210** 0.0431 0.202** -0.0347 0.00250
 (0.0469) (0.0365) (0.0433) (0.0331) (0.0199)
 -0.0248** -0.0087 -0.0027 -0.0134** -0.0016
 (0.0074) (0.0041) (0.0065) (0.0023) (0.0034)
 -0.0004 0.0004 0.00003 -0.0008 0.0011
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0004)
        
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 No No No No No
 No No No No No
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 0.955 0.619 0.861 0.923 0.810
 107,187 107,187 107,187 107,187 107,187
Dependent variable:
LN value-added per FTE
% mini-job workers
% temp agency workers














Estimations at the firm-level, weighted for worker observations. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the firm-level and reported in the parentheses (* p<0.01, ** p<0.001)
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Appendix chapter 4















































Brokers and securities brokers, investment advisers
Insurance intermediaries
Asset management
Foreign exchange brokers and other lending
Other financial intermediation
Central banks
Investment institutions in financial assets
Investment institutions in fixed assets
Investment institutions with limited membership
Industry-wide pension funds
Company pension funds and savings funds
Occupational pension funds
Other pension funds
Administration offices for shares and bonds
Market makers
Risk analysts and damage assessors
Insurance grants
Actuarial and pension consultancy firms; management and 
administration of pension assets
Guarantee funds
Other services in connection with insurance and pension funds
Financial holdings
Investment companies
Mortgage banks and construction funds
People’s credit bank and commercial financing companies
Management of financial markets
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Table 4.A.2   Characteristics of employees in the upper half of income distribution in 2016 for bonus cap 
and non-bonus cap industries
  Bonus cap industries Non-bonus cap industries
 Number of employees (fte) 82,671 11,995
 Number of companies 682 403
 Part time workers 15.3% 13.9%
 Average income per FTE € 93,557 € 115,371
 Share of foreign employees 2.27% 3.43%
 Share of high skilled employees 79.94% 81.68%
 Outflow to other industries 3.41% 4.57%
 Inflow from other industries 1.97% 5.27%
 Outflow to related industries 0.98% 1.3%
 Inflow from related industries 0.87% 1.36%
 Migration from the Netherlands 0.42% 0.57%
 Migration to the Netherlands 0.35% 0.58%
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Figure 4.A.1   Labor mobility financial sector (‘broad’ classification of bonus cap and non-bonus cap 
industries)
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Figure 4.A.2   Labor mobility between financial industries and total of “related” industries
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Figure 4.A.3   Labor mobility between bonus cap industries and (specific) related industries
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Figure 4.A.4   Development average real income (upper half) employees financial sectors 2010-2016
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Figure 4.A.5   Development of real full-time wages of financial sector employees per income group (2010 
= 0)
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Table 4.A.3   Placebo test for ‘parallel trends’ assumption: inflow into financial sector. Based on 
Difference-in-Difference model to estimate the marginal change in probability of inflow into bonus cap 
industries from another industry in the Netherlands. Year of introduction differs for each model (641,140 
observations).
Table 4.A.4   Placebo test for ‘parallel trends’ assumption: broader classification of bonus and non-bonus 
cap industries (outflow). Based on Difference-in-Difference model to estimate the marginal change 
in probability of outflow from bonus cap industries to another industry in the Netherlands. Year of 






 (percentage points) 
 (% change)
(1) 
 Probability of 


























Estimations of individual level logit regressions based on equation 4.1. Only employees in the upper 
half of the income distribution in their respective industry are included. Coefficients present marginal 
probabilities in percentage points, percentage change reported in the parentheses. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the 5-digit industry level. Regressions include 5-digit industry and year fixed 
effects as well as the age group, gender, size of the job, years at the employer, foreigner dummy, annual 
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Estimations of individual level logit regressions based on equation 4.1.  Only employees in the upper 
half of the income distribution in their respective industry are included. Coefficients present marginal 
probabilities in percentage points, percentage change reported in the parentheses. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the 5-digit industry level. Regressions include 5-digit industry and year fixed 
effects as well as the age group, gender, size of the job, years at the employer, foreigner dummy, annual 
fulltime wage, size of the firm and growth of the industry as control variables. (* p<0.01, ** p<0.001)
(5)
Probability of 
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Table 4.A.5   Placebo test for ‘parallel trends’ assumption: broader classification of bonus and non-
bonus cap industries (inflow). Based on Difference-in-Difference model to estimate the marginal change 
in probability of inflow into bonus cap industries from another industry in the Netherlands. Year of 
introduction differs for each model (758,018 observations).
Table 4.A.6   Placebo test for ‘parallel trends’ assumption: inward international migration. Based on 
Difference-in-Difference model to estimate change in probability of migration to the Netherlands. Year of 
introduction differs for each model (641,140 observations).
Estimations of individual level logit regressions based on equation 4.1.  Only employees in the upper 
half of the income distribution in their respective industry are included. Coefficients present marginal 
probabilities in percentage points, percentage change reported in the parentheses. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the 5-digit industry level. Regressions include 5-digit industry and year fixed 
effects as well as the age group, gender, size of the job, years at the employer, foreigner dummy, annual 
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Estimations of individual level logit regressions based on equation 4.1. Coefficients present marginal 
probabilities in percentage points, percentage change reported in the parentheses. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the 5-digit industry level. Regressions include 5-digit industry and year fixed 
effects as well as the age group, gender, size of the job, years at the employer, nationality, annual 
fulltime wage, size of the firm and growth of the industry as control variables. (* p<0.01, ** p<0.001)
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Table 4.A.7   Placebo test for ‘parallel trends’ assumption: outward international migration. Based on 
Difference-in-Difference model to estimate change in probability of migration from the Netherlands. Year 
of introduction differs for each model (629,262 observations).
Table 4.A.8   Placebo test for ‘parallel trends’ assumption: real wage development. Based on Difference-
in-Difference model to estimate the difference in income development between bonus-cap and non-




































Estimations of individual level logit regressions based on equation 4.1. Coefficients present marginal 
probabilities in percentage points, percentage change reported in the parentheses. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the 5-digit industry level. Regressions include 5-digit industry and year fixed 
effects as well as the age group, gender, size of the job, years at the employer, nationality, annual 
fulltime wage, size of the firm and growth of the industry as control variables. (* p<0.01, ** p<0.001)
Estimations of individual level linear regressions based on equation 4.3. Only employees in the upper 
half of the income distribution in their respective industry are included. Coefficients present difference in 
development of earnings between bonus-cap and non-bonus cap employees. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the 5-digit industry level. Regressions include 5-digit industry and year fixed effects as well 
as the age group, gender, size of the job, years at the employer, foreigner dummy, size of the firm and 
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Table 4.A.9   Placebo test for ‘parallel trends’ assumption: real wage development per year. Based on 
Difference-in-Difference model to estimate the difference in income development between bonus-cap 
and non-bonus cap industries, estimations per combinations of two consecutive years.
Table 4.A.10   Difference-in-Difference estimation: inflow into financial sector. Estimation of the marginal 
change in probability of inflow into bonus cap industries from another industry in the Netherlands 
(641,140 observations).
Estimations of individual level linear regressions based on equation 4.3. Only employees in the upper 
half of the income distribution in their respective industry are included. Coefficients present difference in 
development of earnings between bonus-cap and non-bonus cap employees. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the 5-digit industry level. Regressions include 5-digit industry and year fixed effects as well 
as the age group, gender, size of the job, years at the employer, foreigner dummy, size of the firm and 
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Estimations of individual level logit regressions based on equation 4.2. Coefficients present marginal 
probabilities in percentage points, percentage change reported in the parentheses. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the 5-digit industry level. Regressions include 5-digit industry and year fixed 
effects as well as the age group, gender, size of the job, years at the employer, foreigner dummy, annual 
fulltime wage, size of the firm and growth of the industry as control variables. (* p<0.01, ** p<0.001)
(5)
Probability of inflow 
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Table 4.A.11   Difference-in-Difference estimation: individual characteristics. Estimation of the change in 
probability of outflow from bonus cap industries to another industry in the Netherlands. Only employees 
below 40 years with at least a bachelor’s degree or equivalent.
Table 4.A.12   Difference-in-Difference estimation: international migration. Estimation of the change in 
probability of migration to or from the Netherlands.
  (1) (2) 
 Dependent variable Probability of outflow to  Probability of inflow from
  another industry another industry 
 Change since 2016  1.19%-point** -0.44%-point
 (percentage points)  
 (% change) (27.69%) (-5.69%)
 Observations 123,489 115,827
Estimations of individual level logit regressions based on equation 4.1 & 4.2.  Only employees in the 
upper half of the income distribution in their respective industry are included. Coefficients present 
marginal probabilities in percentage points, percentage change reported in the parentheses. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the 5-digit industry level. Regressions include 5-digit industry and year 
fixed effects as well as the age group, gender, size of the job, years at the employer, nationality, annual 
fulltime wage, size of the firm and growth of the industry as control variables. (* p<0.01, ** p<0.001)
  (1) (2) 
 Dependent variable Probability of emigration to  Probability of immigration from
  another industry another industry 
 Change since 2016  0.01%-point -0.03%-point
 (percentage points)  
 (% change) (2.21%) (-8.36%)
 Observations 629,262 641,140
Estimations of individual level logit regressions based on equation 4.1 & 4.2. Only employees in the 
upper half of the income distribution in their respective industry are included. Coefficients present 
marginal probabilities in percentage points, percentage change reported in the parentheses. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the 5-digit industry level. Regressions include 5-digit industry and year 
fixed effects as well as the age group, gender, size of the job, years at the employer, nationality, annual 
fulltime wage, size of the firm and growth of the industry as control variables. (* p<0.01, ** p<0.001)
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Inleiding
De afgelopen decennia is de loonongelijkheid in veel ontwikkelde economieën toegenomen. 
Traditioneel worden technologische ontwikkeling en globalisering als de belangrijkste 
verklaringen van deze toename van de loonongelijkheid gezien. Deze verklaringen hebben 
gemeen dat ze mogelijk “skill-biased” zijn, oftewel de relatieve vraag naar werknemers 
met verschillende vaardigheden kunnen beïnvloeden. Technologische ontwikkeling en 
globalisatie vergroten de relatieve vraag naar hooggekwalificeerde werknemers, en 
daarmee de loonongelijkheid tussen lager- en hoger-gekwalificeerde werknemers. Dit 
proces kan worden versterkt door veranderingen in arbeidsmarkinstituties en de relatie 
tussen werkgevers en werknemers. Liberalisering van de arbeidsmarkt, verlaging van het 
relatieve minimumloon en verzwakkingen van de vakbonden kunnen de bescherming 
van de lagere-inkomensgroepen op de arbeidsmarkt ondermijnen en daarmee minder 
tegenwicht bieden aan de eerdergenoemde ongelijkheid verhogende marktkrachten.  
De op vraag- en aanbod gebaseerde modellen blijken goed in staat loonverschillen tussen 
groepen werknemers met verschillende opleidingsniveaus of andere waarneembare 
factoren te verklaren. Verschillende empirische studies laten echter zien dat een groot 
en toenemend gedeelte van de totale loonongelijkheid zich voordoet tussen werknemers 
met vergelijkbare waarneembare vaardigheden. Deze loonverschillen tussen ogenschijnlijk 
vergelijkbare werknemers blijken verband houden met de bedrijfstak of zelfs met het 
bedrijf waarin werknemers werkzaam zijn. Deze bevindingen leidden tot een relatief 
nieuwe verklaring voor de waargenomen toename van de loonongelijkheid: toenemende 
verschillen in het gemiddelde loon dat door bedrijven wordt betaald. 
Als bedrijven verschillen in het loon dat ze betalen aan hun werknemers, en als deze 
loonverschillen tussen bedrijven in de loop van de tijd toenemen, wat is daar dan de 
reden voor? Er zijn twee mogelijke verklaringen: (i) bedrijven verschillen steeds meer in 
hun loonpremie, d.w.z. ze betalen verschillende lonen aan vergelijkbare werknemers, of 
(ii) bedrijven verschillen steeds meer in de gemiddelde kwaliteit van hun werknemers. 
Als de eerste verklaring klopt zijn bedrijven zelf een bron van loonongelijkheid vanwege 
verschillen in winstgevendheid of de mate waarin deze wordt gedeeld met werknemers. 
Als de tweede verklaring klopt zijn bedrijven niet de bron van loonongelijkheid maar het 
platform dat loonongelijkheid mogelijk maakt. Dit laatste moet worden genuanceerd als de 
twee verklaringen aan elkaar zijn gerelateerd. Dit zou betekenen dat hooggekwalificeerde 
werknemers niet alleen steeds meer samenwerken in dezelfde bedrijven, maar dat dit ook 
bedrijven zijn met hogere loonpremies.
Bedrijven worden echter niet alleen meer heterogeen in het gemiddelde loon dat ze 
betalen, ook op het gebied van arbeidsproductiviteit en winstgevendheid lijken de 
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verschillen tussen bedrijven wereldwijd toe te nemen. De productiviteitsgroei van de 
wereldwijde koplopers onder de bedrijven vertraagt niet of nauwelijks, maar de rest van de 
bedrijven lijkt achterop te raken. Deze divergentie in arbeidsproductiviteit kan ook worden 
gerelateerd aan de afname va de arbeidsinkomensquote (AIQ). Een groeiend aandeel van 
de economische activiteit verschuift naar een kleiner aantal hoogproductieve bedrijven 
met een relatief laag arbeidsaandeel, waardoor het totale arbeidsaandeel in de economie 
afneemt. 
Eén van de vele niet volledig beantwoorde vragen is of en hoe de toenemende divergentie 
van lonen en productiviteit tussen bedrijven met elkaar verweven is. Dit hangt waarschijnlijk 
nauw samen met de eerdergenoemde mogelijke verklaringen voor loonverschillen tussen 
bedrijven. Het kan zijn dat verschillen in productiviteit op bedrijfsniveau leiden tot 
verschillen in lonen die deze bedrijven betalen aan hun werknemers. Het kan echter ook 
zijn dat sommige bedrijven beter opgeleide werknemers kunnen aantrekken, waarvoor ze 
hogere lonen moeten en kunnen betalen en waardoor ze productiever zijn. Met andere 
woorden: ontvangen werknemers hogere lonen omdat hun werkgevers productiever zijn, 
of zijn bedrijven productiever omdat ze productievere en dus beter betaalde werknemers 
hebben? 
De financiële sector speelt een belangrijke rol in de recente groei van de loonongelijkheid. 
Maar het beloningsniveau in de financiële sector veroorzaakt niet het meeste debat, vooral 
de structuur van de beloning en de prikkels die hieruit voortvloeien worden als mogelijk 
problematisch gezien. De beloning in de financiële sector bestaat voor een relatief groot 
gedeelte uit bonussen, en deze bonussen zouden een stimulans kunnen zijn om excessieve 
risico›s te nemen ten koste van de aandeelhouders en de samenleving. Sinds de financiële 
crisis hebben overheden verschillende maatregelen genomen om deze mogelijke problemen 
aan te pakken. In Nederland is op 7 februari 2015 de Wet beloningsbeleid financiële 
ondernemingen (Wbfo) in werking getreden. Een belangrijk onderdeel van deze wet is 
een bonusplafond van 20% van de vaste beloning voor alle medewerkers van financiële 
ondernemingen waarop de wet van toepassing is. Naast de vraag of een bonusplafond 
daadwerkelijk succesvol is in het verminderen van het nemen van buitensporige risico›s, 
bestaat de mogelijkheid dat een dergelijk beleid onbedoelde gevolgen zou kunnen hebben 
voor het concurrentievermogen van financiële ondernemingen op de arbeidsmarkt voor 
financiële professionals. 
Drie empirische studies
In dit proefschrift heb ik onderzoek gedaan naar drie vraagstukken die op verschillende 
manieren verband houden met de gevolgen van (arbeids)marktimperfecties. Alle drie 
de studies zijn empirisch van aard en maken gebruik van Nederlandse microdata van 
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het CBS op zowel bedrijfs- als individueel niveau. De eerste studie onderzoekt de rol van 
bedrijven in de ontwikkeling van loonongelijkheid in Nederland. Om dit te onderzoeken is 
een longitudinale database met alle werknemers en werkgevers actief in de industrie- en 
dienstensectoren in Nederland voor de periode 1999-2015 gecreëerd. Hoewel Nederland 
wordt gekenmerkt door een relatief lage inkomensongelijkheid van het besteedbare 
inkomen, neemt de bruto loonongelijkheid toe. Het grootste deel (ongeveer 70%) van deze 
toename van de loonongelijkheid blijkt plaats te vinden tussen bedrijven. Loonverschillen 
tussen bedrijven kunnen bestaan uit drie verschillende componenten. Ik gebruik “two-
way fixed effects” regressie modellen om het relatieve aandeel van deze drie mogelijke 
componenten te schatten. De bevindingen laten zien dat alle drie de componenten 
bijdragen aan de waargenomen divergentie van lonen die door bedrijven worden 
betaald. De belangrijkste factor is segregatie van werknemers; bedrijven verschillen in 
toenemende mate in de kwaliteit van hun werknemers, dit verklaart ongeveer 32% van 
de toenemende individuele loonongelijkheid. De segregatie van werknemers tussen 
bedrijven hangt daarnaast samen met de loonpremie die bedrijven betalen. Dit betekent 
dat hooggekwalificeerde werknemers, met een bijbehorend hoger loon, in toenemende 
mate werken voor bedrijven met een relatief hoge loonpremie en laaggekwalificeerde 
werknemers, met een bijbehorend lager loon, voor bedrijven met relatief een lage 
loonpremie. Deze ontwikkeling is verantwoordelijk voor ongeveer 20% van de stijging van 
de totale loonongelijkheid. Verschillen in loonpremies, oftewel verschillen in de lonen die 
door bedrijven aan werknemers met vergelijkbare kwalificaties worden betaald, verklaren 
ongeveer 10% van de toenemende ongelijkheid. De resterende 30% van de toegenomen 
loonongelijkheid vindt plaats binnen bedrijven.
De tweede studie onderzoekt of, en hoe, de ontwikkeling van productiviteitsverschillen 
tussen bedrijven verband houdt met de toenemende loonverschillen tussen bedrijven. 
De relatie tussen productiviteit en loon wordt beïnvloed door heterogeniteit in het 
werknemersbestand van bedrijven. Om hiervoor te controleren passen we eerst de 
gebruikte methode uit de eerste studie toe om voor ieder bedrijf de bedrijfs- en de 
werknemerscomponenten van het gemiddelde betaalde loon te schatten. In de tweede 
stap worden deze componenten samengevoegd met productiestatistieken. Deze procedure 
maakt het mogelijk om niet enkel de relatie tussen bedrijfsprestaties en de betaalde 
lonen te onderzoeken, maar ook een onderscheid te maken tussen de rol van bedrijven 
en de rol van de kwaliteit van werknemers in deze relatie. Uit de analyses blijkt dat de 
loonverschillen tussen bedrijven met verschillende prestatieniveaus in de loop van de tijd 
toenemen, evenals de sterkte van de relatie tussen prestaties en lonen. Deze ontwikkeling 
is voornamelijk toe te schrijven aan de toegenomen heterogeniteit in de samenstelling van 
het personeelsbestand tussen meer- en minder productieve bedrijven, en voor een kleiner 
gedeelte aan toenemende divergentie in de loonpremies die bedrijven met verschillende 
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productiviteitsniveaus betalen. Deze bevindingen tonen aan dat de toegenomen segregatie 
van werknemers tussen bedrijven met verschillende prestatieniveaus het belangrijkste 
kanaal is waardoor productiviteitsverschillen zich vertalen in loonverschillen tussen 
bedrijven.
In de derde studie gebruik ik de introductie van het Nederlandse bonusplafond in de 
financiële sector als een natuurlijk experiment om het effect van dit bonusplafond op de 
arbeidsmobiliteit van werknemers in de financiële sector te bestuderen. Ik gebruik een 
Difference-in-Difference methode waarbij werknemers uit de financiële sector die werkzaam 
zijn in deelsectoren waarvoor het bonusplafond niet geldt als controlegroep dienen. Deze 
methode houdt in wezen in dat de arbeidsmobiliteit van ‘bonusplafond’ werknemers, sinds 
de introductie van het bonusplafond, wordt vergeleken met de arbeidsmobiliteit van ‘niet-
bonusplafond’ werknemers en de periode vóór de implementatie van het bonusplafond. De 
belangrijkste bevinding is een verhoogde kans van 0,65 procentpunt dat een medewerker 
een bonusplafond sector verlaat voor een andere sector in Nederland. Dit effect is groter 
voor werknemers in een lagere leeftijdsgroep, in een hogere-inkomensgroep en voor 
werknemers met minimaal een bachelorsdiploma of gelijkwaardig. Ik vind geen bewijs 
voor een effect op de internationale migratie van werknemers. De kans dat een werknemer 
een bonusplafondsector verlaat en naar het buitenland emigreert en de kans dat een 
werknemer in een bonusplafondsector recent naar Nederland is geïmmigreerd is niet 
significant veranderd sinds de invoering van het bonusplafond. 
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Zo, dat was het dan! Het proefschrift is af, wat betekent dat het voor mij lange, en onverwacht 
onbekende en kronkelende pad van een promovendus (bijna) is afgerond. Terugkijkend 
op het gehele proces zit ik vol met gemengde gevoelens. Aan de ene kant blijdschap, 
dankbaarheid en trots dat ik dit traject heb mogen doorlopen en succesvol heb weten af te 
ronden. Aan de andere kant twijfels of ik het pad überhaupt wel zou zijn ingeslagen als ik 
echt wist waar ik aan begon. Maar hoe ik er ook naar kijk, ik heb zo ontzettend veel geleerd, 
niet in de laatste plaats over mezelf.
Vanaf het eerste college dat ik mocht geven aan een zaal vol studenten, nu bijna 10 jaar 
geleden, wist ik eindelijk wat ik later wilde worden; een docent! Ik ben Esther-Mirjam Sent 
en Eelke de Jong voor altijd dankbaar dat ze mij deze kans durfden te geven, ik begreep pas 
later hoeveel geluk ik daarmee heb gehad. Naïef als ik was duurde het nog enkele jaren 
voordat het tot me doordrong dat ik, om docent op een universiteit te kunnen zijn, een 
promotieonderzoek zou moeten uitvoeren. 
In 2013 bood Utz Weitzel mij die kans, ik mocht naast mijn baan als docent in deeltijd 
onderzoek gaan doen. Ik weet dat ik waarschijnlijk niet de ideale promovendus ben 
geweest, maar met jouw scherpe inzichten, oog voor zowel de grote lijnen als de details, 
humor en ontspannen en geduldige manier van begeleiden is het toch gelukt. Utz, bedankt 
voor het vertrouwen dat je in mij hebt gehad en voor alles wat je voor mij hebt gedaan en 
mij hebt geleerd. Bovendien zijn er waarschijnlijk niet veel mensen die kunnen zeggen dat 
ze een Namibische/ Duitse/ Nederlandse/ Siciliaanse hoogleraar/ olijfboer als promotor 
hebben gehad!
De eerste twee jaar was ik erg zoekende. Zoeken naar het juiste onderwerp voor mijn 
onderzoek, zoeken naar de juiste balans in het voortdurende conflict tussen korte-termijn 
onderwijs deadlines en lange-termijn onderzoek deadlines, zoeken naar intrinsieke 
motivatie, en letterlijk zoeken in de rijke en complexe databases van het CBS. In 2015 
werd, op voordracht van Utz, Anna Salomons mijn copromotor. Ik denk dat vanaf dat 
moment het proces in een noodzakelijke stroomversnelling kwam. Anna en Utz wisten 
samen mijn enthousiasme voor onderzoek en nieuwsgierigheid naar de bevindingen weer 
aan te wakkeren. Anna bedankt voor de enorm behulpzame feedback en gesprekken. 
Ik denk, zonder iemand tekort te willen doen, dat ik nooit eerder iemand heb ontmoet 
die zo indrukwekkend snel tot de kern van een probleem of analyse kan doordringen. Je 
enthousiasme heeft mij veel motivatie gegeven om door te gaan en de klus te klaren.
De gehele promotieperiode was natuurlijk nooit zo leuk geweest zonder alle fijne collega’s 
bij de sectie Economie, een plek waar ik me altijd thuis heb gevoeld. Dit is niet het moment 
om alle collega’s met wie ik zo prettig heb samengewerkt of gewoon een gezellige tijd heb 
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gehad individueel te benoemen, mede uit angst iemand te vergeten. Toch zijn er een aantal 
collega’s die ik in het bijzonder wil bedanken.
Joris, je weet dat ik je in colleges vaak gebruik als voorbeeld om te illustreren hoe moeilijk 
het is voor een ‘baas’ om luie en opportunistische medewerkers zoals ik een beetje aan 
het werk te krijgen. En hoewel ik weet dat je hier helemaal niet in gelooft, denk ik toch dat 
je daar onbewust wel in slaagt. Ik ben enorm onder de indruk van hoe jij je vele rollen als 
collega, docent, onderzoeker, manager en sectievoorzitter binnen de opleiding tegelijkertijd 
vervult. Ik hoop nog vaak de onderlinge strijd met je aan te kunnen gaan en ik denk dat jij 
een zeer belangrijke pijler bent in het succes van ons programma.
Chris, grote baas, wij blijven elkaar maar tegenkomen. Je speelt graag de rol van nonchalante 
oude mopperkont, en dat doe je goed, maar stiekem heb je veel hart voor de zaak en heb ik 
veel aan jou te danken. Ik weet dat je dit ‘boekje’ niet gaat lezen, maar ik ben toch blij dat 
je dit keer niet kan zeggen: “het zal mijn tijd wel duren”. Ik hoop je ook na je welverdiende 
pensioen nog vaak op jouw manier enthousiast doch ingehouden te zien knikken op de 
muziek bij Down the Rabbit Hole. 
Ik wil ook enkele collega’s bedanken met wie ik meer intensief heb samengewerkt of contact 
heb gehad. Hierbij denk ik bijvoorbeeld aan Sandor, Charan en Timo als coördinatoren 
van de EvdM cursussen, aan Annelies, Hatice, Robbert en Roel als voormalige of huidige 
kamergenoten, aan Charissa als drijvende kracht achter ‘team IEB’, en aan Marzieh als CBS-
microdata kamergenote. Ook denk ik hierbij aan de vele ‘junior lecturers’ die vaak vers uit 
de opleiding ineens voor de klas staan als werkgroep docent. Jullie krijgen hier niet altijd 
het krediet voor dat jullie verdienen, maar zonder jullie zou het niet lukken het programma 
aan te bieden zoals we dat doen. 
Het is misschien een beetje ongebruikelijk, maar ik wil ook graag alle studenten die de 
afgelopen 10 jaar mijn cursussen hebben gevolgd bedanken. Ik hoop natuurlijk dat ik jullie 
gedurende die tijd iets interessants en misschien zelfs nuttigs heb weten bij te brengen, 
maar jullie hebben mij sowieso veel geleerd en gebracht. Docent zijn is de mooiste baan 
die er is en het mogen geven van colleges aan jullie geeft mij altijd weer de energie en 
inspiratie om door te gaan. 
Graag wil ik de leden van de manuscript commissie, Joris Knoben, Esther-Mirjam Sent 
en Joost de Laat bedanken, die in de Corona zomer van 2020 bereid zijn geweest mijn 
proefschrift te lezen en te beoordelen. Daarnaast dank ik André van Hoorn en Elena 
Fumagalli voor het plaatsnemen in de promotiecommissie.
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Op een bepaalde manier zou ik het vreemd vinden om mijn vrienden te bedanken, ik heb 
namelijk zo’n vermoeden dat de meeste van hen niet weten waar mijn onderzoek over 
gaat, of zelfs dat ik promovendus was. Daar ben ik erg blij mee, want het is fijn om ook een 
leven geheel buiten de universiteit te hebben. Misschien is excuses zelfs wel meer op zijn 
plaats, excuses voor mijn vervelende feitjes en betweterige monologen terwijl zij gewoon 
van een biertje, voetbalwedstrijd of concert willen genieten. Jullie moeten weten dat ik me 
al erg probeer in te houden! Ik ben blij dat twee van hen, Rutger en Martijn (alias Sjek & 
Sjek), tevens mijn oud-huisgenoten en oud-studiegenoten, bereid zijn de rol van paranimf 
op zich te nemen. 
Dan denk ik dat dit het juiste moment is om mijn moeder te citeren toen ik haar vertelde 
dat het gebruikelijk is je ouders te bedanken: “Waarom zou je dat doen, daar hebben wij 
toch niets aan bijgedragen?”. Gelukkig volgde al snel: “of ja, misschien dat we altijd hebben 
geprobeerd je te stimuleren om een goede opleiding te volgen?”. Ik wil eigenlijk nog wel 
iets verder gaan. Het geheugen kan selectief zijn, maar als ik denk aan vroeger, aan samen 
met Bob en Paul opgroeien in ons fijne huis, heb ik enkel warme herinneringen. Papa 
en mama bedankt voor de meest plezierige, vrije en zorgeloze jeugd die ik me maar kan 
voorstellen! Ik hoop dat jullie nog lang mogen genieten van jullie fijne plek in Bergharen en 
winters in Spanje. Wel zou het fijn zijn als jullie overwintering vanaf nu wat saaier verloopt.
Als laatste wil ik mijn lieve, iets te hardwerkende, onvoorstelbaar nuchtere, maar bovenal 
geweldige vriendin Indre bedanken. Ik ben ongelooflijk trots op jou en hoe jij je geheel 
eigen weg weet te vinden in de Nederlandse samenleving. Ik leer zo veel van jou en kan me 
geen toekomst voorstellen zonder jou!
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